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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
 There are people spending time in jails who do not belong there (Alexson & 
Wahl, 1992). Seriously mentally ill offenders make up a disproportionate number of 
inmates and tend to be in and out of jail frequently often for minor offenses (Wexler & 
Winick, 1996). Within the criminal justice systems in North America, judges, lawyers, 
prosecutors, physicians, and social service providers have collaborated to address this 
problem with the establishment of mental health courts, like 102 Court in Toronto, 
Canada (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). In recognition that this particular 
population is in trouble with the law not because of criminality but due to illness, poverty, 
homelessness, and isolation, professionals endeavor to “divert” accused away from jail 
and towards the services they need (Slinger & Roesch, 2010; Wexler & Winick, 1996). 
This is a deliberate attempt to reduce rates of recidivism by replacing traditional punitive 
interventions with therapeutic interventions, based on the legal concept of therapeutic 
jurisprudence (Wexler, 2011).  
 This dissertation examined the processes and impact of the Toronto mental 
health court between January and August 2012. I conducted an ethnography of the 
court during which I observed the court daily and spoke with judges, lawyers, social 
workers, accused, and their families. I also conducted a phenomenological analysis 
during which I interviewed nine accused who had successfully completed the diversion 
process through 102 Court. 102 Court is a stunning example of Foucauldian bio-power 
at work and I use this and related concepts and subjectivity to critique the court in the 
chapters that follow.  




 Several critical issues emerge from this work. First, for some people who 
pass through 102 Court its approach, processes and personnel are “life-saving” and the 
Court is interpreted as a threshold to a new life. Second, despite this potential benefit 
there are also potential dangers and evidence of egregious racial disparity among the 
accused. A disproportionately large percentage of black accused appeared in 102 Court 
compared with the Toronto population and there is evidence that the processes of the 
court may negatively impact non-English speakers and immigrants more than their 
Anglophone and Canadian-born peers. Third, the processes of the court may, in some 
cases, lead to involuntary pharmaceutical treatment after very brief assessment by 
psychiatrists and may even result in indefinite detention in a psychiatric facility. Finally, 
benevolent and medicalized discourses mask coercion and de-politicize the processes 
and outcomes of the court.  
   
Research Aims 
 Morrow and Jamer (2008) called for new ways to listen to and interpret the 
experiences of people with mental illness in the current climate of mental health care 
reform in Canada. Consistent with their call, the aim of this research is to critique the 
application of therapeutic jurisprudence in 102 Court through the theoretical lens of 
subjectivity. I will explore the subjectivity of the accused through a phenomenological 
analysis and assess the processes of subjectivation that shape their experiences 
through an ethnographic analysis. I will argue in Chapter Four that a particular sort of 
bio-power (Foucault, 1976) is at play in this system, a pharmaceutical-subjectivity that 




controls both individuals and the community of mentally ill accused. The main research 
question is:  What are the experiences of adults with mental illness in contact with the 
law in Toronto? The secondary research question is: How are subject positions 
produced by the processes of the TMHC?  
In this chapter I provide necessary background information to contextualize the 
research presented in Chapters Two and Three and the discussion in Chapter Four. To 
understand the role of specialty courts like 102 Court I first provide a sketch of the 
evolution of mental health courts from the U.S. drug court model. Then, I describe the 
demographic characteristics of Toronto’s population, sketch the history of the Canadian 
deinstitutionalization of seriously mentally ill people, discuss 102 Court’s position at the 
medico-legal nexus and the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry in Canada, 
discuss the theoretical framework I will employ, and elaborate my methods. 
 
Specialized Courts: What problems are being solved? 
 During the 1990s one of the most important policy concerns to emerge in the 
U.S. was mental health and substance abuse problems among people entering the 
criminal justice system (McGaha, Boothroyd, Poythress, Petrila, & Ort,  2002). The 
nature of these problems results in a “revolving door” effect (Wexler & Winick, 1996), 
where people cycle in and out of the judicial system regardless of time in jail or charges 
conferred. Research in the 1990s illustrates the enormity of the problem. For instance, 
Ditton (1999) estimated that the prevalence of mental health and substance abuse 
issues may be over 60% among offenders. Accused with mental illnesses were jailed 2-




3 times longer than their counterparts who do not suffer mental illnesses (Alexson & 
Wahl, 1992). Jails pay for medications for prisoners, must administer those medications, 
house them safely, and provide supervision in some cases for accused who pose a 
danger to themselves or others (McGaha et al., 2002). Court dockets (especially in 
urban centers) can become clogged with these revolving door populations that may take 
longer to process than other cases (McGaha et al., 2002). Specialized courts developed 
to address these issues, increase efficiency in the courtroom and jails, and help people 
in need. Looking upstream, specialized courts evolved to understand and address the 
underlying issues of addiction and mental health, to help people deal effectively with 
these problems, and to break the cycle of re-appearance before the courts (Wexler & 
Winick, 1996).   
 The first of these specialized courts, a drug court, was spearheaded by then state 
attorney Janet Reno in Miami, Florida in 1989 (Nolan, 2001). Accused before the court 
were diverted away from the regular judicial system into court-centered treatment 
(Schneider et al., 2007; Slinger & Roesch, 2010; Wexler & Winick, 1996). There was the 
recognition that non-violent drug possession charges and traditional punishment 
paradigms did not change addictive behaviors. Ongoing addiction results in seeking out 
drugs when released, leads to more possession charges, and results in a revolving door 
phenomenon (Wexler & Winick,1996, p. 4). The Miami drug-treatment court emphasized 
the rehabilitation of accused and cast the judge as a member of the treatment team 
(Wexler & Winick, 1996). Those who agreed to plead guilty and have their cases 
diverted from the regular stream to the drug-treatment court also agreed to: remain 




drug-free, periodic drug-testing, treatment recommendations, and they were asked to 
report to drug-treatment court for supervision (Wexler & Winick, 1996).  Assessment of 
the Miami court began in 1990 and was published in the early 1990s (Goldkamp, 1994). 
The promising recidivism rates reported sparked tremendous interest in the U.S. and 
other countries, resulting in over 2,600 drug courts in the U.S. today (National 
Association of Drug Court Professionals, n.d.).  
  There has been extensive evaluation of these drug courts in the United States 
since Goldkamp’s study that support and expand his encouraging results. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office [U.S. GAO] conducted a large-scale study and 
concluded that drug courts significantly reduce recidivism rates (U.S. GAO, 2005), 
conclusions supported by several meta-analyses (Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006; 
Lowenkamp, Holsinger, & Latessa, 2005; Wilson, Mitchell, & MacKenzie, 2006). A multi-
site National Institute of Justice study of adult drug courts in the U.S. (dubbed MADCE) 
compared drug court participants from 23 sites with matched comparison offenders from 
six sites where drug courts were not available and has resulting in several analyses. 
Published results based on this data concur that drug courts result in significantly 
reduced recidivism rates among drug court participants compared with matched non-
drug court accused (Rempel, Green, & Kralstein, 2012a; Rempel et al., 2012b). Rempel 
et al. (2012b) reported that in addition to significantly reduced recidivism rates, 
participants in drug court programs were significantly less likely to report drug and 
alcohol use than the comparison group, results that were confirmed by oral swab. Green 
and Rempel (2012) investigated psychosocial outcomes related to drug courts based on 




the MADCE data and found modest non-significant improvement across a broad range 
of variables that fell into four categories: socioeconomic well-being, family relationships, 
homelessness, and living situation (Green & Rempel, 2012). Funding for drug courts 
may come from local, state and federal sources. For instance, Florida State drug courts 
include fines collected from people charged with prostitution and related acts at the local 
level, state funding through agencies including the Department of Corrections, and 
federal funding sources including Drug Court Discretionary grants, Operation Weed and 
Seed funds (designated for high crime areas), Drug Free Communities funding, Housing 
and Urban Development programs, etc.1 (Florida State Courts, n.d.).  
 Accused with addictions are only one of several revolving door populations that 
bog down legal systems with cycles of release and re-entry2. Other populations include 
sex trade workers, domestic violence cases, people charged with driving while 
intoxicated, and seriously mentally ill offenders. With the positive recidivism results of 
the Miami and subsequent drug courts, specialty courts have emerged to address the 
needs of these and other populations3.  The focus of this research is a mental health 
court, so only this derivation of the drug court model will be discussed in detail.  
 Mental health courts (MHCs) are a more recent evolution of drug courts, with the 
first one appearing in Broward County, (Fort Lauderdale) Florida in 1997 (McGaha et 
al., 2002; Wexler & Winick, 1996). The Broward MHC emerged from the work of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some of these grants require partnerships with health care service organizations.  
2 And increases costs associated with the courts  
3 Some specialty courts sub-specialize to women (women’s mental health court) or 
students (campus drug court) or Veterans (Veterans drug court) or Aboriginal persons 
(Aboriginal drug courts). There are dozens of combinations and permutations of 
perceived problem and target population.   




Mental Health Taskforce that began in 1994 to address community service needs of 
mentally ill accused and system efficiency problems related to length of stay in jail and 
the number of jail admissions (McGaha et al., 2002). The Taskforce was comprised of 
representatives from the public defender’s office, the state attorney’s office, the Broward 
County jail, and community service providers, and chaired by a judge (McGaha et al., 
2002). The court required the voluntary participation of accused, included people with a 
diagnosis believed to have contributed to their legal involvement, and expedited release 
from jail and referral to community services (McGaha et al., 2002). Only people accused 
of non-violent misdemeanor crimes were eligible for the Broward MHC (McGaha et al., 
2002). It was hoped that evaluation of this court would, as it had for Miami’s drug-
treatment court, be important evidence for policy makers. However, McGaha et al., 
(2002) reported numerous complications with their evaluation of the Broward MHC 
including reluctance to randomly assign participants (deemed unethical), the favorable 
inter-agency working relationship (likely a result of the Taskforce that preceded the 
MHC), the dynamic environment of the MHC which made evaluation of court processes 
challenging, the relative complexity of MHC processes compared with other 
misdemeanor courts, and the informality of the court that is consistent with the 
philosophical approach of therapeutic jurisprudence (McGaha et al., 2002).  
 There are some critical differences between MHCs and drug courts that make 
MHCs more difficult to evaluate and replicate. Drug courts may leverage free and readily 
available (at least in urban areas) community-based resources like Alcoholics 
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous in support of their clients, whereas no equivalent 




support exists for people suffering serious mental health problems. There are 
tremendous differences in resources available, a large array of services needed 
indefinitely for many mentally ill accused, and these many interact with one another and 
the legal system in multiple ways. The processes of the drug court are relatively orderly 
and easy to follow and evaluate compared with mental health court proceedings 
(McGaha et al., 2002). As a result, there are logic models for evaluations of drug courts 
whereas the variability frustrates similar models for MHCs. Drug courts offer an accused 
a platform for telling his/her story to the judge and courtroom attendees whereas MHC 
accused do not have a chance to tell their stories in some iterations of the court. It is 
relatively straightforward to illustrate a recovery rate with respect to drug courts due to 
the routinized and structured treatment plans, whereas most serious mental health 
problems may be chronic in nature and highly individualized (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2008). MHCs are therefore very local in flavor frustrating quantitative 
researchers who seek replicable results and making qualitative approaches particularly 
appealing. Most accused enter a drug court facing drug-related charges whereas MHC 
accused appear before the court for a variety of reasons (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
2008). Drug court participants are easily monitored through urinalysis and other 
surveillance tests but MHC treatments are not easily monitored (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2008).  
 Mental health courts vary considerably from place to place. For instance, the 
legal definition of “mental health court” may differ by state. Washington state legislature 
defines MHC as:  




“a court that has special calendars or dockets designed to 
achieve a reduction in recidivism and symptoms of mental 
illness among nonviolent, felony and nonfelony offenders 
with mental illnesses and recidivism among nonviolent felony 
and nonfelony offenders who have developmental disabilities 
as defined in RCW 71A.10.020 or who have suffered a 
traumatic brain injury by increasing their likelihood for 
successful rehabilitation through early, continuous, and 
intense judicially supervised treatment including drug 
treatment for persons with co-occurring disorders; 
mandatory periodic reviews, including drug testing if 
indicated; and the use of appropriate sanctions and other 
rehabilitation services” (RCW 2.28. 180).   
 
By comparison, Illinois state law says "Mental health court" means  
“a structured judicial intervention process for mental health 
treatment of eligible defendants that brings together mental 
health professionals, local social programs, and intensive 
judicial monitoring” (730 ILCS 168/10).  
 
Washington State law includes persons with developmental disabilities and traumatic 
brain injury as well as people suffering from mental health problems. This is sometimes 
the practice in MHCs even without the legislation4. The Illinois legislature emphasizes 
the more therapeutic possibilities of MHCs including reference to interventions and the 
cooperative medical-legal-social service alliances that drive these courts. These 
definitional differences hint at some of the possible implementation variability that is 
widely acknowledged (McGaha et al., 2002; Schneider et al., 2007).   
 The impact of specialty courts is most frequently examined through recidivism 
rates, which are considered for many the gold standard of outcome measures 
associated with the criminal justice system.  There have been several studies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As was the Case with the Toronto MHC 




recidivism rates among participants of specialty courts in the United States with 
inconsistent results. For instance, Bonta, Law, & Hanson (1998) reviewed 54 studies of 
recidivism rates among mentally ill offenders that occurred between 1959 and 1995. 
They concluded that the major factors associated with recidivism rates were criminal 
history variables (such as juvenile delinquency) and were the same for offenders with 
and without mental illness. Clinical variables like specific diagnoses and hospital 
admission and stay data had the lowest effect sizes (Bonta et al., 1998).  
 A review of the literature pertaining to recidivism rates among mental health court 
participants revealed seven studies (Christy, Poythress, Boothroyd, Petrila, & Mehra, 
2005; Cosden et al., 2010; Dirks-Linhorst & Linhorst, 2010; Herinckx, Swart, Ama, 
Dolezal, & King, 2005; McNeil & Binder, 2007; Moore & Hiday, 2006; Trupin & Richards, 
2003). These studies were based on U.S. mental health courts and varied widely by 
sample size, analysis method, and court characteristics. Of these, five studies 
concluded that mental health courts reported lower recidivism rates among diversion 
participants (Dirks-Linhorst & Linhorst, 2010; Herinckz, Swart, Ama, Dolezal, & King, 
2005; McNeil & Binder, 2007; Moore & Hiday, 2006; Trupin & Richards, 2003). 
However, two found no statistically significant differences between diversion participants 
and comparison groups (Christy et al., 2005; Cosden et al., 2010). Only Moore and 
Hiday’s (2006) study included factors associated with recidivism and they reported that 
only prior arrest severity impacted the odds of re-arrest. However, no clinical factors 
were used in the design. The authors’ explanation for higher recidivism rates among 
those who fail to complete diversion compared with those who graduate in their study 




uses a pharmaceutical metaphor; they refer to partial completion as a “partial dose” and 
graduation as a “full dose” and their research design predicts that success measured by 
reduced recidivism rates is premised on a full dose of service linkages, medication 
compliance, and surveillance (Moore & Hiday, 2006, p. 662).   
 Examination of the most recent study published study is instructive. Dirks-
Linhorst and Linhorst (2010) examined factors associated with recidivism rates among 
accused who passed through a suburban St. Louis, Missouri mental health court over 
six years. Their study includes all accused eligible for diversion, divided into three study 
groups: those who graduated from diversion; those who were negatively terminated 
from diversion; and those who opted for the regular system of law despite being eligible 
for diversion (Dirks-Linhorst & Linhorst, 2010). The results indicated that 14.5% of 
diversion graduates, 38% of those who were negatively terminated from diversion, and 
25.8% of those who opted for the regular stream were re-arrested within one year of 
discharge from the diversion program (Dirks-Linhorst & Linhorst, 2010). The authors 
stress the lower recidivism rates among graduates in comparison to the other study 
groups. However, it is very interesting (and absent from) the authors’ discussion that 
recidivism rates were greater among those who did not graduate but attempted 
diversion compared with those who opted to have their cases resolved through the 
regular stream. The process of being negatively terminated from diversion often 
includes a series of violations of the conditions of release. However, the authors only 
included re-arrests post discharge, so this would not account for the difference. This 
study stresses the need for qualitative studies and cannot claim to have evidence that 




mental health courts “work” because there is a notable lack of connection between the 
essential elements of mental health courts and recidivism rates.  
 Certainly, U.S.– based researchers interested in specialty courts are exploring 
more questions. Notably, data has emerged regarding differential rates of graduation 
from diversion programs based on race, leading many qualitative researchers to ask 
why and design studies that attempt to identify barriers with an eye to systems 
improvement. Some studies explore the implications of mental health courts for social 
work practice and research (Castellano, 2011; Linhorst et al., 2010; Tyuse & Linhorst, 
2005). Qualitative research includes consumer-perspective assessments of specialty 
court diversion programs (Cosden et al., 2010). There are hundreds of articles related to 
specialty courts in the U.S., and many of those include data regarding who passes 
through the court in terms of gender, race/ethnicity, and age (see Gendreau, Little, & 
Goggin, 1996) as well as other variables like recidivism rates or economic analyses. 
The consistent attention to demographic variables especially opens up possibilities for 
consideration based on disparity that can be analyzed along single dimensions like age 
or race or at the intersection of multiple overlapping categories of difference. Given the 
known over-diagnosis of schizophrenia among racialized groups in Canada (aboriginal 
peoples) and the United States (African-Americans, especially men), and the mass 
incarceration of those groups, it is reasonable to ask questions about disparity in the 
mental health court milieu.  
 
 




Specialty Courts in Canada & Toronto Mental Health Court (“102 Court”) 
  The Toronto mental health court (TMHC) and the Toronto drug treatment 
court (TDTC) both began in 1998 and were the first specialty courts in the country 
(Toronto Drug Treatment Court, n.d.). They are both located in the Old City Hall 
Courthouse5 in downtown Toronto and serve overlapping populations. One process 
inefficiency that accompanies large numbers of seriously mentally ill people in the 
criminal justice system is the extra time it takes to conduct fitness assessments in 
regular court6 and the Toronto MHC was created in response to a need to streamline 
these evaluations (Schneider et al., 2007). These courts were modeled on the American 
courts discussed above and were modified for the Canadian legal and medical context. 
The TMHC has, in turn, become a model for similar mental health courts across the 
country including Saint John, New Brunswick, Ottawa, Kitchener, Sudbury, etc. (Slinger 
& Roesch, 2010). Similarly, drug courts have multiplied in number and specificity across 
Canada. Although this growth is modest compared with the United States, its impact is 
spreading and remains largely unevaluated (Slinger & Roesch, 2010). Perhaps due to 
an absence of formal evaluations, there are no published recidivism rates related to 102 
Court in Toronto. 
 The Toronto MHC has never received federal or provincial money for its 
operation. It is a mutually beneficial collaboration between the Ontario Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry of the Attorney General which each have resources sunk into serving 
the seriously mentally ill accused whether they be in hospital, outpatient care, or jail. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 There is also an aboriginal court in operation at Old City Hall.  
6 Fitness and its assessment will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  




the structure and process that shapes the court, not extra funding. Justice Schneider, 
Toronto mental health court’s founding justice and long-standing administrative judge 
recalls the luck of having an unused courtroom in the court house when he and other 
justices were collaborating with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health to develop 
the TMHC. Some drug courts located in smaller Canadian cities operate in a similar 
manner. London, Ontario is one of a handful of drug courts in Ontario and like many 
others “scrape by” with resources drawn from about a dozen community service 
agencies (Richmond, 2013). The Toronto drug court, by contrast receives $750,000 
from the federal government annually and has three full-time case managers/therapists 
(Richmond, 2013). Toronto is one of several federally funded drug courts that operate in 
Canada’s most populated cities (also Edmonton, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Ottawa, and 
Regina). Canadian drug court effectiveness has been questioned recently with a review 
of the federally funded drug courts by the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, which 
found the quasi-coercive techniques used in drug courts are in conflict with therapeutic 
goals, not in service of them (Werb et al., 2007). The authors also question the 
methodology used to assess effectiveness in drug courts given the low retention rates in 
many drug courts and lack of longitudinal data (Werb et al., 2007).  
 As noted in the discussion of U.S. mental health courts, roughly three quarters of 
people who suffer from serious mental health issues also have substance abuse issues. 
The prevalence rates of substance dependence or abuse and a mental illness is 
estimated at 74% among U.S. state prisoners (James & Glaze, 2006). Similarly, among 
British Columbian prisoners diagnosed with a substance use disorder, more than 75% 




were also diagnosed with a non-drug related mental disorder (Canadian Mental Health 
Association, 2012).  
 Unfortunately the literature relating to Canadian mental health courts is not deep. 
Dewa, Trojanowski, Cheng, and Sirotich (2012) identified factors that program 
developers deemed important for inter-ministerial collaboration in Ontario. Few 
evaluations of specialized courts have been conducted in Canada; none have been 
conducted on mental health courts (Slinger & Roesch, 2010). Canadian courts have 
produced what Slinger and Roesch call “informal reporting of basic statistics”. 
Thoughtful planning, including collecting appropriately detailed data are often lacking 
from these informal reports (Slinger & Roesch, 2010, p. 262). Hannah-Moffat and 
Maurutto (2012) conducted a study of over 2000 cases in four Canadian jurisdictions. 
They conducted 50 interviews with professionals associated with three kinds of 
specialty courts (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2012). Their work, however, excludes 
mental health courts and the perspective of disordered accused.  
 Ironically, discussion about Canadian courts relies heavily on U.S. comparisons 
(Slinger & Roesch, 2010) while admitting that comparisons are frustrated by the local 
nature of each court. In a parallel irony, calls abound for more “scientific” or “objective” 
studies of the courts (Schneider et al., 2007; Slinger & Roesch, 2010) which is a proxy 
for more detailed statistics about outcome measures such as recidivism rates and 
number of community service connections. Local qualitative studies are dismissed as 
“insufficient”, “nonrandom”, and “anecdotal” (Schneider et al., 2007; Schneider, personal 
communication, 2012). While many researchers and workers call for more research, 




there is little interest in the voice of the consumer/client. I posit that this is due in part to 
an attraction to the perceived objectiveness of statistics and partly due to discrimination 
of people who suffer with serious mental health issues.  
 Appearance before the TMHC is voluntary, diverts accused from the regular 
justice stream into treatment and services, requires periodic reporting before the court to 
monitor treatment compliance, and to have been screened by professionals from the 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health for an appropriate serious mental health 
problem. To be clear, addiction to drugs or alcohol may be present among the accused 
of 102 Court, but the primary reason they would be considered “properly” before7 the 
court would be a “serious mental health”8 problem. It is clear that the Toronto MHC 
considers serious mental health problems ones that involve psychosis in the majority of 
cases. The Diagnostic and Statistics Manual IV includes several psychotic disorders: 
brief psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, 
schizophreniform, and shared psychotic disorder (Heffner Media Group, 2011). This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In both the U.S. and Canada there are many specialty courts with overlapping 
populations. For instance, an accused may be aboriginal, suffer from schizophrenia, and 
be addicted to drugs and alcohol. How do you determine whether their case is best 
suited to aboriginal court, drug court, mental health court, or the regular stream? Based 
on my research this may be influenced by their lawyer and his/her connections with 
Crown attorneys in the courts, previous experience of the accused with one court 
(positive or negative), how the accused most strongly self-identifies, the preference of 
the accused, the perceived biggest problem affecting the behavior of the accused, etc.  
8 Various disorders may be considered “serious mental illnesses”. The U.S. National 
Alliance on Mental Illness [NAMI] include: “major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and borderline personality disorder” (NAMI, 2013). However, in 
practice, any subset of these disorders may be used. There is widespread inconsistency 
in defining serious mental illness (see Ruggeri, Leese, Thornicroft, Bisoffi, Tansella, 
2000). Alternative terms include severe mental illness, chronic mental illness, persistent 
mental illness, mental health issues, mental health problems, mental disorders 
combined in various ways, further muddying precision. 	  




disorder cluster is characterized by psychosis or delusions and hallucinations (Heffner 
Media Group, 2011). The DSM defines delusions as, “false beliefs that significantly 
hinder a person's ability to function.  For example, believing that people are trying to hurt 
you when there is no evidence of this, or believing that you are somebody else, such as 
Jesus Christ or Cleopatra.”  Hallucinations are “false perceptions.  They can be visual 
(seeing things that aren't there), auditory (hearing), olfactory (smelling), tactile (feeling 
sensations on your skin that aren't really there, such as the feeling of bugs crawling on 
you), or taste” (Heffner Media Group, 2011). I saw two cases that did not include a 
psychotic element and those diagnoses were PTSD and severe adjustment disorder. All 
others were either schizophrenia (and its variants) or bipolar disorder9 (and its variants 
including schizo-affective disorder). The focus on psychosis is consistent with 
conversations with court workers, forensic psychiatrists, and the non-peer reviewed 
study by Dinshaw (2010) that appears on the TMHC website.  
 With different mandates and judicial and health care systems, each court 
represents a local and unique response to the criminalization of the mentally “disordered 
accused”. The incomparability of the courts and the lack of a generic model frustrate 
researchers and policy-makers who wish to extrapolate processes from one court to 
another. Unlike the U.S. state definitions of mental health courts as even a rough 
guideline that might increase uniformity within a state, Canada has no definition for 
mental health courts in the Canadian Criminal Code, only a section (672) that directs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In court, forensic psychiatrists would diagnose accused as having “bipolar disorder 
with psychotic features”. This correlates with the DSM category of schizoaffective 
disorder that sometimes includes major depressive, manic or mixed episodes.  




any court in its interaction with mentally ill accused. The local nature of these courts is a 
perceived barrier to the evidentiary basis for expanding such programs. Despite the lack 
of generalized evidence, specialty courts are growing in number and the special 
populations targeted are expanding.    
 Toronto’s MHC is a public space where the business of the court and the people 
who inhabit its spaces are available for public scrutiny and inquiry. But this is a place 
hidden in plain sight. People are accused of minor, un-sensational crimes10 like stealing 
a bottle of water or rum, repeatedly trying to scrape stickers off convenience store 
windows, kicking someone who refused to spare change at a bus stop. Many accused 
cycle in and out of the court and become familiar regulars to the court staff. Many may 
also be found panhandling on neighboring streets and filling downtown shelter beds. 
The accused of 102 Court suffer greatly from mental illnesses and most are chronically 
impacted, sometimes suffering so long, friends and family have long disappeared from 
their lives. They are the ever-present, largely ignored denizens of Toronto, the 
homeless, the street people, the shelter dwellers, and the grate-sleepers. And for the 
most part their passage through the criminal justice system is not very different from the 
rest of their lives. It is mostly unnoticed, a paternalistic brush with gatekeepers who offer 
them access to a clean record, more permanent housing and other services for the price 
of compliance and surveillance. The goal of TMHC is to keep them out of prison, out of 
the court system, and to connect them with psychiatric treatment and social services 
they are lacking. So if recidivism rates are lowered among this population, the TMHC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There are no misdemeanors in Canadian law. 




has, for many observers, succeeded. I seek to offer a critique of this system of care and 
surveillance that will place the experiences and thoughts of the “disordered accused” in 
a position of authority. Social justice advocates are present in the TMHC, working within 
the system as lawyers, judges, and social workers. Their attempts to make systemic 
changes through individual cases, their passion about clients, and their frustrations with 
the healthcare system will add another dimension to this argument.    
 
“Disordered Accused” 
 How to name the people who pass through 102 Court is a fundamental problem 
and I have no adequate response beyond unpacking terms, being reflexive, and settling 
on the least worst option. People accused of crimes are ubiquitously called “accused” 
and the literature about Canadian mental health courts regularly calls them “disordered 
accused” (see for instance Schneider et al., 2007). While I am inclined to follow social 
work convention (and the practice of some defense attorneys) and refer to them as 
“clients”, I think that few professionals conceptualize them as clients beyond the strict 
code of professional ethics that guides the relationships. I initially considered them 
“consumers” of the court along with their non-professional support system if they have 
one (friends and family). Several months into my field research I realized that they were 
less consumers of the system than being consumed by the system. The term 
“consumer” implies a degree (at least a modest degree) of power and agency that the 
disorder accused lack. Also, accused presented themselves to me as being in trouble 
with the law. I was asked occasionally by accused before the court if I was also an 




“accused”. So upon reflection, the term accused is the most appropriate term for the 
people I did research among.  
 
What is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 
 Mental health courts are deliberate applications of the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence (TJ)11, which admit that people who are accused of crimes and proceed 
through the criminal justice system are affected by that interaction. Therapeutic 
jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that focuses on the therapeutic and 
anti-therapeutic consequences of legal rules, processes, and the behavior of legal 
actors (Wexler, 2011). Wexler and Winick (1996) asked, “How can mental health law 
maximize therapeutic outcomes?” The administrative judge of Canada’s first mental 
health court asserts, “the law should be administered in a way that incorporates 
therapeutic goals” (Schneider et al, 2007, p. 3). These TJ courts operate under the 
philosophy that traditional punitive responses to criminal behavior among the “mentally 
disordered accused” are inappropriate and ineffective (Schneider et al., 2007). There is 
an understanding that the reason for criminal behavior is not individual choice and 
mental health court is a response to address the root cause (Schneider, 2010; Slinger & 
Roesch, 2010). Further, it is an admission that poor social conditions may be part of that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Whether therapeutic jurisprudence is properly a theory is uncertain. Schneider et al. 
(2007) uses the term “theory” without debate, but Wexler (2011) prefers the more 
modest “field of inquiry”. As Wexler is the Director of the International Network on 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and one of the seminal authors on the subject, I will follow 
his lead.  




root cause (Winick, 2003) hence provision of social services is a key feature of these 
courts.  
 Wexler and Winick (1996) first described the possibilities of therapeutic 
jurisprudence to address both the emotional needs of accused and psychological impact 
of the criminal justice proceedings upon accused and they argued for connections 
between systemic structure, rehabilitative potential, and psychological concerns. The 
impact of their distinct legal concept on reshaping the delivery of legal services and 
fashioning a generation of lawyers has been enormous. Stolle calls the impact “nothing 
short of phenomenal” (Stolle, 2000, p. xv). It is clear that specialty courts are part of a 
trend of judicial innovation that attempts to humanize and improve outcomes for 
litigants, victims, defendants, and communities that face chronic problems (Berman & 
Feinblatt, 2001). Winick and Wexler, in their introduction, tell us that the “law is a social 
force that may produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences” (Winick & Wexler, 
2003, p. 7). They assert that therapeutic jurisprudence “has insights regarding how 
courts might be structured so as to maximize their therapeutic potential” (Winick & 
Wexler, 2003, p. 7). TJ is a quasi-utilitarian approach to practicing law that attempts to 
integrate therapeutic goals into legal processes (Stolle, 2000).  
 Much is written about the symbiotic relationship between specialty courts and the 
concept of therapeutic jurisprudence but formal definitions of TJ are elusive as are 
guidelines about which features of specialty courts represent these therapeutic ideals. 
The courtroom has been described as a “laboratory” to uncover the elements of court 
processes that contribute to therapeutic goals (Winick & Wexler, 2003), although the 




evaluations discussed above emphasize the difficulty in doing so. For practitioners of 
TJ, the judge and sometimes the court itself are sometimes conceptualized as 
therapeutic agents (Winick & Wexler, 2003).  
 There are several core concepts that help define therapeutic jurisprudence and 
are operationalized in mental health courts12 (Marini, 2003; Schneider et al., 2007; 
Winick & Wexler, 2003).  1. Medication is framed as “needed” by the accused. 
Pharmaceutical intervention is the cornerstone of release plans and, for most accused 
becomes a key component of diversion.  Compliance with pharmaceutical regimes is 
necessary for graduation from diversion and avoiding penalties that include 
accumulating more criminal charges. Adherence to pharmaceutical treatment is a 
tangible outcome measure like recidivism rates (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001).  2. The 
medical system has failed to adequately care for seriously mentally ill people, forcing 
the legal system, unprepared for an influx of seriously mentally ill people, to action. This 
is how most analysts frame the historical circumstances that have resulted in so many 
mentally ill people in contact with the law and will be discussed below. In order to 
positively impact outcomes, collaboration with mental health professionals and 
organizations is necessary (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001). 3. The negative psychological 
outcomes of jail compared with hospitalization are emphasized, where imprisonment is 
believed to cause or exacerbate decompensation13. 4. The adversarial process in court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I have adapted a generalized list of principles. For stance, Winick and Wexler discuss 
general outcomes and I specify pharmaceutical compliance.  
13 Decompensation is a common term in mental health care. Episodes of 
decompensation are defined by the U.S. Social Security Administration as 
“exacerbations or temporary increases in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of 




is suspended in favor of a collaborative approach to put mentally ill accused at greater 
ease (Berman & Feinblatt, 2001). 5. There is an attempt to look upstream, where the 
criminal behaviors of the accused are envisioned as caused by mental illness making 
treatment of the illness the most appropriate deterrent to future criminal behavior.   
 A key process within the applied framework of therapeutic jurisprudence is the 
diversion of people away from the system of mainstream law towards a more 
appropriate system. For instance, many mentally ill people are charged with minor, non-
violent offenses deemed more appropriately addressed through adequate housing, job 
training, treatment programs, and other social service interventions. However, not all 
accused who pass through such a court are eligible for diversion, so my ethnography of 
the court described in Chapter Two will include many accused who are not being 
diverted.  
 The definition of therapeutic jurisprudence remains vague, so it is to these core 
concepts that I will turn in Chapter Four to critique 102 Court based on the processes of 
subjectivation described in Chapter Two and the lived experiences of 102 Court 
accused as discussed in Chapter Three.   
 
Serving Toronto, Serving the World 
 Toronto has a population of approximately 2.5 million people (Statistics Canada, 
2006), and is nestled in an urban corridor (the “Golden Horseshoe”) that includes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adaptive functioning, as manifested by difficulties in performing activities of daily living, 
maintaining social relationships, or maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace” 
(Social Security Administration, 2013).  




approximately 8.76 million people (Statistics Canada, 2006), one-quarter of the total 
Canadian population. Among Torontonians, 1.2 million people (or 48%) self-identify as 
immigrants and 1.1 million people (or 44%) self identify as belonging to a “racialized 
group”14. Of racialized Torontonians, south Asians are the largest contingent (25.7% of 
the racialized groups) followed by Chinese (24.3%), Black15 (17.9%), Filipino (8.8%), 
and Latin American (5.6%) (Statistics Canada, 2006).   
 
Deinstitutionalization and Criminalization of the Seriously Mentally Ill 
 Following the deinstitutionalization of mental health across North America in the 
1960s, many seriously mentally ill people fell out of systematic care. In some places 
there was a deliberate policy of shifting people from institutional to community-based 
care, but no such policy existed in Ontario. In Ontario there was a deliberate plan to 
reduce the long-stay population of mental hospitals regardless of what happened to 
people after discharge (Simmons, 1989). The money saved from dismantling institutions 
was in theory, intended to be diverted to building local, community-based care 
programs. Community care was, in its most optimistic incarnation, intended to integrate 
people with mental health issues into the community and provide more cost-effective 
care. However, most people with severe and persistent mental health issues have not 
been the consumers of community care services in Canada (Sealy & Whitehead, 2006). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is important to note that an immigrant may or may not also belong to a racialized 
group and those who identify as belonging to a racialized group may or may not be an 
immigrant.   
	  
15 “Black” is the terminology used by Statistics Canada although other designations are 
geographical.  




The actual outcomes of deinstitutionalization were catastrophic, forcing many mentally ill 
people onto the streets and out of care completely. One outcome was the increasing 
visibility of the homeless mentally ill on city streets in the 1970s and 1980s. This was 
exacerbated in Toronto due to the climate. In central and Eastern Canada, Toronto is 
one of a handful of mild urban centers. Thus, cities and towns in harsher parts of the 
province and country shift homeless people (via one-way bus tickets) to Toronto, giving 
them a chance to survive the winters, eliminating or reducing the visibly homeless in 
other cities, and inflating the numbers of homeless mentally ill in Toronto compared with 
other central Canadian cities. Estimates of Toronto’s homeless population vary widely 
due to inconsistencies in the definition of “homeless” and methodological issues 
associated with enumeration. However, most sources agree that deinstitutionalization 
resulted in many people with mental health problems living on the streets.  
 A second outcome of deinstitutionalization is the increasing criminalization of the 
mentally ill (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001; Schneider et al., 2007). The penal system has 
become a “surrogate” for the mental health institutions of the 1960s and 1970s, with 
increasing numbers of adults accused of criminal activities diagnosed with mental health 
issues and enormous populations of mentally ill people languishing in prisons (Canadian 
Mental Health Association [CMHA], 2012). One recent Canadian study found the rates 
of serious mental health problems among inmates to be three times that of the general 
population (Olly, Nicholls, Brink, 2009).  
 Sealy and Whitehead (2004) assessed deinstitutionalization in Canada over forty 
years, but limited the institutions considered to psychiatric hospitals beds in psychiatric 




units, and community health centres, ignoring jails as a potential variable. Due to this 
limitation (which they do not acknowledge as a limitation per se), they conclude that 
people with mental illnesses moved from psychiatric hospitals to psychiatric units, and 
their hospital use began to decline in the 1990s (Sealy & Whitehead, 2004). They report 
that community care was slow to be funded and imply that adequate expansion of 
community care resources may have met the needs of the mentally ill by the 1990s 
when hospital admissions to psychiatric units began to decline. Fewer admissions to 
psychiatric units may indicate longer stays or more cost-efficient admissions to non-
specialty unit beds. More grievously, they fail to recognize the concomitant rise in 
severe and persistent mentally ill people incarcerated at this time. Schneider et al. 
(2007) says that people suffering mental health problems have been entering the 
criminal justice system at an increasing rate, in excess of 10% per year for the 12 years 
preceding 2007. It is unclear whether this is due to increased rates of the diagnosis of 
mental health problems among accused, increased interactions with the law, increased 
interactions with the law resulting in charges, or some combination thereof16.  
 There is significant overlap in the problems associated with deinstitutionalization 
in both Canada and the United States despite the differences in health care 
approaches. Universal health care in Canada is a public system (Fierlbeck, 2011) not a 
national one like that of Britain’s National Health Service. The Canadian system is 
funded by public money and coverage varies by province (Fierlbeck, 2011).  Type of 
service varies as well. For instance, 99% of hospital-based interventions are covered for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The authors of such studies do not unpack the various possible reasons for the 
increase and assume it is increased criminality among the mentally ill.  




those eligible (i.e. citizens and permanent residents) (Health Canada, 2010).  
Physicians are not hospital employees, but rather independently bill the provincial 
government for the services they provide (in and out of hospital) on a “fee-for-service” 
basis.   
 Mental health care in Canada is not simply a subset of health care, but is a 
different system of care. Fierlbeck (2011) argued that some of the major health care 
policy developments in Canada have actually been detrimental to mental health care. 
She argued that the large-scale deterioration of mental asylums needing expensive 
renovations, discourse of community-based care coming out of the second World War, 
the American civil rights movement, and the increasing availability and use of 
pharmaceuticals all informed decisions in Canada to move towards deinstitutionalization 
(Fierlbeck, 2011).    
Two pieces of legislation, the Diagnostic Services Act of 1957 and the Medical 
Care Act of 1966, would have greater impact on mental health care policy than any 
mental healthcare initiative has (Fierlbeck, 2011). These acts defined what would be 
subject to federal-provincial cost-shared funding. Under this paradigm physician visits, 
whether hospital or community based, would be covered. However, other professionals 
including psychologists, social workers, occupational therapists, addiction counselors, 
and psychiatric workers were not covered outside the hospital setting, making the cost 
of psychiatric treatment incurred by the province half as expensive in hospital compared 
with the cost of care in the community (Fierlbeck, 2011). Thus, despite the goals of 
deinstitutionalization, Ontario and other provinces sought to provide as much mental 




health care as possible in hospital settings (Fierlbeck, 2011). Also, legislation ensured 
that prescription drugs were not covered by health insurance if procured outside the 
hospital. As mental health treatments became increasingly pharmacological, and as 
people suffering from serious mental health problems often had trouble securing 
employment to cover the cost of medications, access to pharmacological treatments 
actually diminished as more and more pharmaceuticals became available (Fierlbeck, 
2011). This trend has been reversed recently and will be elaborated below.   
 Public health insurance in Canada is traced to either 1947 or 1972 (Fierlbeck, 
2011). In 1947, Saskatchewan introduced publicly funded universal hospital insurance 
but a fully Canadian system was not achieved until 1972 (Fierlbeck, 2011). Technically, 
there are thirteen health care systems which all feature public health insurance 
(Fierlbeck, 2011). However, during the transition to public health insurance, many 
physicians were reluctant to support a government-run system effectively making them 
employees of the state. The current system was only achieved by ceding the regulation 
of physicians to physicians themselves and allowing them to retain considerable power 
over provincial health policy (Fierlbeck, 2011). This degree of influence over health 
policy has resulted in a highly medicalized model of care and has been cited as a barrier 
to integrative care within the country (Fierlbeck, 2011). Mulvale, Abelson, and Goering 
write, “physicians learned to protect the Ontario Health Insurance Plan [OHIP] funds by 
encroachment from other provider groups and to lobby against any reforms that might 
reduce existing privileges (2007, p. 376).  




 Mental health care in Canada has been called the “poor cousin” of universal 
health care despite the large number of Canadians impacted by mental illness. For 
instance, one in five Canadians will experience mental illness during their lifetime and 
3% (~ 1 million) of Canadians live with a severe and persistent mental illness (CMHA, 
2003). Mental illness is the second leading cause of hospital admission among people 
20-44 years of age (CMHA, 2003). Families of those with mental illness report being 
stretched to the limit and unable to cope (CMHA, 2003). Critics of Canada’s mental 
health care system point out that the country has no national action plan for mental 
health and lags far behind sister G-8 nations in this regard (CMHA, 2003).  
 The Mental Health Commission of Canada [MHCC] was created in 2005 (with all 
party support in the House of Commons) to help establish a national strategy for mental 
illness with the recognition that a coordinated approach across provinces and territories 
is desirable to reduce systemic fragmentation although service delivery occurs through 
non-federal mechanisms, much like health care (CMHA, 2012). The Commission was 
funded in 2007 and produced a framework for a national strategy in 2009 (Mental Health 
Commission of Canada [MHCC], 2011). The framework is the outcome of consultations 
across the country with hundreds of stakeholders. It is extensive and speaks to some of 
the issues of concern to this project. For instance, there is recognition that good mental 
health is more than absence of mental illness but is a complex synthesis of economic, 
social, psychological, and biological factors across a lifespan (MHCC, 2011). Concepts 
like “cultural safety” and “cultural competency” are referenced and acknowledged.  
Finally, it is acknowledged that cultural difference can sometimes be interpreted as 




illness and that crime is associated with mental illness (MHCC, 2011). The effort is 
commendable but, at this point, has not been translated into mental health care funding 
or policies.  The emphasis is on indigenous culture and healing practices with some 
acknowledgment of the repressive colonial policies that have contributed to greater 
burdens of mental health issues among First Nations peoples. Non-indigenous, non-
biomedical practices are acknowledged as important among Canada’s diverse 
population (MHCC, 2011). However, in a poly-cultural city like Toronto more is required 
than a bureaucratic acknowledgement.  
Pharmaceutical interventions play an important part in the treatment paradigms 
for mental health problems in Canada. Canada’s relationship with the global 
pharmaceutical industry is complex17. Disease control and pharmaceuticalization are 
increasingly global in nature, but regional and local variations persist (Biehl, Good, & 
Kleinman, 2007). In some ways Canadian trends in pharmaceutical sales and 
consumption, marketing, research and development are consistent with other wealthy 
countries but there are national and provincial policies and legislation that impact the 
political economy of big pharma in Canada.  
Since 1980, the global pharmaceutical industry has exponentially increased 
sales, reach, and influence. Global pharmaceutical sales were almost $500 billion in 
2003 and approximately half of that was attributed to the United States and Canada 
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  As is my personal relationship Between 1998 and 2002, I worked in neurological 
clinical trial research as a clinical manager and occasional research coordinator in 
Toronto. I have am ambivalent relationship with pharmaceutical industry and 
pharmacological treatments generally. I elected to leave the industry after receiving a 
job offer from a Contract Research Organization [CRO] (a professional trial 
management company) and instead, began graduate studies.  




(Petryna & Kleinman, 2006). Canada is among the top ten pharmaceutical markets in 
the world (Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry [ABPI], 2013 following IMS 
World Review 2012 Analyst). In 2007, new pharmaceuticals made up 17% of the 
Canadian pharmaceutical market share18 (ABPI, 2013, following IMS Health World 
Review Analyst, 2010). Drugs account for second highest share (15.9%) of health 
spending in Canada, behind hospitals and ahead of physicians (Canadian Institute for 
Health Information [CIHI], 2013). Spending on drugs continues to rise in Canada (CIHI, 
2013) but at a slower annual rate than previous years (3.3%) that is thought to be due to 
patent expirations and generic pricing policies (CIHI, 2013). In other words, while 
spending rates have slowed this is not necessarily indicative of reduced utilization. 
Pharmaceutical spending accounts for 17.2% of total health spending in Canada 
compared with 11.9% in the United States (Laugesen & Glied, 2011).  
 
Political Economy of Big Pharma 
The solutions operationalized in 102 Court to address serious mental health 
issues are nested in a political economy of big pharma in Canada and Ontario. The 
pharmaceutical industry is rife with secrecy and piecing together the politics and 
economics of the pharmaceutical industry is incomplete but necessary to appreciate the 
reliance of mental health professionals on “magic bullet” solutions.  
There are many aspects of big pharma that have been sharply critiqued. For 
example, claims by the pharmaceutical industry that high costs to consumers are to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 By comparison, in 2007 new pharmaceutical products made up 21% of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical market (IMS Health World Review Analyst, 2010).  




recoup research and development costs have a hollow ring when big pharma spends 
more than twice on marketing and administration than R&D (Angell, 2005). There has 
been a proliferation of lifestyle drugs that have come to market that address chronic 
diseases common to the west while ignoring tropical diseases in poor countries (Petryna 
& Kleinman, 2006). Dr. Allen Frances, Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force, asserts that 
psychiatry today is pathologizing normal feelings, behaviors, and habits19 (Frances, 
2013) and the pharmaceutical industry is benefitting from these expanding markets 
(Frances, 2013; Leonhauser, 2012). Worse, there are accusations that psychiatry has 
been bought out by big pharma (Moynihan & Cassels, 2005). It is unclear how much the 
industry knows of its influence on consumers and physicians (Petryna & Kleinman, 
2006). But its influence is enormous. The pharmaceutical mergers of the late 1990s 
created gigantic companies with huge revenue streams and equally influential research 
agendas (Law, 2006). Big pharma sets the research agenda, recruits the best and 
brightest young researchers, regularly lies to physicians and consumers (Frances, 
2013) but apologizes and continues to engage in misleading activities because it is 
profitable (Frances, 2013). There have accusations that pharmaceutical literature (both 
reports to regulatory agencies and sponsored scientific articles) overemphasize positive 
results, sometimes downplaying even suppressing negative ones (Healy, 2006). Some 
critics claim that the majority (as much as 75%) of scientific, peer-reviewed journal 
articles focused on randomized controlled clinical trial are ghost-written by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This aligns well with former Merck CEO, Henry Gadsden whose dream was to sell 
pharmaceuticals to healthy people (Moynihan & Cassels, 2005).  




pharmaceutical companies who append experts names to them to increase credibility 
(Healy, 2006).  
Direct-to-consumer advertising in the United States if often cited as particularly 
dubious practice and has been said to “recast well-being as a commodity and a distinct 
personal achievement” (Petryna & Kleinman, 2006, p. 3). Moreover, these 
advertisements have been described as marketing illnesses (Healy, 2006) and targeting 
consumers who do not need treatment (Frances, 2013). While these concerns are 
important, direct-to-consumer marketing is illegal in Canada20, shaping the approach to 
marketing for pharmaceutical companies and re-casting physicians, pharmacists and 
(most importantly) third-party payers like provincial governments as the consumers in 
the Canadian market. However, even advertisements in medical journals are regulated 
differently in Canada and the United States (Chepesiuk, 2005). The Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Advisory Advertising Board must review and approve advertisements 
that appear in Canadian journals (Chepesiuk, 2005). As a result, pre-release regulations 
are more stringent, although even this level of regulation has been critiqued (Cooper & 
Schriger, 2005).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 There are many US publications sold in Canada and the Canadian versions of Vogue 
magazine, Time magazine, etc. must be altered to reflect these laws. Similarly, U.S. 
television shows are broadcast with a different set of ads. However, there are leaks in 
this system and some cable packages expose Canadians to some direct-to-consumer 
advertisements as does frequent exposure to the U.S. and internet access generally. 
There is also a way to market disorders, even pharmaceuticals, through the media, 
which might report on new drugs available or promising clinical trial research. After the 
release of news items related to certain new drugs or technologies, the medical office I 
worked in would be inundated with calls for appointments to discuss the new therapies.   




Much has been made about the lower cost of pharmaceuticals in Canada 
compared with the United States (Angell, 2005 for instance). The reduced cost is due in 
part to Canadian national regulatory policy and practices that differ from those of the 
U.S. (Angell, 2005). Canada became a signatory to the World Trade Organization’s 
[WTO] agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] on 
January 1, 1995 (World Intellectual Property Organization, n.d.). TRIPS obliges 
countries to provide at least 20 year patent protection in all fields of technology, such as 
pharmaceuticals (Angell, 2004; Biehl et al., 2007). This works to standardize patent 
policy globally. However, Canada has national laws that impact how this global 
regulation is shaped nationally and locally. Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review 
Board assesses the market price of patented drugs to ensure they are not deemed 
“excessive” (Angell, 2005) and the board has legislated transparency (Patented 
Medicine Prices Review Board, 2011).  
Canadian pharmaceutical legislation is constantly being challenged and 
reformulated. National policy and laws are complicated by power struggles between 
Ottawa and provinces, particularly when health care is governed provincially. As 
previously discussed, Canada’s provinces and territories each have their own insurance 
coverage and these health care payers negotiate the product listing agreements with 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers, which is a list of pharmaceuticals that the provincial 
government will reimburse when prescribed. If Pharmaceutical manufacturers inflate 
prices, a province may choose to exclude the patented drug from reimbursement, 
effectively restricting market share. This is how provinces keep the price of patented 




pharmaceuticals low while remaining compliant to global regulatory pressures 
(Schulstad, 1994). This provincial variation in negotiated listing prices may lead to cost 
disparities, large administrative costs, and unequal bargaining power within and across 
provincial and territorial jurisdictions (Morgan, Thomson, Daw, & Friesen, 2013). 
Recently, Health Canada was accused of favoring pro-big pharma legislation that 
speeds new pharmaceuticals to the Canadian market at the expense of safety reviews 
(Vogel, 2011). 
Regardless of the patent laws and the regulated length of patent, drugs are 
manufactured by generic manufacturers once the patent expires. In an attempt to 
control the competition, pharmaceutical manufacturers in Canada license the production 
of “pseudo-generics” upon patent expiration to discourage competitors from the 
necessary investments needed to produce generics (Hollis, 2003). But there are 
persistent attempts to lower costs wherever possible. For instance, there were recent 
attempts to lower costs of generic drugs in British Columbia (via the Pharmaceutical 
Services Act – Bill 35) which proposed reduced transparency of the government’s 
decision-making processes and allowed researchers access to personal health 
information stored by the provincial government (Anonymous, 2012).  
It is difficult to find statistics about pharmacological utilization in Canada. The 
Mental Health Commission of Canada recognizes this lack of data and confirms that 
“there is no single national organization dedicated to gathering or analyzing data 
nationally or provincially” (MHCC, 2013). Health Canada, the Canadian equivalent of the 
FDA, has a dataset of approved active and inactive drugs that tells us (for instance) that 




there are 718 antipsychotic products approved for use in Canada. This number seems 
very large but this list separates all strengths available (e.g. 2mg, 5mg, and 10mg 
tablets of Abilify are counted as three products and drugs that are available in different 
administration routes are also counted separately). But you cannot search the data for 
prescriptions filled per product or calculate utilization in any other way.  
In 2002, the global sales of antipsychotic drugs rose 19 percent. By 2012, global 
mental health pharmaceutical sales ranked fifth among therapeutic classes with sales in 
excessive of $40 billion (USD) (IMS, 2013). In 2008 Canadians were taking more 
prescription medications than the previous year (The Canadian Press, 2009). 
Prescriptions filled by Canadians rose by more than seven percent in 2008 compared 
with 2007. Psychotherapeutics21 made up the second most prescribed drug class in 
Canada in 2008 (The Canadian Press, 2009).  
The research I conducted for this dissertation encountered pharmaceuticals and 
specifically antipsychotic pharmaceuticals ubiquitously. However, data about the 
specific utilization patterns among accused and prescription patterns by the forensic 
psychiatrists I witnessed in 102 Court were not collected. Data focused on Toronto 
generally or by physicians at CAMH are, to my knowledge, not published. But the 
reliance on pharmaceutical interventions is clear. I will demonstrate that antipsychotic 
pharmaceutical interventions manage and normalize seriously mentally ill people who 
frustrate efficiency in the medical and legal institutions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I have no data about how this category of psycho-pharmaceuticals is broken down by 
consumption patterns in Canada. Presumably, Canada consumes anti-depressants in 
larger quantities than antipsychotics.  





Medico-Legal Nexus in 102 Court 
  The TMHC operates at the medico-legal nexus, intentionally 
interdisciplinary in accordance with the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence. Certainly the 
court is part of the provincial court system, operating within a courthouse with many 
traditional and other specialty courts. The judges, Crown attorneys, duty counselors, 
clerks, and court officers who work in 102 Court, do not do so exclusively. They rotate in 
and out of the court, although some appear in 102 Court with greater frequency than 
others. The court falls under the purview of the Attorney General of Ontario, is part of 
the provincial criminal justice circuit, and deals primarily with minor offenses such as 
theft under $5000.  
 The court social workers are employed by an agency called the Community 
Resource Connections of Toronto [CRCT], a provincial Ministry of Health initiative. 
While in many mental health care settings, social workers provide psychotherapy; the 
social workers employed at 102 Court describe their role as “brokers”, people who 
manage community-based case managers. I believe they mean they do not directly 
arrange services for their clients or perform clinical interventions, but they manage 
community-based workers who do. However, they do meet with clients every time they 
come to court, track them down in the community when they do not appear before the 
court as scheduled, counsel them about court procedures, advocate on their behalf 
before the judge on occasion, and generally manage their complicated cases. The 
CRCT offices are adjacent to the courtroom and people flow into and out of the court 




when in session. CRCT workers manage the cases of accused participating in 
diversion. They meet regularly with clients when they are scheduled to appear before 
the court, help clients make appropriate community connections, find housing, and liaise 
with clients’ case managers in the community.   
 The TMHC coordinates psychiatric services with the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health [CAMH], a large public mental health hospital located in four sites in 
Toronto. CAMH is a research, teaching, and clinical facility that dominates the public 
face of mental health treatment in Toronto. According to its annual report (CAMH, 
2012), CAMH served 27,373 individuals during 2011-2012 (CAMH, 2012). 
Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders accounted for 33.4% of the 4,040 (or 1,349 
individuals) in-patient admissions for 2011-2012 (CAMH, 2012). It is unclear how many 
of these patients came to CAMH through 102 Court and other mental health courts in 
Toronto. Forensic psychiatrists attend 102 Court daily. They usually arrive over lunch 
and assess anyone the court has found unfit in the morning.  They may meet with 
accused in the cells or the social work offices. There is a schedule for out-of-custody 
accused to see psychiatrists as well. The assessments vary in length and the 
psychiatrist will remain available to the court into the afternoon if needed to provide 
testimony regarding diagnosis and pharmacological treatment options as necessary. 
While this arrangement seems logical, not all mental health court models employ 
forensic psychiatrists; British accused access the civil mental health system (Schneider, 
2010). This means that accused in Britain become medical subjects while those of 102 
Court become forensic subjects, with the legal aspects of their identities securely 




adhered to them. I will discuss in Chapters Two and Four how forensic subjects are 
formed, the enduring legal subjectivity of the accused, and the techniques of 
surveillance made possible by the processes of subjectivation.  
 
Subjectivity, Bio-power, and Surveillance 
 A critique of therapeutic jurisprudence ought to include consideration of the ways 
that subjects are produced and maintained through the processes of 102 Court and how 
accused experience those processes. Therefore, at the core of this research is an 
interest in subjectivity. Subjectivity may be defined in many ways and researchers have 
approached the topic from many angles. Current understandings recognize subjectivity 
as creative and agentive, one that allows an individual to relate to the world. My 
ethnography of 102 Court explores how the subject is declared, recognized, disciplined 
and surveilled in very particular ways. Foucault’s work on the subject, bio-power, and 
surveillance will help shape the discussion and arguments presented in the following 
chapters.  
 As way of introduction, Foucault was a French social theorist, who taught and 
wrote prolifically on the subject, power, discipline, surveillance, madness, and many 
other topics from a historical perspective. For my purposes, his analysis of the prison 
(Foucault 1977) and bio-power (Foucault, 1976; Foucault, 2003) are particularly salient. 
Discipline and Punish traces the development of the modern prison and the concomitant 
development of modern technologies of discipline (Foucault, 1977). Bio-power is a 
relatively under-developed idea in Foucault’s work, appearing briefly in the History of 




Sexuality (1976) and his lectures at the College de France in 1976 (Foucault 2003). 
However, the concept of bio-power has been picked up by many researchers and will be 
discussed in more detail below and in the following chapters.  
Foucault coined the term ‘bio-power’ and discussed it in only six pages (Foucault, 
1976). He proposed a bipolar schematic of power over life that evolved from the ancient 
power of the sovereign during the 17th and 18th centuries and ushered in what he calls 
the “era of bio-power” (Foucault, 1976, p. 140) which we are still experiencing. The first 
pole, anatomo-politics, operates at the anatomical level of the individual body and seeks 
to produce productive and disciplined bodies. The second pole, bio-politics, operates at 
the population level and focuses on regulatory controls (Foucault, 1976). Foucault 
insists that these two poles are not mutually exclusive and that it is around these two 
superimposed poles that the “organization of power over life was deployed” (Foucault, 
1976, p. 139). Anatomo-politics and bio-politics are techniques of power that segregate, 
hierarchize, and guarantee relations and effects of domination (Foucault, 1976).  
Anatomo-politics is targeted at man-as-body (individual level) and deploys 
disciplinary mechanisms to increase the productivity and docility of individuals 
(Foucault, 2003). Disciplinary mechanisms include separation, serialization, reports, 
inspections, training, and surveillance to control and maximize the productivity of 
individual bodies (Foucault, 2003). Particular institutions including prisons, factories, 
schools, and hospitals deploy such mechanisms (Foucault, 1977). Bio-politics is 
targeted at man-as-species (population level) and deploys regulatory mechanisms to 
address persistent population problems that weaken the population and consequently 




waste time and money and decrease productivity (Foucault, 2003). Mechanisms include 
regulatory processes such as forecasts and statistical estimates that intervene at the 
general level (eg. Recidivism rates must be lowered) and attempt to establish an 
equilibrium that protects the population from the internal problem or threat (Foucault, 
2003) such as serious mental health impacts. Both anatomo-politics and bio-politics 
seek to maximize productivity (Foucault, 2003). Taken together, anatomo-politics and 
bio-politics constitute bio-power. Medicine plays a critical role in Foucault’s 
conceptualization of bio-power because it possesses both disciplinary and regulatory 
effects (Foucault, 2003). Medicine establishes a link between the scientific knowledge of 
both the biological processes that operate on populations and organic processes that 
operate on individuals (Foucault, 2003).   
One effect of bio-power is that it distributes the living according to value and 
utility; it distributes them around a norm. The norm becomes increasingly important as 
the era of bio-power evolved (Foucault, 1976). Foucault argued that the norm is one 
element that circulates between the disciplinary and the regulatory, can be applied to 
both the individual organism and the population, and can control the disciplinary order of 
the body while insulating the population from internal threat (Foucault, 2003). The 
following chapters will provide an example of bio-power and will illustrate Foucault’s 
claim that the law operates “as a norm…increasingly incorporated into a continuum of 
apparatuses (medical, administrative, etc.) whose functions are for the most part 
regulatory” (Foucault, 1976, p. 144).  




Working in a Foucauldian tradition, Rabinow and Rose expand on Foucault’s 
brief discussion of bio-power and argue that the concept is characterized by a minimum 
of three elements, which will all recur in the upcoming chapters (Rabinow & Rose, 
2006). First, bio-power is characterized by one or more truth discourses and authorities 
(who are considered legitimate to articulate them). Secondly, strategies for intervention 
aimed at emergent biosocial collectivities, such as the non-violent mentally disorder 
accused. Finally, their discussion of modes of subjectification22 is worth quoting in its 
entirety.  They write, “Modes of subjectification, through which individuals are brought to 
work on themselves, under certain forms of authority, in relation to truth discourses, by 
means of practices of the self, in the name of their own life or health, that of their family 
or some other collectivity, or indeed in the name of the life or health of the population as 
a whole” (emphasis added) (Rabinow & Rose, 2006, p. 197). This notion of self-
governance was part of Foucault’s conceptualization of bio-power. He articulated this 
before he invented the term bio-power when discussing the 19th century psychiatric 
practices among the mentally ill (Foucault, 1965). He described 19th century therapeutic 
interventions that called on the madman to recognize his own madness, to work on 
himself, to exercise self-restraint and that set up a set of relations between those 
deemed mad and the men of reason who managed the interventions (Foucault, 1965). 
Later Foucault argued that the disciplinary practices [of anatomo-politics] “regard 
individuals both as objects and instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1977, p. 170). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I use the terms subjectification and subjectivation interchangeably. I prefer 
subjectivation, but Rabinow and Rose (2006) use subjectification which I will retain 
when discussing their ideas.  




disciplinary subject internalizes the requirements imposed on him, so that he governs 
himself, thus ensuring increased control without increased resources to control, surveill, 
report, etc.  
Research in 102 Court has demonstrated that this court in particular and the 
notion of therapeutic jurisprudence that underlies it is a strong example of bio-power at 
work. Anatomo-politics and bio-politics became de-coupled during deinstitutionalization, 
when seriously mentally ill people were left to their own devices, institutional proxies for 
the asylum failed to materialize, and mentally ill people were freed from the disciplinary 
routines and controls of the mental institution. They were spatially disbanded as they 
dispersed into the interstices of the city as a new homeless population. Bio-politically, 
their regulation morphed into those regulatory practices associated with the homeless or 
the poor. However, the increasingly recognized problems of the seriously mentally ill in 
contact with the law has stimulated the emergence of therapeutic jurisprudence and the 
courts of law associated with it. This re-coupling of anatomo-political and bio-political 
powers is not really new (although marketed that way by early promoters of TJ like 
Wexler & Winick, 1996). In the chapters that follow I will analyze the bio-power at play in 
102 Court as a lens through which to critique the processes and effects of the court.  
 Although Foucault’s work is influential in many disciplines and his range of 
interests is broad, he considers his work generally to be about the subject (Foucault, 
1982). He says there are two meanings to “subject”, “subject to someone else by control 
and tied to his own identity by self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). Foucault (1982) 
tells us that there is a form of power that produces a subject, that categorizes the 




individual, that ties him to his individuality, and imposes a truth on him that he must 
recognize. I call this process subjectivation, and it forms the theoretical framework for 
Chapter Two. The second meaning of subject refers to the inner thoughts and feelings 
of an individual and are explore in Chapter Three in a phenomenological analysis. The 
two aspects of subjectivity are not always considered in partnership as I will do in the 
following pages, but there are precedents. Anthropologist Janis Jenkins (2010), for 
instance insists that subjectivity is not solely a feature of individual experience but 
includes objective forces that operate on an institutional level.    
 Many other anthropologists have carried out research about or related to 
subjectivity. Biehl (2005) considered the life of Catarina, a woman isolated and 
discarded as insane. Biehl’s work with Catarina compelled him to recognize that 
subjectivity is a process of experimentation that encompasses familial, inner, medical, 
political, and conceptual dimensions (Biehl, 2010; also Biehl et al., 2007). For a review 
of subjectivity in relation to the body and embodiment in anthropological research see 
Wolputte (2004).  
 There is a particular set of processes and practices that create the legal subject 
of 102 Court. So the 102 Court experience for accused is shaped by the subjectivation 
processes and practices of the court as well as the meaning of those experiences in the 
lives of accused. The dialectic relationship between subjectivation and subjectivity is the 
theoretical thread that links the chapters of this work. Thus, this research is both an 
exploration of the subjectivity and subjectivation of the disordered accused of 102 Court.  




 The dual sides of subjectivity described above calls for a two-pronged 
methodological approach: one that addresses questions of subjectivation and a second 
that seeks answers regarding the experiences and especially the meanings of those 
experiences for the disordered accused of 102 Court. Here, I use meaning in a 
relational sense. I am interested in the impact of the 102 Court experience for accused 
as a key to assessing the purported therapeutic framework of the court.   
 Subjectivation will be explored using data collected from the ethnographic 
observation of 102 Court processes and people over the course of eight months and 
interviews with professionals who work in the court. Subjectivity will be explored using 
an interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). 
Phenomenology is literally the study of “phenomena” according to Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu). It is “the appearance of things, or 
things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the 
meanings things have in our experience.  It can be considered either a disciplinary field 
in philosophy or a movement in the history of philosophy” launched by Edmund Husserl, 
Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others. According to classical Husserlian 
phenomenology, “our experience is directed toward things only through particular 
concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a 
given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean”. A more 
detailed discussion of my phenomenological approach will be discussed below and in 
Chapter Three. For these purposes I am most interested in the ways we experience 
things and the meaning those experiences have in our lives. Specifically, I am interested 




in the ways that the former disordered accused experienced 102 Court and the meaning 
the court has in their lives.  
 
Phenomenology 
 Phenomenological studies are those in which human experiences and meanings 
are examined through the detailed descriptions of the people being studied. 
Understanding the "lived experiences” marks phenomenology as a philosophy based on 
the work of Husserl, Schuler, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as much as it is a method of 
research. As a method, phenomenology involves studying a small number of people to 
develop patterns and relationships of meaning. Ashworth (1997) argued that an 
important methodological principle of any research based on the attempt to describe the 
life-world of another person is that the researcher must begin by bracketing, or setting 
aside prior assumptions about the nature of the experience being studied. With this 
approach, the findings will not be generalized but will build upon limited research and 
form a unique interpretation of events (Creswell, 1994). Phenomenology therefore 
attempts to understand all aspects of a phenomenon in preference to concentrating on 
one specific concept and therefore has a reverence for caring for the whole person 
(Robinson, 2000).  
To explore subjectivity among the accused of 102 Court, I conducted an 
interpretive phenomenological analytic (IPA) study (Smith et al., 2009). IPA is a 
relatively new addition to phenomenological methodologies, first articulated by Smith 
(1996) in which he argued for a qualitative and experiential approach that could 




dialogue with mainstream psychology. IPA gained most of its momentum in qualitative 
psychology in the U.K. but is expanding across disciplines and geographic locations 
(Smith et al., 2009). An advanced search of the ArticlesPlus database for English-
language peer-reviewed journal articles with “interpretative phenomenological analysis” 
as the subject resulted in 307 hits, of which roughly 62% were published after Smith et 
al.’s (2009) manual. Disciplinary subjects included research in clinical psychology (66), 
sociology (46), rehabilitation (44), public, environmental, and occupational health (39), 
health psychology (27), and psychiatry (25). These articles ranged in subject from pain 
(29), illness (26), identity (23), depression (22), and cancer (20). To my knowledge one 
other study has used both interpretative phenomenological analysis and ethnography. 
Kemp and Sandall (2010) combined these methodologies to examine the birth talk 
delivered by midwives to expectant months at 36 weeks. Although IPA is not part of the 
considerable anthropological literature dedicated to phenomenology (see Desjarlais & 
Throop, 2011 for a review), it might be considered alongside trends in critical 
phenomenology that attend to the political, social, and discursive forces that shape 
experience in particular settings (Biehl et al., 2007; Good, 1994; Scheper-Hughes, 
1993).  
 IPA has three theoretical axes: phenomenological, hermeneutical, and 
idiographic (Smith et al., 2009). IPA is fundamentally phenomenological, but there are 
some core concepts of phenomenology that do not appear with IPA: notable is the 
absence of an “essence”. Many qualitative methods books will describe 
phenomenological studies as striving towards the “essence” of an object or 




phenomenon (see for example Creswell, 1994). Husserl (certainly based his philosophy 
on the idea that every object or phenomenon has an “essence” and this was partially 
why his ideas were labeled “anti-relativist” (Sokolowski, 2000). This extreme 
reductionism, which suggests that there is a universal truth about 102 Court, allows little 
space for pragmatic discussion about perspectives or client-based care and is not 
consonant with my research aim to critique therapeutic jurisprudence. Therefore IPA’s 
rejection (or perhaps just setting aside of such truth claims) is consistent with my 
experiences and goals. However, there are other aspects of Husserlian phenomenology 
that are picked up by IPA including bracketing and tracing themes, which shall be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. The IPA approach is more theoretically 
indebted to Heidegger23. Specifically, Heidegger was interested in how an embodied 
and intentional actor experiences the world through possible and meaningful options 
(Smith et al., 2009). This is a person-in-context approach that allows the experiences of 
individuals to be nested in relationships, institutions, and policies.  
 IPA is also based on dual interpretations; hence it is “hermeneutical” and 
explicitly in the tradition of Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. First the 
informant interprets their experience during a conversation, and then the researcher 
interprets their interpretation. Finally IPA is idiographic or related to the individual. It is 
radically committed to individual experience. Due to this commitment, IPA studies 
typically aim to recruit very small numbers of people, and as homogenous a sample as 
possible. For example, Kemp and Sandall (2010) interviewed 15 people, Pestana and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Heidegger’s work is based on Husserl and while there are numerous examples of 
phenomenological work, Heidegger’s conceptions are central to IPA.  




Raghavan (2011) interviewed four adults with mild learning disabilities to explore their 
life experiences using IPA, and Simpson, Mullin, & Froggatt (2013) interviewed 10 
spouses of people with dementia. Therefore, to recruit nine seriously mentally ill 
accused that have passed through 102 Court within the last four years is an appropriate 
sample for this method. IPA research is particularly useful for examining experiences of 
transition, such as diversion through 102 Court. More detailed methodologies will follow 
in Chapters Two and Three.     
   
Daily Experiences in 102 Court 
 To understand the processes and roles of 102 Court, I conducted an 
ethnographic study of the courtroom and its environs. Ethnography is both a method 
and a product, often characterized by participant observation (Creswell, 1994). 
Ethnographic methods generally require purposive and convenience sampling. In other 
words, a researcher must go to places, talk to people, and experience events that will 
provide data and inform analysis. This is particularly true when doing urban fieldwork in 
a poly-cultural city like Toronto (Stoller, 1997). Sherry Ortner defines ethnography as 
“the attempt to understand another life-world using the self – as much as possible – as 
the instrument of knowing” (Ortner, 1995, p. 173). Sample size is variable but is 
considered sufficient when talking to people, going to places, and attending events 
ceases to alter the overall analysis. Consistent with this approach, I attended and 
observed the court from January to September 2012. Participant observation is “both a 
humanistic method and a scientific one (that) produces a kind of experiential knowledge 




that lets you talk convincingly” (Bernard, 2011, p. 256). Using this method, the 
researcher becomes an instrument of data collection and analysis as they learn through 
firsthand experience of participation and direct observation. This research was 
particularly heavy on the observation side of the participant-observation equation. 
However, I did become a participant as a defense researcher in one case that left 102 
Court for consideration before the Supreme Court of Ontario.  
 In anthropological tradition, individual data may help elucidate political and social 
processes (Biehl, 2005, for example) and provide rich, detailed descriptions of people’s 
lives that help reveal relationships between the local and the global, between liminal 
experiences and centralized messages and policies. Also, stories, particularly those rich 
in detail and affect, can challenge stereotypes and stimulate policy discussion about 
“universal” access to care and social equity, two fundamental values espoused by 
generations of Canadian policy-makers.  
 The court and the courthouse are public spaces, and the proceedings of any 
court in the building including 102 Court are a matter of public record unless a 
publication ban is specified during a session. In a court like 102, which proceeds 
through a docket of approximately 10-20 cases in a day, publication bans are rare. On 
two occasions, the judge announced a publication ban, so I simply stopped taking 
notes. Otherwise, details revealed in court (including the name of the accused and 
details of the allegation) may be reproduced as long as the revelation does not impact 
the resolution of the case. Because the proceedings are open to the public, school 
classes rotate in and out, take notes, and sometimes speak to a judge or a Crown 




attorney. Authorities from other parts of Canada sit in the gallery (benches for 
observation) to glean information on processes and logistics to help set up mental 
health courts in their communities. If an accused is facing more sensational charges and 
is passing through the court due to fitness concerns, reporters may be seen in the 
gallery, also taking notes. In my many weeks of observation, I noticed reporters on two 
occasions regarding one person accused of murder. In other words, access to the court 
was unproblematic as it is a public space.  
 The TMHC is an example of a zone of exception (Agamben, 1995). It is open and 
transparent in theory and characterized by a high degree of surveillance on the part of 
the court over accused, however the space is invisible in to the general public due to 
lack of interest, a willful blindness that accompanies homeless, mentally ill, and other 
marginalized people all over the city. Thousands of people occupy the space of the 
courthouse as employees, community workers, reporters, guards, accused, families, 
and legal professionals. But very few of these people notice 102 Court or the accused 
that pass through it.  
 The TMHC is in session Monday to Friday from 10:00 am until the docket is 
complete. The daily schedule of session and recession is not predictable, nor is the total 
daily time in session. Typically court concludes by 3:00 pm, but on occasion runs until 
6:00 pm. The routine varies according multiple factors: the number of people on the 
docket; which lawyers are in attendance; whether accused have been brought to the 
adjacent prisoners’ cells from the main cells; the schedule of the judge; even the 
medical necessities of clerks can alter the schedule. Recesses are often loudly 




announced – “we’ll reconvene in 15 minutes”. However, there are times when there is 
no discernible announcement or the announced amount of time passes and the door 
remains locked. For the out-of-custody accused and me, this means that waiting on the 
benches in the hall outside 102 Court becomes part of the rhythm of the day. To best 
approach the experiences of the out-of-custody accused, I arrived at the courthouse 
approximately 30 minutes before court began each day. The hallway is where the court 
officers are stationed at the rear employees’ entrance. It is from this vantage point that I 
observed prisoners, sometimes chained together being led to the cells adjacent to 102 
Court from the main cells. Lawyers call out the names of clients, meetings are held 
between defense attorneys and clients, and duty counselors (free legal aid lawyers) troll 
for people without representation. Judges flow in through the employees’ entrance in 
street clothes then ebb back to courtrooms in long black robes. But mostly, large 
numbers of poorly or un-housed, mentally ill people with a wide variety of peculiar 
behaviors gathered and waited for the door of 102 Court to be opened. Ten each 
morning was the assigned time to appear before the court for those accused who had 
been released from jail. I observed and recorded using24 the processes, routines, 
language, dress, people and relations in the hall and the court.  
 In the courtroom I was particularly interested in the processes and routinized 
language of the court, and the roles of professionals in relation to the accused. 
Following Coombe (1991, p. 14), I considered the court a “dramaturgy of power” and I 
analyzed it as performance. Ethnographic analysis was ongoing throughout the period 
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of data collection and slightly altered my original research questions. Specifically, I 
encountered early difficulty establishing who was being processed through the court as 
an accused. This seemingly straightforward variable ought to have been easily 
addressed by one or both of the two datasets associated with the court, but was not. 
Neither the docket dataset nor the social work dataset25 addressed the ethnic or racial 
identity of the accused. Daily observation led me to inquire specifically about race 
among the accused of the court due to what seemed like a disproportionately large 
number of black people appearing as accused. I altered my research questions and 
methodology to include observations specifically focused on race, gender and court 
outcomes. My targeted gender and race observations were easily added to my daily 
note taking in the court and lasted approximately three months.  
  Between mid-February and the end of April, 2012 I recorded appearances in 
court by race and gender and whether the accused appeared before the court in 
custody or were reporting to the court as part of a bail condition. Because many 
accused appear before the court multiple times, I refined these data collection methods 
by May to record individuals by surname. For the purposes of this research, the 
collection of surnames of the accused will not be reproduced for dissemination 
purposes, but were collected solely to establish the number of individuals passing 
through the court. Each day, I designed one sheet of paper for women, one for men. I 
divided each sheet of paper into four sections: white, black, Asian, and other visible 
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minority26. For each individual I recorded their surname, whether they appeared in-
custody or out-of-custody, and their return date. If a forensic psychiatrist discussed a 
diagnosis I included that. For appearances that were more complicated or longer or 
involved the testimony of forensic psychiatrists, I took notes about the case unless a 
publication ban was specified. 
 Observation of court proceedings can be challenging. Microphones are 
strategically placed throughout the room to capture the voices of key players (the 
accused, the Crown attorney, the defense, and the judge) for the court recorder who 
produces the official transcript of the proceedings. But these do not serve to amplify 
voices for observers. This is exacerbated in 102 Court by the relaxation of court 
protocol. For instance, regular rules of conduct in the Ontario courts include silence and 
no disruptions. Many courtrooms are prim, quiet places of etiquette observance. To 
disrupt the proceedings may result in reprimand or expulsion. By contrast, 102 Court is 
a lively, noisy, chaotic place. This boisterous atmosphere sometimes complicated data 
collection because it was, at times, difficult to hear the proceedings and the unofficial 
discourses were as interesting as the official ones.  
 These observations were rounded out by semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations with key personnel within the TMHC. Interviews with court affiliated social 
workers, attorneys, volunteers, clerks, court officers, and other support staff were 
conducted (with consent) throughout the eight-month study period.  Many interviews 
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flowed from questions that arose during observation of the court. Interviews were also 
conducted with nine accused and three parents of accused.   
 By focusing on the disordered accused in this study, I situate this work in a 
stream of social justice advocacy and health disparity scholarship. I hope this work will 
also add to the literature about bio-power. This work raises questions about racial 
inequality among seriously mentally ill Canadians (i.e. people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) that are difficult to contextualize due to major gaps 
in knowledge about who is diagnosed with what in Canada. This, in turn, raises 
questions about Canada’s values and practices regarding disparity and identity.  
  
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Three chapters will follow this introduction. Chapter Two will be an exploration of 
the subjectivation processes of 102 Court. The routine processes, power dynamics, and 
language of the court based on eight months of observations and clarifying interviews 
with professionals of the court will form the backdrop for this chapter. To explore who 
becomes this particular legal subject, a different tack will be taken. Detailed 
observations over three months tracked gender, race/ethnicity, custodial status, 
diagnosis, and outcome. Chapter Three is an exploration of the experiences of the 
accused, the meaning of those experiences in their lives (i.e. their subjectivity). Here, an 
interpretive phenomenological analysis of the open-ended interview questions attempts 
to tease out the inner worlds of the formerly accused in relation to the court processes. 
In sum, Chapter Two is concerned with outside pressures that create the subject 




whereas Chapter Three is concerned with the inner world of those subjects. The final 
chapter will offer a critique of the court by uniting the subjectivation-subjectivity work of 
Chapters Two and Three to assess the declared goals of the court and suggest future 
areas for research and consideration. Chapter Four will present a consideration of bio-
power, subjectivity, surveillance and liminality in relation to the findings of Chapters Two 





































Chapter Two: Producing Legal Subjects 
 
 As usual, I arrive thirty minutes before court begins to sit in the hall outside 
102 Court. Robert, a court affiliated social worker stops to chat. His day is off to a rough 
start. He has received a call that one of his clients is in a community service agency with 
his pants around his ankles shooting people with a fire extinguisher. He moves into his 
office next to 102 Court, shaking his head. A dirty, smelly man passing by suddenly 
leaned over me, his face inches from mine and yelled, “You think you can fucking rob 
me?”, then just as quickly kept on walking. He startled me and I spilled some coffee on 
my shirt. The court officer at a nearby desk moved to intervene but I motioned that it 
was okay and he sat back down. Rafik is manning the officer’s desk today. We have 
struck up many conversations lately and now he seems to trust my assessment of the 
verbal aggression. Jeannie recognized me today, after months of seeing one another. 
She sat down right next to me wearing a parka (despite the warm summer 
temperatures), carrying two butter tarts and a styrofoam cup filled with coffee. She did 
not ask me for money or cigarettes as she always does, but the morning is young. After 
a few minutes she started her usual conversation, but today extended her discussion of 
“three country robbery” to include the accusation that “cops killed my kid”. Her dislike of 
the police shines through regularly. She took great offense to a Chinese man who tried 
to sit next to her, physically blocking him by waving her arms. He sat elsewhere and she 
began hurling/slurring/ranting racial epithets in his direction while pacing the hall. 
A quiet man sits on the bench beside me. He hoists his bag onto his lap and gently 
rocks back and forth. We wait. A tall man wearing a long black robe with diagonal red 




sash strides confidently down the hall. The man rocking beside me announced softly, 
“Here’s the judge”. He stood as the judge passed us and we all followed him down the 
hall. Our motley crew entered the court and scattered along the benches of the gallery 
waiting for him to officially enter. The Crown attorney and clerks were already in the 
court as was another court officer. Attorneys come and go. Workers joke, change from 
street shoes to work shoes, shuffle files, and discuss cases. Everyone waits for the 
judge to enter the room and when he does, we stand motionless and quiet until he takes 
his seat. Court is in session but people continue to come and go, more quietly now.  
 Gordon shuffles into court. He is old, diminutive. He wears wrap-around 
sunglasses that cover half his face, and enormous clothes once owned by a much 
larger man. He knows the court staff and calls out, “Good morning Madame Crown 
Attorney”. She greets him smiling even after he follows up by calling her “dear”. The 
court staff seem fond of him. Ananda (a.k.a. “the fan”) is sitting in the body of the court 
again today. As always she has pulled a seat cushion from her bag that she places on 
the hard wooden bench. She looks as if she’s attending a baseball game: Cap, over-
sized shorts, sports socks, trainers, and large tee shirt. But today I wonder if she’s de-
compensating because she is also wearing a hospital mask, gloves, and is rocking back 
and forth cackling quietly. When the duty counselor calls her name she marches right up 
to the judge’s bench and complains about her frequent court appointments. Finally 
accepting her next return date, she backs out of the courtroom yelling, “it’s too much! I 
have to poop! I have to shower! I have an appointment at Mount Sinai [hospital] at 11!” 
This is a typical scene in Toronto’s “102 Court”, Canada’s first mental health court.  




 This chapter will explore the ways that the subjects of 102 Court are constituted. 
Here, I seek to unpack some of the processes and routine discourses of the court and 
reflect on the ways that particular subjectivities are defined and produced. Who appears 
in 102 Court, for what reasons, and the role of 102 Court events on medico-legal 
outcomes will be explored. The strength of 102 Court as an example of bio-power will 
be discussed vis-à-vis Rabinow and Rose’s critical three elements: truth discourse and 
authorities considered competent to speak the truth; interventions aimed at an emergent 
biosocial population in the name of life and health; and forms of subjectification in which 
individuals work on themselves (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). Techniques of power underlie 
the processes and effects of 102 Court, so the disciplinary and regulatory features of the 
court will be stressed.  
A dramaturgical metaphor for court observation was useful. However, observing 
and considering 102 Court as “theater” was less productive than 102 Court as 
“performance and protest” (after Lazarus-Black & Hirsch, 1994). The relationship 
between the production of subjectivities and power and resistance was quickly of 
interest during research and by altering the lens through which I regarded the court; I 
hope to have captured more of this perspective.  
 Coombe (1991) states that legal processes are constitutive of subjectivities. 
Comack and Balfour (2004) argued that despite the basic legal premise of equality 
before the law, practices, processes, and discourses of the law maintain an order of 
inequalities, particularly gender, race, and class inequalities. (Coombe, 1991, p. 5). This 
chapter focuses on the most ubiquitous discourses, the major processes of 102 Court,  




the particular subject positions that are produced through these processes, and how 
these are implicated in an order of inequalities.  In this dissertation I argue that the 
meaning of 102 Court in the lives of people who experience its processes are 
constituted by both internal states and external constructions of subject (following 
Jenkins, 2010). This chapter will focus on subjectivation which foregrounds Chapter 
Three and the exploration of the inner states of disordered accused.  Particular attention 
to which social groups appear before the court and the difficulty of contextualizing 
observations will be discussed. The variations in approach among the decision makers 
involved with 102 Court impact who becomes a subject and the processes of 
subjectivation. The professionals who occupy the key positions within 102 Court rotate 
in and out of the court including the Crown attorney, the judge, the duty counselors, and 
the defense attorneys. There are observable differences in approach, emphasis, and 
habits of the various key players and these variations combine in many different 
combinations to shape the subjectivation of the accused.  
 Extending the dramaturgical analogy, therapeutic jurisprudence (and its 
implementation as mental health courts) is the deus ex machina, a contrived solution to 
an apparently insolvable difficulty, at play here. The creation of 102 Court is an attempt 
to address structural violence27 within the criminal justice system. The concept of 
therapeutic jurisprudence admits that physical and emotional harm can result in the 
imprisonment of seriously mentally ill accused without the benefit of rehabilitation. The 
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structural violence that is addressed through the existence of 102 Court may originate 
with deinstitutionalization, lack of community mental health services, criminal justice 
responses to interaction with mentally ill people, or some combination thereof. However 
benevolent the intentions of its founders, 102 Court ameliorates some forms of 
structural violence for some people while producing new forms. It also reflects structural 
violence at other junctures of the criminal justice system. The production of new 
subjects, “proper” legal subjects of 102 Court offers openings and opportunities for 
some accused, but forecloses possibilities for others (Biehl, 2010). Also, being deemed 
a proper subject of the court is akin to walking along a razor thin mountain pass; fall one 
way and be met with freedom, services, housing, and support but fall the other way and 
you face indefinite detention. Paul Farmer argued that the suffering of victims of 
structural violence is difficult to capture for three reasons; we find it difficult to relate to 
the suffering of people very different from us; the enormity and extent of suffering is 
difficult to convey in facts and figures; and the dynamics and distribution of suffering is 
little understood (Farmer, 1997). He has highlighted the importance of gender and racial 
axes, describing an intersectional analytic approach without calling it that (Farmer, 
1997). Comack and Balfour (2004) argue that the Canadian judicial system reproduces 
gender, race, and class inequalities and that therefore the law is complicit in 
perpetuating disparities. If this argument is valid, it seems likely to be apparent, perhaps 
amplified among seriously mentally ill people. In this chapter, I will attempt to trace the 
structural violence of the court within a broader critique of court processes with special 
attention to the axes of gender and race. The gender axis will be discussed but is less 




robust than the racial axis for several reasons. Another nearby mental health court is 
colloquially known as the “women’s court” and many 102 cases are traversed there 
possibly resulting in lower than expected numbers of women in 102 Court. Also, fewer 
of my conversations and interviews were with women. Farmer’s axes are important here 
but others likely impact the experiences of accused and the ways that structural 
violence is produced and reproduced in this system. For instance, other axes of 
marginalization such as being accused of a crime, class, social isolation, immigration 
status, language, and odd behaviors associated with the diagnostic features of 
psychosis may all intersect to impact the ways that suffering is experienced. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to explore those intersections comprehensively but may be a 
productive future approach to capture suffering among this population.  
 My ethnography of the court and courthouse included the court in session, the 
drama of the hall outside 102 Court during recesses, and the Old City Hall courthouse 
generally. Much of the experience of the courthouse for non-professionals is waiting for 
lawyers, social workers or other professionals, waiting for court to resume, waiting for 
your docket number to be called, etc. The hallway outside 102 Court, located in the 
basement of the courthouse is faded architectural glory. The ceilings are high and the 
corridor is at least 15 feet wide hinting at a grand architectural past. But, glaring 
fluorescent lights light the space. It is brutally hot in the summer and very cold in the 
winter, when anyone with a coat keeps it on and buttoned up. The dirty, neglected walls 
are lined with uncomfortable, mismatched wooden benches that often cause my legs to 
fall asleep. The toilets are at best private and at worst revolting. Female employees 




have a separate toilet, the door locked with a numeric keypad. The public ladies’ room 
has two stalls. The stall that faced the hallway was without a door so anyone using it 
risked exposure if the hall door opened. Effectively, it was rarely used. The other stall 
was smaller than usual; to close the door you had to partially straddle the toilet. The 
patterns of urine and feces that surrounded this toilet became familiar to me as the 
months wore on because although the cleaning staff’s cart was seen regularly outside 
the bathroom, the stains never changed. Nor did the smell, which was nauseating and 
suggested the toilet’s outflow was pooling somewhere nearby. Homeless women often 
used the sink to bathe in, leaving water, paper towels, hair and smudged makeup in 
their wake. Sometimes vomit, used menstrual pads, and dirty diapers littered the 
corners. The smells from this bathroom often wafted into the hallway making the 
benches closest to it the last resort for those waiting on court, especially on very hot 
days.  
 The people who linger in the hall, waiting for those with more power, are primarily 
the accused and their families. There is only one other court off the hall and it hears 
mostly federal drug cases. So the hall is filled with mentally ill people behaving oddly, 
speaking aloud to no one in particular, trying to sleep on a bench, marching up and 
down the hall cackling out loud. But there are also gang members and their friends and 
families, children, and confused parents. There is all manner of dress here, some look 
like retired librarians, others like sex workers. People wear fedoras, ball caps, hijab, 
hockey shirts, saris, fishnet stockings, gang insignia, anarchist symbols, tattoos and 
piercings, old, cheap bags or just recycled plastic grocery bags. I can only identify a 




handful of the languages I hear. We rely on the cheap terrible coffee available around 
the corner of the hall. It is clear that many of the people in the hall are homeless or 
inadequately housed. Many are very poor. In contrast are the lawyers and other 
courthouse employees like clerks, social workers, and volunteers who, having places to 
store their belongings do not carry coats and bags or wear outdoor weather gear. They 
have better shoes, are in a hurry, and compulsively check PDAs28. This is where many 
lawyers meet their clients and talk about cases. There is very little privacy for accused 
and I frequently heard details of cases from 102 and other courts. The lawyers are 
always in a hurry, often glancing up and down the hall while explaining strategy or next 
steps, looking for the next client, another lawyer, something else. Video cameras record 
all activities and a court officer is stationed at the north employees’ entrance. Judges 
enter wearing street clothes and rarely stop to speak to anyone. Eventually, they flow 
back down the hall wearing robes to take their place on the benches of the courtrooms. 
Court workers gather in cliques to go to lunch or smoke outside or go to a pub after 
work. Lawyers openly discuss their cases and their attitudes towards clients and 
families are easily discernible. Here I could listen for the various approaches among 
duty counselors. Some actively announce their role and explain what it means and look 
for families and accused clients. Others never work the hall so transparently, but may 
quietly approach someone they think might be a client or relative. Names are called 
aloud, “Anyone here for Jamieson?” Employees come and go at will through the 
employee exit, partially explaining the uncomfortable temperatures of the hall. But 
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accused or non-professionals like families and researchers can only exit through the 
door not re-enter. To re-enter the building requires walking around to the front entrance, 
climbing the stairs, passing through the security checkpoint (empty pockets, place items 
on conveyer belt for x-ray inspection, pass through a metal detector then a wand wave, 
if the detector was triggered) then descend the stairs to the basement again.  
 For me, the hallway was both a place to continue observing the courtroom 
activities (broadly conceived) and a place to meet people. Many accused approached 
me in the hall, because they assumed I was waiting for a lawyer and waiting to report. It 
was inconceivable to many that I would sit for hours voluntarily. Parents of accused also 
approached me and I got to know several people very well because of the amount of 
time we spent sitting and waiting in the hall and the court. Some of the accused and 
parents later took part in interviews that form the basis for Chapter Three.  
 As a daily observer of the court, I was the most dedicated audience for the 
performances and protests of 102 Court. I shared a high level of education with some of 
the court professionals. But I also shared circumstances with the out-of-custody 
accused: I moved with them into and out of court as sessions began, ended, and began 
again. I was mostly ignored as accused are. For some professionals it was months into 
my daily routine before they would speak to me and introduce themselves. Some of the 
accused said I was “one of them” because I was not studying law, and was more 
interested in speaking with them than their lawyers or social workers. Many of the 
accused are story-tellers who rarely have an audience outside of lawyers and doctors. I 
sat in the “body” of the court with the out-of-custody accused, their friends, families, and 




the occasional housing worker. There were rarely other observers. School classes 
would briefly attend 102 Court as part of a larger courthouse tour. Students would file in, 
sit in cliques. Some were attentive, others played with electronic devices. No school 
group remained more than a few minutes, although some would have an audience with 
a judge during the lunch break. Sometimes a community worker, whose clients included 
accused from 102 Court, would watch for a half day. Once a representative from 
another provincial court watched closely and took notes in order to glean information to 
establish a mental health court in their prairie community. Three journalists appeared 
one day following an accused facing very serious allegations. The accused was only 
briefly passing through 102 Court for fitness testing and was promptly transferred to a 
more appropriate court. So, I was the entire audience on many days. Towards the end 
of my research, a court clerk admitted they called me the “resident academic” and 
another clerk noted that I would talk to anyone, even the “crazies” which had made her 
a little suspicious of me at first. Her observation highlights the social division between 
accused and professionals in the court. Professionals greet one another and make 
small-talk as colleagues often do, speaking about their weekends, children, and other 
personal details as well as discussing cases. They congregate together, borrow pens, 
and move easily into the business section of the court. Accused move reluctantly into 
the professional space of the court, they often sit apart from one another, make little eye 
contact, and have few conversations. There were few observers in 102 Court and I 
never witnessed any observer interact with an accused they were not bound to by family 
bond or professional obligation.   




 If the activity and practices of the court and environs are considered a 
dramaturgy, what is this role, “the accused”, in 102 Court, who is cast in this role, and 
what are the possible story endings for them?  
 The disordered accused are situated at the liminal space of the legal - medical 
nexus. The point of 102 Court is to redirect these burdensome people from the legal 
system to the healthcare system. It is the historical deinstitutionalization and the 
contemporary state of enormous mental health service deficits that exacerbates the 
contact between the disordered accused and the law. Jails and hospitals are both 
publicly funded and under increasing pressures for economic efficiencies and 
streamlining. The complexity of suffering endured by the disordered accused is 
enormous and defies efficiency forcing these two institutions into a dance of 
responsibility. The creation of the court first presents as a cooperative venture that 
improves efficiencies in both institutions, but tensions remain. Sometimes, the courts 
become frustrated with the lengthy wait times for psychiatric beds and judges order 
accused into hospital despite no available bed. This triggers the appearance of legal 
teams from CAMH in 102 Court and sometimes the intercession of a superior court.  
 “Order” and its antithesis, “disorder”, are of fundamental importance at play in 
102 Court. First, there is law and order, which has been disrupted by the alleged 
criminal behavior that leads to arrest and eventually to court. Maintaining order is a 
mandate of the Crown attorney and must be considered for each case that comes 
before her. The social order that non-accused people benefit from must be protected by 
the decisions taken by any court. If an accused, mentally ill or not, disrupts that order to 




the detriment of “innocent” residents, then an appropriate legal response ought to be 
meted out. But the “disorder” of disordered accused is not that which is created with 
criminal activity but a particular kind of internal state that is perceived to drive criminal 
behavior. Depression or the hyper-vigilance of someone suffering PTSD is not the 
“disordered” described here, despite being disordered in psychiatric nosology. As 
described in Chapter One, people end up in diversion in 102 Court following a 
psychiatric assessment that confirms a diagnosis deemed appropriate for the court. So 
although the accused in 102 Court have diagnosed disorders, it is only those disorders 
defined by disordered thinking leading to disorderly behaviors that are the disorders on 
display. Behaviors perceived as psychotic are the focus of 102 Court. Arrigo (2004) 
argues that although concepts of order and disorder are processes found in all systems, 
law artificially corrals disorder and expressions of disorganization. Disorder is 
disciplined in 102 Court; it is identified, labeled, reported, and surveilled in a classic 
anatomo-political display of power. The production of “good legal subjects” (Arrigo, 
2004, p. 206) is the goal. This discourse is steeped in morality where order is 
associated with “good” legal subjects and disorder with “bad” subjects. The source of 
the disorder is clearly individual and internal and conceptualized as neuro-
psychological. But the disorder of the individual’s brain and any suffering associated 
with that are really not the object of interest in 102 Court despite discourses of treatment 
and therapy and the generally benevolent disposition of the court. The neuro-
psychological pathology of the disordered accused spreads outside the boundaries of 
the individual to impact family, friends, work colleagues, teachers, landlords, and 




eventually when the disorder spreads too far, to friction with the police and hospitals. It 
is, therefore, the spread of the disorder like a contagion that is disturbing. The first, 
second, even the 15th instance of friction with the police may not result in trouble beyond 
a growing visibility among the police. When arrest finally occurs, the disorder has 
spread to such a point that “good” legal subjects (i.e. mentally healthy people not in 
contact with the law) are perceived as direct or indirect victims of the accused’s 
disorder. “Good” subjects are impacted directly if they are, for instance, the shop owner 
whose bottle of water was stolen, the victim of a nuisance crime. Indirect impact 
includes the increased police resources allocated to these nuisance crimes (and 
therefore unavailable for other police issues). Depending on the behavior under review, 
the perceived potential for future escalation of the behavior or the potential threat to 
“good” subjects is a point of decision for the Crown attorney. For example, an elderly, 
homeless woman appeared in 102 Court accused of kicking another woman waiting at a 
streetcar stop who refused to give her money. The kick was singular and the only 
reported incident of the kind. The accused did not know the victim. The victim sustained 
no injuries, not even a bruise, and declined to make a victim impact statement. Yet the 
accused was compelled to “give” a DNA sample as a condition of her release from jail 
lest her criminal violence escalate in the future.  Her actions may have been 
“symptomatic”, a result of psychiatric distress, but they might this be a rather response 
to chronic poverty, homelessness, social isolation, and frustration?  
 Those who embody this subjective position come to do so through several 
routes: accused may self-disclose their mental health issues and ask to be referred to 




102 Court29; lawyers may approach the 102 Crown and refer clients; or accused may be 
referred by the police, front-line first-responders who are able through experience and 
training to recognize mental health issues. By whatever avenues an accused may find 
his way to 102 Court, it is the Crown attorney who will decide whether the case is 
eligible for diversion or not; she is the gatekeeper of 102 Court.  She relies on the expert 
opinion of CAMH psychiatric assessments to evaluate the psychiatric component of her 
decision and is eminently qualified to assess the alleged criminal acts of the accused 
and the potential risk to the public. She is looking for a causal relationship between the 
diagnosis and the criminal behavior, effectively restricting the possible mental health 
issues that might be addressed through 102 Court. The psychiatrist, and by extension, 
the Crown attorney must be convinced that the accused suffers a mental health problem 
that was at play during the commission of the alleged crime. This goes a long way to 
understanding the concentration of psychosis-related diagnoses in 102 Court. The 
literature acknowledges a small but significant association between schizophrenia and 
violent criminal acts (see review by Taylor, 2008). Although this study was intended to 
study only those “properly” before the court30, an ethnography of the court itself includes 
those not properly before the court31 as well as those properly present. Some of the 
data that follows in this chapter concerns accused observed in 102 Court over the 
duration of the study. These data include some “malingerers”, some accused well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Many court workers believe that accused in other courts malinger or try to take 
advantage of the perceived leniency of 102 Court by pretending to suffer from mental 
health issues. These malingerers, once identified are summarily transferred back to 
their original, non-mental health courts for processing.    
30 People accused of minor, non-violent crimes 
31 People transferred to 102 Court to have fitness assessed by the “experts” on hand 




known to the court, and others just passing through for fitness testing. It is well 
understood that many accused who pass through 102 Court have mental health issues, 
sometimes chronic and very debilitating, but due to the absence of psychosis, they are 
not “properly” before the court and get transferred back to the regular stream of justice.   
  
Suffering in the Court of Invisibility 
 Comack and Balfour (2004) argue that legal spaces are built on discourses that 
resonate with wider society despite being presented in legalese. They emphasize the 
difficulty in tracing the structural violence of courts due in part to the (re)production of 
inequalities in discretionary spaces rather than the formal rules of the law (Comack & 
Balfour, 2004). Long-term observation of the court offers insight into practices and 
discourses that help define discretionary spaces, unofficial relations, and reflect wider 
social relationships. One of the most disturbing aspects of my fieldwork in 102 Court 
was the cries, pleas, screams, and accusations of the accused that were systematically 
ignored by most people. Mental health courts like all Ontario courts are founded on 
principles of transparency, where accused must be present when forensic psychiatrists 
testify about their diagnoses and treatment recommendations.  Certainly the court exists 
due to recognition of the injustice experienced by mentally ill accused in the criminal 
justice system. The court’s foundation and ongoing operation is an organizational and 
institutional gesture of benevolence and sympathy regardless of unintentionally 
draconian outcomes in some cases. Most people who work in the court are very 
sympathetic to the clients. Some defense lawyers work longer hours for less pay to 




specialize in helping mentally ill clients. Judges lay aside the strong rules of etiquette to 
endure slurs, accusations, and chaotic behavior in the courts. It is not unusual for the 
smell of vomit, urine or feces to waft through the court, caked on an accused.  
 For all this obvious sympathy and tolerance, when an accused makes 
accusations of mistreatment or objects to their diagnosis they are routinely ignored. 
There are the frequent denials of mental health problems while listening to the testimony 
of forensic psychiatrists. “I am not bipolar!” One young woman was asked about the 
injections she received to treat her schizophrenia and she replied calmly, “I don’t believe 
I am schizophrenia [sic]”. A male accused returned to 102 Court half way through a 
treatment order during which he was resident in a hospital and he reported that “they 
[the psychiatric staff] stick needles in my ass and abuse me”. More disturbing are the 
accusations of abuse by police officers, jailers, fellow accused, or court officers and the 
pleas for help. Of course some of these expressions of suffering are likely due to 
delusions, perhaps traumatic memories. Some are surely based on “real” events near or 
distant in time. Some may well be allegations in need of investigation. But suffering is 
not really the central concern. The intense suffering displayed by some people is 
ignored as part of the disorder, as “histrionics” of women accused, as inappropriate 
outbursts, misbehavior, and symptoms. Court room cries, screams, pleas, denials, and 
the pain and suffering revealed by these behaviors are regularly ignored or addressed 
sternly as court disruptions. My experience in 102 Court suggests that accusations of 
violence in distant institutions (like jail) are more likely to be believed than those 
concerning people in the courthouse like court officers or cell-mates.  




 Court officers are the sharp end of the disciplinary stick in the courthouse. Within 
the building they have powers similar to police officers. They wear uniforms closely 
resembling those of the police, carry handcuffs and weapons, and escort prisoners 
(willingly or not) around the building. They readily acknowledge the need for force in 
some circumstances, most deploring its use. There are difficult situations faced by 
officers such as screaming, defecating in cells, and smearing menstrual blood all over 
cells. I witnessed an accused in custody in 102 Court reach into his pants and smear 
feces on his face while court was in session. Some accused refused to wear clothing, 
persistently trying to disrobe; one man smelled so awful it caused another to retch in the 
court. Court officers have the least enviable jobs; dealing intimately with accused and 
attempting to maintain professional propriety and sympathy, sometimes amidst 
appalling work conditions.  
 Court officers have various relationships with the accused of 102 Court. I met 
Clem, a court officer, after seeing him many times in the hallway outside 102 Court. 
Clem had worked as a court officer for eight years. Although technically based from the 
downtown Toronto courthouse, he liked variety in his work so taught at the police 
College from time to time. According to Clem, there were 900 court officers in Toronto 
and they received no special training to deal with mentally ill accused in the system. He 
described a spectrum of professionalism and empathy among court officers that he said 
ranged from excellent, through mediocre, to “embarrassing and awful”. He said that 
officers learned on the job and hoped they would learn from both the good and bad 
conduct of other officers. He said he always tried to be a good role model and that 




sometimes, a bad role model was also helpful. He gave the example of a court officer 
now in trouble after making faces at an accused in court that was noticed by the crown 
attorney and the court recorder.  Clem said “102ers” were like “deer in the headlights” 
compared with other prisoners. Clem reported that regular prisoners are often very 
savvy and work the system, sometimes arranging meetings with other prisoners by 
requesting specific court dates, knowing they will be transported from the jails to large 
holding cells at the courthouse and can intermingle. Although the courthouse 
experimented with different ways to segregate prisoners (by source or rival gangs or 
geographically), Clem emphasized that 102ers needed to be separated from these other 
prisoners. He offered to show me the cells of 102 Court.  
 However, it was Catherine, a court clerk, who took me through 102 Court’s cells. 
On a recess, before I left the courtroom, she approached me and asked if I would like to 
tour the cells. She explained she could see no harm in it, I seemed interested in every 
aspect of 102 Court, and they were empty. The crown attorney and other court staff 
were very curious about me staying. All eyes followed Catherine and me as we walked 
through the prisoner’s box and she asked the court officer on duty to let us into the cells. 
I know what a privilege it was for me to tour the cells. Many people who work with 
accused never enter them, for security reasons they meet clients in a special room. 
Busy professionals have no reason to tour empty cells. I saw three separate cells 
adjacent to 102 Court. There was a small single cell, for people who needed to be alone 
and two cells large enough for multiple accused. The ceiling was very high (like the rest 
of the courthouse) but the walls, floors, and benches were all covered in steel floor 




plates. This metal sheeting has a raised diamond pattern that provides skid resistance. 
The benches were built in and thoroughly encased in the metal. I labeled one of the 
cells, the “graffiti room” because of the almost complete coverage of the walls by 
messages and drawings. The metal was darkened by grime and bodies. The cells were 
solid and very private with thick heavy doors and small windows. I recalled all the times I 
heard the banging of metal doors from these cells while sitting in the adjacent court 
room and reconsidered how much distress and force would be needed to create the 
clamor. I also recalled how many accused complained in court about the cold cells in 
the winter. The bodily fluids of accused that Clem spoke about would be more easily 
cleaned from these metal boxes, so I could appreciate the practicality of metal as a 
building material, but it was shockingly inhumane and claustrophobic to me.  
 There is a tension between the visibility and invisibility of the accused at play in 
102 Court. Here is a system that by design is “transparent”; where the courtroom is 
open to the public, key courtroom voices are carefully recorded and transcribed, and the 
transcripts are available to anyone who orders them32.  Ironically, what actually occurs 
in this space to the people who pass through it as disordered accused is so 
unremarkable they are rendered almost invisible to the public. The court is open, yet the 
body of the court remains unoccupied. The accused are so invisible, drug deals occur in 
the body of the court while it is in session and if anyone notices, they do not stop it. The 
elderly mother of one accused, dressed in ill-fitting faded clothes, sat in court for days 
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before anyone noticed she was not an “out-of-custody”33. Reporters do not record these 
proceedings, sketch artists do not portray the scene. The accused rarely speak. In the 
theater of the court the accused are the courtroom equivalent of drama’s “unseen 
character”, a role critical to the turning of the plot but never actually seen or heard. The 
unsolicited cries, pleas, screams, and accusations of accused are not on script; they are 
dismissed as symptoms, and systemically ignored. In a complete contradiction the 
accused are highly monitored and watched by the court once they are released. Their 
housing, medication regimes, community appointments, personal relationships, 
geographical wanderings all fall under intense surveillance which shall be discussed 
further in Chapter Four. They are at once watched and disregarded, surveilled and 
dismissed, visible and invisible.  
 
“You can’t talk to those people, they’re totally irrational!” 
 Irrationality and rationality are strategically ascribed to accused in both formal 
and informal ways. Formally, the capability of accused before the law is not typically 
questioned. Their participation in the legal processes of the court is premised on the 
assumption that they make a rational choice to proceed through the court’s diversion 
process if they are offered that possibility. They are able to instruct their lawyers and if 
they are deemed unable to do so, it is their fitness that is called into question. This 
rational choice to proceed through diversion or return to the regular stream, to plead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 i.e. an accused who has been released on bail and reports to the court. This contrasts 
with an “in-custody”, an accused who is currently in jail and will be brought into the 
courtroom by court officers.  




guilty or not, to recognize and ably communicate that they understand basically where 
they are, what they are charged with, and what is happening in the court, is foundational 
to their participation in 102 Court. It is also the rational decision that is invoked when 
they violate the terms of parole. But, says the judge, you agreed to report to court every 
morning at 10:00 am and you have failed to do so. They are held accountable to the 
rational decisions they have taken. For bail conditions to be met, a set of restrictions 
and conditions must be recalled, agreed to, and adhered to. They must find a way to 
move about the city to appointments and court and shelters. They need to stay on their 
medication regimes. However, I was discouraged from interviewing accused several 
times due to their irrationality. Accused are “irrational” and “hysterical” when they allege 
violence or impropriety at the hands of jailers or cellmates. Both their irrationality and 
rationality are reduced to a neuro-chemical imbalance, considered the root cause of 
their legal, social, and biomedical problems that might be restored with antipsychotic 
medications. The accused of 102 Court are expected to enter into a contract with the 
court voluntarily and adhere to that contract through self-governance. They are to keep 
their appointments, take their medications, and follow the advice of mental health 
practitioners while immersed in a system of reward and punishment. This recalls 
Foucault’s historical examination of 19th century psychiatric practices that called for 
patients to self-regulate, to admit their unreason in exchange for greater corporeal 
freedom, and to submit to the authority and truth discourses of experts (psychiatrists 
then, mental health practitioners, often psychiatrists now) (Foucault, 1965). The 
ambivalence of ascribed (ir)rationality is a critical feature of the bio-power leveraged by 




this court. It is the truth discourses of the forensic psychiatrist that authorizes many of 
the possible outcomes of 102 Court.   
 
Who are the Disordered Accused: Axes of Race and Gender 
 There were 1,125 appearances by accused in 102 Court over approximately 
three months of observation between May and August 2012. During the study period, 
483 individuals came through the court of which 77% were men and 23% were women 
(372 men and 111 women). One hundred and fifty-six men appeared in-custody, making 
the average number of appearances in custody two per individual man. Two hundred 
and sixty-five men appeared out-of-custody with a range between one report and 13 
reporting events.  For female accused 47 individuals appeared in-custody 97 times. In-
custody female appearances ranged between one and six times whereas female out-of-
custody appearances ranged between one and 22 times. Seventy-seven women 
appeared 199 times out-of-custody.  
 Twenty-three men were given a diagnosis of schizophrenia34, four were 
diagnosed with psychosis or psychotic disorder NOS, three were diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder and two were diagnosed with both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. One 
man was given a diagnosis of anxiety and depression, another with severe adjustment 
disorder. Similarly, six women were diagnosed with schizophrenia, two with bipolar 
disorder and one with psychosis. Therefore of 43 diagnoses offered in court as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 These numbers are based on the testimony of forensic psychiatrists, not self-
disclosure or diagnosis that follow accused in their case files. Therefore it is a 
conservative number.  




evidence, 41 or 95% were related to psychosis and 31 or 72% were specifically 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. See Table 1. for a summary of these findings.  
 
Table 1. Summary of Diagnoses in 102 Court 
  


























 The first question to be asked is whether the frequency of appearances by men 
and women in 102 Court was consistent with the general population. According to the 
2006 census, 47% of Torontonians self-reported being part of a visible minority 
(Statistics Canada, 2009) compared with 48% of the men (n=372) and 54% of the 
women (n=111) I observed and categorized. However, breaking the category of visible 
minority into three distinct groups namely, black, Asian, and other visible minority is 
more revealing. Among men, 28% (n=105) of the 372 individuals observed were black, 
9% (n=32) were Asian, and 11% (n=42) were other visible minorities. These data may 
be compared with census data that indicate that 8.4% of Torontonians self-report as 




black, 11.4% self report as Asian, and 27.2% as other visible minorities, a significantly 
different distribution35 (Statistics Canada, 2009) (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Males by Race in Toronto & 102 Court
 
 
Similarly among women, 31% (n=34) were black, 7% (n=8) were Asian, and 16% (n=18) 
were other visible minorities, a significantly different distribution than the general 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Females by Race in Toronto & 102 Court 
 
 
Testing Fitness, Testing Canadian-ness 
 Each mental health court emerges from a particular, local political context. The 
impetus behind the creation of 102 Court was to improve the processing of unfit 
accused through the criminal justice system.  “Fitness” must not be confused with 
wellness or health. It is concerned specifically with the ability of an accused to 
understand the proceedings of the court and to instruct his or her defense attorney. 
While similar to American legal tests of fitness, the Canadian notion places less 
emphasis on demonstrating rationality to understand the proceedings of the court and 
more on the ability to communicate with defense attorneys (O’Shaughnessy, 2007). 
“Unfit to stand trial” is defined in the Canadian Criminal Code as, “Unable on account of 
mental disorder to conduct a defense at any stage of the proceedings before a verdict is 
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disorder to (a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings, (b) understand the 
possible consequences of the proceedings, or (c) communicate with counsel” 
(Government of Canada, 2013). It is a test of the moment, and may change from hour to 
hour or day to day.  The classic test of fitness, called the “Taylor test”, is a series of 
questions posed by a defense counselor (usually) to an in-custody accused about the 
court and the roles of people in it. For instance defense might ask, “I am a defense 
lawyer, your lawyer. What is my job in court? The woman sitting up there [points to 
judge] wearing the sash is a judge. What is her job? Do you know what you are accused 
of? In general, not your case, if you are asked for a plea in court, you have two choices. 
What are your two choices?” The threshold for fitness tests is called “low” in court, 
meaning that a basic understanding demonstrated without the use of legalese is 
sufficient to be deemed fit by the judge. However, this test is laden with assumptions.  
 There is inconsistency with the delivery of the fitness test. For example, the first 
Taylor test I witnessed was delivered in less than one minute and consisted of four 
questions, “What is the role of the Crown? What does duty do” – at this point I realized I 
had no idea what a correct answer might be. The questions continued with, “What does 
a judge do? “How might you plead to the allegations against you?” The accused 
answered as I might have, he stumbled through the first two questions and answered 
the last two questions fairly well. The language used (“Crown” and “duty”) is common in 
the Canadian legal system. They are short forms of Crown attorney and duty counselor. 
Crown attorneys are prosecutors under the auspices of the Attorney General of Ontario. 
Duty counselors are free, legal aid defense attorneys who unlike their private practice 




colleagues do not move around from courtroom to courtroom following their clients but 
remain assigned to a specific courtroom and handle cases of accused who come to 
court without legal representation. The use of these terms in a fitness test assumes 
knowledge of the Canadian legal system. This discourse is not general knowledge in 
Canada, where television and movie depictions of law are often imported from the 
United States and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom. As a well-educated Canadian 
citizen, I had no recall of these roles from my school days in Ontario and Quebec. Given 
a few minutes to think about the answers might have helped with recall, but many of the 
accused in 102 Court, and many of the residents of Toronto (more than 50 percent) 
were born outside Canada. Their exposure to this specialized language might be 
significantly less than many people born and educated in Canada. Further, it assumes a 
strong grasp of the English language. Of 483 individuals I tracked in 102 Court over 
three months 7.4% (or 36 people) required the assistance of a court translator to 
understand the proceedings. There were 25 translators employed during this period who 
translated between English and French, Tamil, Arabic, Korean, Spanish, Punjabi, 
Telugu, Urdu, Farsi, Cantonese, Vietnamese, Tibetan, Tagalog, Mandarin, Dinka, 
Somali, Ethiopian, Indriya, Hungarian, Russian, Polish, American sign language, 
Croatian, Portuguese, and Hebrew. Of 63 fitness tests I recorded, 52 were performed 
among people fluent in English and 11 required a translator. The ratio of those deemed 
fit: unfit37 among the English-speakers was 20:6 compared with a ratio of 5:6 among the 
non-English-speakers. These accused may or may not be Canadian-born although it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In some cases, numerous fitness tests were performed per individual. In this case, 
the final finding was employed in this calculation.  




perhaps more likely in cases with other than francophone accused. If they were born 
outside Canada, their length of residency might impact the Taylor test results. Also, 
given the variation in languages translated and the possible variations of the legal 
systems in their home countries that might operate very differently from that of Canada, 
much more than mere word translation is required. It is impossible from these data to 
ascertain the quality of the translation38, the length of residency of the accused, or the 
factors that might influence the differential in fitness test outcomes among English-
speaking and non-English speaking accused. These findings relate directly to the legal 
literacy of the accused. The concept of legal literacy is variously defined but here I 
follow the definition of the Canadian Bar Association which is, “the ability to understand 
words used in a legal context” (Canadian Bar Association, 1992, p. 23). One court 
worker described the Taylor test as one of “understanding not knowledge”. By this she 
meant that textbook definitions of the role of court professionals was not required, but 
she failed to consider how different kinds of literacy and knowledge were required to 
pass the Taylor test.  
 The Taylor test is less a test of ability to meaningfully participate in your own 
defense than it is a test of Canadian assimilation and the acquisition of highly 
specialized language. It reflects “how legal thought, logic, imagery, and language 
symbolically reveal roots of [Canadian] intolerance (Arrigo, 2004, p. 206). Worse still, to 
fail the Taylor test launches an accused down a narrow path where outcomes become 
increasingly draconian as I will describe below.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Although all court translators are certified to translate in the system.  





Released on Bail 
 Many accused who are found fit are released from jail on bail39. If an accused is 
not properly before the court, he will be remanded back to another court for processing 
of bail40. But if the accused has a documented mental health issue that falls in the 
purview of 102 Court, and there is no question of fitness (or they have been found fit), 
bail is often arranged very quickly (sometimes the same day as their first court 
appearance) in 102 Court. As discussed, the alleged crimes of these accused are 
usually very minor, often described as “nuisance crimes”, so risk to the public is 
minimal. Negotiating bail conditions in 102 Court is collaborative, involving the Crown 
and defense, and the community contacts of the social workers. The conditions of bail 
are remarkably formulaic. There are four usual components even though each set of 
bail conditions is drafted to suit a specific accused and his/her alleged offense. First, a 
specification of where the accused will spend nights. This can range from going 
home to a shelter bed. For the many homeless clients of 102 Court, the social workers 
scramble to reserve a shelter bed in the community to facilitate release. This is 
particularly challenging for women accused because of the scarcity of Toronto 
community resources for women compared with men. Social workers might arrange one 
night of shelter then leave it to the accused to find herself ongoing accommodation. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This is often a $500, no deposit bail meaning no money is needed, nor will the state 
ever attempt to collect the $500 should bail conditions not be met. It is symbolic.  
40 This is the usual procedure, but there are exceptions where the personnel of 102 
Court release someone who is not properly before the court. This seems more likely to 
occur when the accused has been bouncing around the criminal justice system for what 
seems an exceptional amount of time.  




instance, one young woman reporting to the court as an out-of-custody accused was 
before the court and answering questions about where she was staying. She became 
agitated with the questions and rhetorically asked the duty counselor where he expected 
her to sleep. She was homeless, the shelters were unacceptable because the people 
stole from her, and she no longer qualified for detox because she was clean. Turning 
away from the judge and lawyers, she suggested that getting high might solve her 
housing problems, making her eligible for a detox bed. Secondly, bail conditions include 
a condition to report back to 102 Court, which includes meeting with a CRCT social 
worker. These reporting regimens are what draw so many out-of-custody accused to 
102 Court every morning at 10:00 am. Typically, they first check in with their assigned 
social worker at CRCT, adjacent to the courtroom. Then they sit in the body and wait for 
their name to be called. They simply rise, greet the judge, collect a yellow reminder slip 
for their next reporting appointment and leave the court. Generally reporting regimens 
begin with frequent reporting that lessens as their compliance with reporting regimens 
and other aspects of bail are demonstrated. Third, follow the advice of psychiatric 
practitioners and mental health care workers and sign any releases they require. 
Having an psychiatric appointment (or promising to have one soon) is, like housing, a 
critical component of release. This is the “treatment” cornerstone of diversion, 
mandating medications and transparency among different kinds of providers. 
Psychiatrists are provided with court papers and evidence of attendance and adherence 
from the practitioner’s office will be expected. Not following the advice or refusing 
medications may become an additional criminal offense, thus obligating practitioners to 




report such non-compliance. This fundamentally alters the doctor-patient relationship. 
Most accused I interviewed were well aware that their doctors were extensions of the 
law, including those who wanted the medications, tolerated the side effects, and felt 
better on medication than off. The descriptor “mental health care worker” ranges from 
the CRCT social workers and community-based social workers to psychiatrists. This 
accords authority to a group of people with a broad spectrum of education ranging from 
no university education to specialized medical training who concomitantly differ in 
autonomy and power. Many people adore their CRCT workers saying, “for some people, 
these people [CRCT social workers] are all they have” and describing them as 
“awesome”. However, their positionality as satellites of the law is recognized by accused 
and by the social workers themselves. If psychiatrists insist they take medications 
(whether they want to or not) and spend little time with them, the social workers are 
recognized as people who at least attempt (and often succeed) in securing resources 
and community connections for them, and this is very appreciated. Yet they remain, 
despite their good deeds, “court workers” as one man confused about ever meeting a 
social worker after months of meetings with court social workers told me. Finally, avoid 
the context of previous alleged offenses. Many of the nuisance crimes seen in 102 
Court are perseverative, the accused commit the same offense in the same place over 
and over again. In some cases, if the offense was committed less frequently it would not 
likely be pursued as an offense. For instance, one woman was accused of calling “9-1-
1” over 500 times in several weeks. The woman required a Russian language translator 
when she appeared in court and she did not seem to understand that dialing “9-1-1” was 




not the appropriate route to seeking non-emergency medical attention. A young man 
repeatedly visited a high-end metro hotel, believing he was interviewing for a job with 
FIFA. His belief brought him to the hotel lobby multiple times per day, eventually 
annoying the security staff, leading to police involvement. Another example is the “dash 
and apologize” escapades of James, a retired British gentleman. By all accounts, 
James had led a successful and average life until a few years ago. He had been 
married for decades, was a father to now-grown children, and had retired after a long 
career in the corporate world. He was energetic, well-spoken, very polite, and friendly. 
He enjoyed pub lunches with a pint of beer and was well-known in several downtown 
establishments. However, James’ mental health seemed to deteriorate recently, his wife 
separated from him, and he began to go for lunch without money. The numerous times I 
saw James in custody, his story was always the same – he ordered and enjoyed lunch, 
but had “forgotten his wallet” when the check came. At first, pub managers slapped him 
on the back and said they would catch up with him next time. But James’ new behavior 
was very consistent and he would return again and again to the same pubs and 
restaurants. His wife insisted that he had access to adequate amounts of money; he just 
did not bring any with him to lunch. James was a favorite among the clerks of 102 Court 
and one said she wished he would just “dash” after the “dine” instead of apologizing for 
his forgetfulness to the manager, and avoid the arrest.  
 The personnel of 102 Court worked proficiently to release people from prison. 
Even when all these conditions were in place and the accused agreed to them, an 
“immigration hold” might delay their release. When a person who is the process of 




immigration to Canada has a criminal charge leveled at him, immigration officials are 
notified and must review the file before release occurs.  
 
Ordering “Treatment”: Coercive Pharmaceuticalization 
 A finding of “unfit” in 102 Court, triggers a series of forms, consultations, and 
processes with very limited possible outcomes. Sometimes defense lawyers may 
successfully argue that perhaps more time with their clients (to coach them) would help 
improve the chances of a subsequent finding of fitness. Because fitness is a test of the 
moment it may be repeated over and over and individuals may have numerous findings 
of fitness over the course of one day or over several days. Perhaps part of this patience 
and persistence on the part of defense attorneys41 is an understanding of the less-than-
optimal consequences of being found unfit.  
 If an accused is deemed “unfit”, the Crown requests and is typically granted a 
form 48, the mental health court’s paperwork triggering consultation with a forensic 
psychiatrist. The judge signs the form and the accused will see the psychiatrist over the 
lunch break between approximately 1:00 and 2:00 pm. Any accused suspected of being 
unfit will, if possible, be screened with the Taylor test before the lunch break in order to 
streamline processing and make good use of the psychiatrist’s time over the lunch 
break. The accused meets with the psychiatrist for assessment of psychiatric well-
being, diagnosis, and fitness. Meetings take place in various locations including (but not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I have witnessed both judges and Crown attorneys who ask whether more time with 
their defense attorney might render an accused fit to stand trial, effectively prompting 
defense to request additional time.  




limited to) 102’s holding cells or the offices of the CRCT staff. By most standards of 
assessment, these are very brief meetings ranging in duration between five and 15 
minutes42.   
 Of the 372 men observed in 102 Court over three months, form 48s were issued 
in 33 cases (8%). Of these, 8 were white (24%), 15 were black (45%), 5 were Asian 
(15%), and 5 were other visible minorities (15%). This distribution differs significantly43 
from the distribution of ethnicities in Toronto according to census data. The frequencies 
among women were too low for statistical testing.  
 During the afternoon court session a fitness hearing is conducted during which 
the forensic psychiatrist takes the stand and testifies about the results of his meeting 
with the accused. The court clerk swears the psychiatrist in using either an oath or 
affirmation based on witness preference. Typically, the Crown begins questioning the 
psychiatrist about his meeting, his opinion of diagnosis and whether the doctor finds the 
accused fit or unfit as a result of the assessment. The defense attorney then cross-
examines the witness, often asking him about the duration of the meeting and the 
specific questions asked and how the accused answered those questions. Typically, the 
opinion of fitness offered by forensic psychiatrists, as experts, is accepted by the judge 
regardless of defense’s exposure of the brevity of the assessment. However, on one 
occasion during my period of observation, the forensic psychiatrist testified about the 
details of the questions and answers that formed the basis for her opinion of lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Forensic psychiatrists are sometimes asked about the duration of the meetings and 
all testimony I witnessed fell between 5 and 15 minutes.  
43  χ2 (3, N=33) = 10.385, p<0.05.  




fitness. When presented with the detailed answers provided by the accused the defense 
submitted that he believed the accused should be found fit and the judge agreed, thus 
overruling the judgment of the doctor.  
 If the psychiatrist’s testimony is that the accused is fit, the fitness hearing ends 
and the court will process the case for release from jail. But, if the psychiatrist assesses 
the accused as unfit, the Crown may (and usually does) opt to apply for a treatment 
order, which, if granted by the judge orders the accused to undergo mandatory 
treatment in a psychiatric hospital or the psychiatric unit of a hospital for a period no 
longer than 60 days. This order is based on the testimony of the forensic psychiatrist 
that the accused is likely to be rendered fit after the administration of antipsychotic 
medication.  
 Here fitness is reduced to a neuro-chemical imbalance, “treatable” with 
pharmaceuticals. It must be for this system to function. Variables with much more 
complex mechanisms such as cultural competence, language ability, or even the 
possibility that behaviors deemed symptomatic of psychosis might be intentional are 
theoretically recognized but rarely successfully invoked by the defense. For instance, 
muteness and not meeting the gaze of an assessing psychiatrist may be evidence of 
distraction due to voice-hearing or they may be intentional acts of non-cooperation by 
people experienced in poor treatment by those with authority, especially those 
associated with the criminal justice system. One psychiatrist testified that an accused 
she had just assessed was wearing a hoodie, which she interpreted as “isolating”. This 




was accepted though it is common knowledge that the all-metal cells are frigid in the 
winter.  
 Treatment orders, where accused are sent either to a psychiatric facility or unit, 
are laden with the benevolent language of healing and help. They are orders of 
“treatment” administered by “doctors” in “hospitals”. The psychiatric testimony always 
includes, sometimes in response to the Crown’s queries, a statement that in their expert 
opinion the treatment with antipsychotic pharmaceuticals (often named specifically 
during the testimony) is the “least invasive” method to render the accused fit to stand 
trial. Voluntariness is suspended here; the cooperation of the accused is irrelevant 
because if they refuse “treatment”, antipsychotic drugs will be administered by injection, 
while physically restraining the accused if needed. Ironically, for the loved ones of 
accused who witness these hearings, many are so relieved to hear their family 
members will receive “treatment” that they believe this is a benevolent judicial response 
to their loved one’s suffering. Defense attorneys are openly aware of the coercive and 
“draconian” nature of this “treatment” and are quick to disabuse client’s relatives that 
treatment orders are necessarily a good thing. Treatment orders, when first 
implemented in the court were most often requested by defense attorneys. But 
increasingly and unsurprisingly, it is the Crown attorney who will request treatment for 
an accused as it is an operationalization of the court’s bio-power (Foucault 1976) and an 
avenue towards neuro-chemical restraint and surveillance.  
 Defense attorneys rarely contest these draconian orders. Some told me that to 
ensure the best outcomes for their mentally ill clients before the court, it was important 




to “play nice”, be cooperative, and follow the well-defined and streamlined processes 
that see accused move rapidly from a finding of unfit to involuntary treatment. If they did 
this, Crown attorneys, the gatekeepers of the court, might be more inclined to consider 
other clients for the court in the future. Other defense attorneys seemed to genuinely 
believe that treatment orders were exactly what their clients needed. But some 
attorneys took advantage of opportunities to contest the request for a treatment order 
although their efforts were seldom successful. It was their belief that by amassing the 
paperwork of protest could, with enough time, cases, and paperwork change the 
system.  
 Women were sent on treatment orders more frequently than men. Of the 483 
people observed, 19 men (5%) and 10 women (9%) were sent on treatment orders. 
While female accused made up 23% of the accused I observed, they account for 53% of 
the treatment orders executed. Taken together 29 treatment orders were issued or 
treatment was ordered for 6% of accused.  
 
Dance of Responsibility: The Problem of the Seriously Mentally Ill 
 Bed shortages are a chronic issue for Ontario hospitals and having a legal 
obligation to provide a bed for an extended period of time (but no longer than 60 days) 
has a number of implications. The accused of 102 Court and similar mental health 
courts in the province must be triaged faster than the general public due to court order. 
Jumping the queue may be a point of criticism, with the recognition that people suffering 
from mental illness not in trouble with the law have medical attention delayed due to 




those who are in trouble with law. Of course, the counter-argument is that trouble with 
law is not a reflection of character or criminality per se, but a symptom of increased 
mental health severity, making their faster triage appropriate. Also, some parents of 
mentally ill adult children leverage this ability to jump the queue to access services 
faster. This has unintended consequences for families. For example, parents sometimes 
call the police to come to their homes due to the behavior of their adult children. They do 
this knowing that when the police are involved, authorities will need to intervene. They 
are very quick to label their children schizophrenic or bipolar hoping to temper the 
response by police and fast-track their children to mental health services. However, 
when a criminal act has occurred at a specific address or is directed at a particular 
person, say a parent, the conditions of release are very likely to include no contact with 
the alleged victim and place of the criminal act. This effectively cuts accused off from 
their family and their parents’ home, sometimes rendering an accused homeless.  
 Friction between the courts and the hospitals can result from the treatment order 
process. Once a treatment order has been signed, a bed must be located often days or 
weeks away. Representatives from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health who 
specialize in locating and reserving appropriate beds throughout the province come to 
court daily in order to provide the court with the date and facility name that will be part of 
the treatment order paperwork. The paperwork and accused will remain in jail until the 
date specified on the order to transfer them to the named institution for treatment. This 
delay must be deemed “reasonable” by the judge, but the definition of reasonable is not 
specified in the criminal code and case law and there is therefore room for various 




interpretations of “reasonableness”. I am certain that all judges that preside in 102 Court 
are well aware and variously sympathetic to bed shortages in the province. But, ruptures 
in this sympathy are also evident. Some judges, when presented with the dates that 
beds are available, will find the delay “unreasonable”, triggering events that lead cases 
to higher courts for resolution. This is the process of 102 Court where the tensions 
between courts and healthcare providers regarding responsibility is most evident. 
Schneider et al. (2007) have written that 102 Court is an attempt to ensure that mentally 
ill accused are directed back towards the appropriate social institution, namely 
medicine, and away from the criminal justice system, but the Canadian Criminal Code44 
does not authorize the courts to direct health care institutions to admit people, 
complicating the dance of responsibility.   
 Finally, when treatment orders are executed the beds that are available may be 
local, (in Toronto), but they may also be in various other Ontario cities including Ottawa 
and North Bay (at distances of 352 kilometers and 292 kilometers, respectively). Timely 
availability of appropriate beds is the primary concern here, but if an accused has family 
or other social support in Toronto, the distances to other locations and the many costs 
of travel (transportation, accommodation, childcare or eldercare, loss of wages, etc.) is 
often prohibitive for loved ones. Sometimes the communication between lawyers and 
families is less than optimal45, leaving parents46 very confused about the system that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Section 672 pertains to mental health law and the role of the court  
45 Defense attorneys are under obligation to their clients, of course, and therefore, are 
not required to speak to family members. Also, it is sometimes the case that an accused 
may forbid his/her lawyer from speaking with his social supports.  
46 I interviewed three parents of accused. They were all parents of adult accused.  




their son or daughter is being processed through. For instance, I met Vera early on in 
my court observation. She, like me, spent day after day observing the proceedings, and 
waiting between sessions in the hall outside 102 Court. Vera, born in Guyana, had 
immigrated to Canada with her young family decades earlier. She was 77 years old, 
walked with a cane, and was very worried about her youngest son, whose case was 
passing through 102 Court. My time in 102 Court overlapped with Vera and her son’s 
only at the end of his court time. He was found NCR (not criminally responsible) and 
remanded to the ORB (Ontario Review Board) indefinitely. However, Vera who said she 
faithfully attended all her son’s court dates despite her mobility issues and the slippery 
winter streets was very confused about where he was and what that meant. After many 
days of sitting next to one another, she leaned over and asked what I was doing in the 
court every day. I explained my research to her. She paused and asked, “So you’re an 
expert on this court”. I denied being an expert, but she was satisfied with her 
assessment and asked if I knew what “CAMH” meant. She said her son had been “in 
the CAMH” for months but she did not know what it was, where it was located, or what 
was happening to him there. I explained that CAMH was the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health, a Toronto hospital. She was happy he was no longer in prison but being 
“helped” in a hospital by doctors. I knew he had been on a treatment order and did not 
explain the veiled discipline and coercion of the order to her. After all, the treatment 
order was over by then. Vera was surprised that CAMH was located so close to her 
home and that she could have been visiting him for months. She asked if I knew the 
contact number for CAMH and I promised to call her that evening with a telephone 




number. When I called she asked if I might act on her behalf with CAMH staff because 
she did not know what to ask them. I declined but I did pass her story on to the social 
service workers of the court-affiliated CRCT. When I described Vera’s confusion, their 
representative became defensive, claiming their door was always open to help families 
of accused. This may be accurate in many cases and in theory, but it assumes a degree 
of knowledge of the system, how various professional roles and institutions overlap, and 
a degree of extroversion or social confidence that Vera did not possess.   
 I also met Rudy in the body of 102 Court. He was a regular in the court waiting for 
his son’s case to be called. His son had been on a treatment order and was “eligible” for 
NCR47, but was fighting this ruling and wished his case to be returned to the regular 
stream of justice. As a result of this legal course, the case came regularly before the 
court and I became friends with Rudy. Rudy was an older man who was born in Guyana 
and had lived in Canada for 30 years. He was a street preacher who lived roughly 40 
km northeast of the city in an outlying suburb. He was always present in 102 Court 
when his son was on the docket, but it involved hours of travel by bus on two separate 
bus systems to get to and from the downtown court. Because his job was very flexible 
he could be in court whenever his son needed him. After a few appearances while in 
custody, his son was released on a surety bail, with Rudy as his surety. This meant that 
his son would live with him and he (the son) was instructed to follow Rudy’s rules and 
advice. If the son failed to do so or in any other way violated the rules of his release, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This is the language of NCR in 102 Court. Being found not criminally responsible may 
lead to indefinite detention, yet the common language used to frame NCR implies it is a 
welcome privilege for an accused.  




Rudy was obligated to report his son’s transgressions to the court. Rudy’s failure to do 
so could result in criminal charges. Rudy accepted these conditions and his son went 
home with him after spending months in detention in both jails and hospitals. One of the 
conditions of his release was to continue to take injectable antipsychotic medications48. 
Rudy was dedicated to his son and did not want me, the court personnel, or anyone 
else to “think badly” of him. For this reason, it took months before Rudy shared with me 
that he was having a very difficult time with the “house arrest”, as he described his role 
of surety. He desperately wanted the conditions of release changed, to ease the 
pressure on him and the tensions of living with his son, but the defense attorney was his 
son’s lawyer and did not take direction from Rudy, so another day in court did not result 
in a request to withdraw surety. He says he is “so tired” of him. His son is having 
nightmares about being watched even though he is on medication. Rudy says he is 
behaving as if “he’s on something” but has found nothing in the house to support this. 
He bullies Rudy and Rudy is having trouble controlling his actions. The son wanders off, 
they argue regularly, and Rudy reluctantly admitted that he was afraid of him.   
   
Into a Zone of Exception: Remand to the Ontario Review Board (ORB) 
 The most serious outcome if an accused remains unfit to stand trial after they 
have been on a treatment order is remand to the Ontario Review Board (ORB). Remand 
(or being ordered) to the ORB indicates that a person will be sent indefinitely to a 
forensic psychiatric unit of a hospital.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Which was read aloud in court officially as “follow the direction and advice of your 
psychiatric practitioner”.   




 Each case is reviewed at least once per year to determine if they may be eligible 
to face their charges49, in other words, if they have become fit to stand trial. If the ORB 
deems them fit to stand trial, they return to 102 Court to re-assess fitness and proceed 
to bail. However, it is not unusual that the end result is detention in a psychiatric ward 
for years for alleged offenses as minor as mischief or theft of a bottle of water from a 
convenience store.  
 Of the 483 people (men and women) observed over three months, 12 (11 men 
and one woman) were remanded to the ORB. While this number is too small to reliably 
test significance, it is disturbing that 8 of the 12 (67%) people remanded to the ORB 
were visible minorities. This concern was echoed by several defense attorneys who 
shared concerns about racial and gender biases with ORB procedures. I spoke with a 
forensic psychiatrist who worked at one of the psychiatric facilities that people from 102 
Court were admitted to following a finding of not criminally responsible. He spoke of the 
racism he witnessed in the facility. He had a patient who had been “detained”50 at the 
hospital under the auspices of the ORB since 1988. The patient was black and accused 
people in the hospital of racism. The psychiatrist said that he complained so loudly and 
regularly of discrimination that he was labeled “aggressive and uncooperative”, which 
perpetuated his detention. A lawyer who regularly attended the ORB hearings about 
whether to release accused said that she was struck by the number of black women 
being detained in psychiatric facilities who were denied release because they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 There were 1,622 accused under the jurisdiction of the ORB in 2010-2011 (Simpson 
2011).  
50 His word 




deemed “aggressive”. Further research is warranted concerning racial disparity among 
people detained under the auspices of the ORB.  
  
What Happens to “Bad” Legal Subjects? 
 The case of Mark51, a university student, is an example of the injustices of being 
a “bad” legal subject before the court. Mark was arrested for mischief and assaulting a 
police officer52 in Spring 2010. He was released from jail, but failed to report to the bail 
program as required, incurring further charges. He was re-arrested and found his way to 
102 Court in custody during the winter of 2012, where I first saw him. He was a trim, 
young black man. His case was at first unremarkable. He appeared one cold morning in 
a flurry of in-custodies. He was found unfit, was assessed by a forensic psychiatrist over 
lunch, who later testified he was unfit. For Mark’s part, he was completely 
uncommunicative in court. The second day he appeared and remained silent except for 
a brief outburst in French. The court officers were leading him out of the box and into 
the cells when he yelled, “Trois cent soixante et un avenue l’Universite” [361 University 
Avenue]. The judge yelled, “stop” to the court officers. Having just been found unfit to 
stand trial, he had yelled out the address of the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto. 
The judge asked rhetorically if being francophone was equivalent to being unfit. The 
judge was visibly annoyed and spoke briefly in French to the accused. On the third day, 
a treatment order hearing was held before a different judge without a French translator 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 To ensure Mark’s anonymity, all identifying features about this case have been 
changed slightly.  
52 Assaulting a police officer covers a spectrum of behaviors from attempting to hurt an 
officer to struggling during an arrest.  




despite the previous day’s events. He was brought into the prisoner’s box and 
presented very differently than he had before. He looked around the courtroom and he 
clutched a folded piece of paper in his hands. A second forensic psychiatrist took the 
stand (the first had testified to his fitness the previous day53) to offer evidence in support 
of the Crown’s request for a treatment order. He testified that he had met with the 
accused but that he [the accused] had refused to speak with him. He offered that he had 
been wearing a hoodie, evidence of isolating behavior, and concluded that he was unfit 
to stand trial54. Formulaically, he said that the least invasive treatment to render him fit 
to stand trial would be injectable antipsychotic medication and anti-side effect 
medications including anti-Parkinson’s medications. But the defense argued that the 
Crown had not demonstrated that the accused could be made fit within 60 days, and 
therefore the treatment order should be denied. Once again, the duty counselor asked 
the accused the Taylor test questions for fitness. This time, Mark spoke but did not 
answer the questions asked. Instead he asked in English and French for the matter to 
be returned to Superior court. He named justices (accurately by the reaction of court 
personnel) who worked at 361 University Avenue. He asked the judge to read him his 
charges. He said no one had done so yet. The judge complied and began skimming the 
list. Mark reached his arms through the circular speaking hole in the plexi-glass 
prisoner’s partition and palms up he entreated the judge, “verbatim”. He read him all the 
details of his allegations. Duty argued that because of his accurate recall of judges’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Recall that because fitness is a test of the moment, it may be administered over and 
over and the result may change moment to moment or day to day. The repetition of a 
fitness test described in this case is common in 102 Court.  
54 It is not unusual for fitness to be tested repeatedly in a short period of time.  




names and his demonstrated knowledge about arraignment practices, that fitness 
should be re-assessed. Repeated attempts to establish fitness by the duty counselor 
failed. Duty had a brief (less than five minute) sidebar with his client after which Mark 
answered the Taylor test questions accurately, quickly, and confidently. The Crown 
jumped to her feet and demanded to know why Mark had not answered these questions 
earlier. Even as a spectator the length and circularity of this questioning was frustrating, 
so her reaction is perhaps understandable but it is inconsistent with the nature of the 
Taylor test as a test of the moment. Mark seemed to not understand her question. The 
judge also asked why he had not answered the questions earlier. Looking confused, he 
asked the court reporter to read back what had just transpired. Mark was found unfit, 
and angrily accused the judge, whom he addressed by name, of bias based on her 
previous work with the police as he was being led into the cells.  Mark was sent on a 
treatment order and returned to 102 Court two months later, found fit, and released on 
bail. But two weeks after that (mid-April), he had failed to report as required by his bail, 
and was re-arrested with another charge. By this time a June trial date had been set but 
the Crown attorney was concerned that he would not remain fit until his trial date in the 
regular stream. Despite her concerns, he was released on his own recognizance and 
asked to report to 102 Court every Friday. For Mark, between Spring 2010 and 
September 2012, his problems escalated, his charges increased, he was arrested 
numerous times, medicated involuntarily, and his legal problems had not yet been 
resolved. It was unclear if he was more comfortable in English or French, further 
exacerbating his problems.  




Approaches to Defense 
In the dance of responsibility evident in the processes of 102 Court, the role of 
defense attorney stood out as particularly important. Some accused had private 
attorneys, others were represented by duty counselors, but it seemed that people who 
had been swirling around the system in the revolving door of 102 Court had found 
private representation55. Defense attorneys may have more power to influence 
outcomes than is immediately obvious. An informant within the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health explained to me that if a defense attorney seeks a finding of fit or unfit for 
their client, they schedule their client’s appearance on days when specific forensic 
psychiatrists will appear in 102 Court because there are patterns of psychiatric 
diagnoses that are more related to the psychiatrist rather than the symptoms of an 
accused. I got to know several defense attorneys over the course of my ethnographic 
work. I describe below two of the approaches of private defense attorneys and the 
variations that may impact outcomes for clients.  
One defense attorney, Peter, was very regularly in 102 Court. He was a very 
likable man and many accused (both interviewees and people I met doing research in 
the court) mentioned him as a wonderful lawyer. He was one of the first people who 
asked me about my work in the court and towards the end of my fieldwork he stopped 
me in the hall to talk. He said he had never seen anyone so dedicated to observing the 
court and asked me to have lunch with him to hear more about the study. Peter had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Private attorneys were likely being paid as legal aid lawyers. Law firms must provide 
a certain percentage of work as legal aid. They may opt to increase that kind of work, 
but it will earn less money than regularly billable work.  




started 20 years earlier as a duty counselor but had quickly gone into private practice. 
He was, perhaps as one might expect, very well-spoken, with carefully chosen phrases. 
He described his clients as “indigent, vulnerable, and poor” who he regarded as “more 
than mentally ill”. He appreciated the intractable and chronic nature of their problems, 
although it was unclear if he was referring to their mental health problems, their legal 
problems, problems associated with poverty, or some combination thereof. He said that 
because his practice consisted of mentally ill accused, it pays much less and takes 
more time (he often works nights and weekends – the only times when he can focus) 
but the work is more interesting to him. He confirmed (what others lawyers had told me) 
that working cases involving the seriously mentally ill often lasted much longer than 
other lawyer-client relationships56. Peter felt that he could have greater impact in his 
clients’ lives with the extended case period.  
 Peter, like other attorneys I spoke with, made a distinction between individual 
cases and the “big picture”. As a young duty counselor, with no trial experience, he did 
not appreciate the big picture as he does now. He described a grey zone between the 
letter of the law and normal legal practices, an elaborate chess game that needed to be 
strategically negotiated in the best interests of clients.  For instance, there is a plethora 
of approaches to following client instructions (and respecting their autonomy) and 
offering them advice about how best to navigate the system. He cited a fair amount of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 There is a financial disincentive to work with the seriously mentally ill accused 
because legal aid only pays for a case once it is resolved. So if these cases last longer, 
lawyers put in more work before being paid for it. More work per case means fewer 
cases overall, which also negatively impacts revenue. This is in addition to the lower 
wage they are paid for legal aid work.  




paternalism in the system and admitted that as a younger lawyer, he told his clients 
what to do. Of course, this implies that he also decided what was “best” for them.  
 He said the spirit of the Canadian criminal code dedicated to mentally ill accused 
emphasized their autonomy and their choice to access the regular stream of justice, and 
hence the adversarial stream. In his experience, some accused benefit from the 
adversarial process, from telling their story and having someone weigh their story 
equally with the story told by the crown attorney and police. It is ironic that the regular 
stream of justice, not 102 Court, offers a platform for an accused to tell their story and 
have it considered equally (at least in theory) as that of the prosecution. The power 
differentials of 102 Court, and specifically the unquestioned authority of psychiatrists, 
rendered the story of an accused irrelevant at best and a symptom at worst.  
 Peter was well aware of critics of mental health courts who complained of the 
intense surveillance of the accused by the court, but the surveillance was a fair trade for 
him because he said, many accused would likely “never get bail in the regular stream”.  
 Peter was one sort of advocate for accused and perhaps the most obviously 
passionate I encountered during my field work. He looked at accused as people and 
individuals and advocated for them as they navigated the criminal justice system. He 
actively wrestled with ethical concerns about autonomy and paternalism and iteratively 
tweaked his practice to reflect what he considered best practices. Peter referenced the 
“big picture” but there were attorneys who approach best practice from an even more 
macro lens and with different goals.  




 Marian, another defense attorney in private practice, seemed to be one of the 
most competent lawyers I witnessed in 102 Court. So, I was shocked when she sat 
down next to me in the hall one day and started a conversation by saying she was not 
always sure what defense counsel was supposed to do. “Was it to help?”, she asked, 
then quickly answered, “No, it isn’t”.  In her opinion, mentally ill accused were as entitled 
to make poor decisions as other clients. However, she admitted she spent a 
considerable amount of time trying to talk her clients out of stupid choices. She 
reminisced about a conversation she had with a psychiatrist in the late 1980s. “Why”, 
she asked “was the criminal justice system (and the NCR finding) the preferred route to 
deal with seriously mentally ill people who need ongoing hospitalization compared with 
the civil commitment route. Her question juxtaposed the forensic and civil commitment 
processes. This dissertation focuses on the forensic route, but there are other avenues 
in Ontario through which people come to inhabit psychiatric facilities or wards on a long-
term basis. The civil commitment process is governed by the Ontario Mental Health Act. 
Although the outcomes may be quite similar between these two routes to commitment, 
the forensic system including 102 Court produces medical-legal subjects (or forensic 
subjects) who never lose the legal aspect of their identity, whereas the civil commitment 
route produces medical subjects only. Legal professionals remain part of the power 
hierarchy that determines outcomes for forensic subjects. For instance, when an 
accused is considered for release from a psychiatric institution, a hearing is held that is 
presided over by psychiatrists, crown attorneys, judges, and defense attorneys. This is 




the composition of the Ontario Review Board57 [ORB] that manages and oversees the 
disposition of accused detained in psychiatric facilities or wards after they have been 
found not criminally responsible for their crimes58. Marion posed this question about the 
route to psychiatric detention in the late 1980s to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist’s 
answer was that the NCR route enabled people to be “treated”. Of course this is a 
recollected conversation from decades earlier, but it impressed her sufficiently to bring it 
into our brief conversation that day. One of the main differences between these two 
routes to commitment concerns consent59. There are a series of safeguards regarding 
consent for treatment that are part of the Mental Health Act and may delay the 
administration of pharmaceuticals compared with the practices possible with a finding of 
NCR. Marion summed up our conversation with her opinion that the commitment route 
through a finding of NCR may be considered treatment, but is “coercive”.  
 The agendas, motivations, and approaches of defense attorneys impact 
outcomes in 102 Court. The attorneys I met who wanted to speak with me knew my 
interest was understanding 102 Court from the perspective of accused and this may 
have influenced who chose to get to know me and how they framed discussions with 
me. But, as I illustrated above, many factors go into what may be a client’s best 
interests, impacting an accused’s experience as well as legal and medical outcomes.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Psychologists and public members appointed by Lieutenant Governor in Council are 
also part of the composition of the Ontario Review Board (Ontario Review Board, 2011).  
58 In order to be found not criminally responsible for a crime, the accused must plead 
guilty. 
59 And may or may not be what the psychiatrist meant by “treated”.  




Bio-power and Subjectivation in 102 Court 
 To conclude this chapter I turn to Foucault’s concepts of panopticism (Foucault, 
1977) and bio-power (Foucault, 1976) and bio-power’s expansion by Rabinow and Rose 
(2006) discussed in Chapter One. First, 102 Court is a strong example of bio-power at 
work. Recall Rabinow and Rose’s three characteristic elements of bio-power which have 
been discussed above: truth discourses and the authorities who are deemed competent 
to speak them; strategies for intervention aimed at an emergent biosocial population in 
the name of health or life; and a form of subjectification in which individuals are called 
upon to self-govern (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). The truth discourses most clearly in effect 
in 102 Court involve the diagnoses and testimony of forensic psychiatrists. Their 
testimony is routinized and often exactly matches the passages of the Canadian 
criminal code that relates to mental health law. Even when they admit no background 
information and a brief period of assessment they are able and do make 
recommendations that might include involuntary pharmaceutical administration or 
indefinite detention under the auspices of the Ontario Review Board. The emergent 
biosocial population of concern to 102 Court is the non-violent mentally disordered 
accused. Foucault’s idea of bio-politics includes the identification of problem populations 
within society and the targeted regulatory techniques that might protect the whole from 
this internal threat. In some ways, this protection of the social whole from a pathological 
sub-population is very clear. The crown attorney’s job is to weigh the good of the public 
against the rights of the individual. More subtly, 102 Court regulates the mentally ill 
accused, streamlining their interactions with state institutions like jails and hospitals to 




increase efficiencies that benefit everyone. The subjectivation processes of 102 Court 
stress that court is envisioned as a therapeutic agent in accordance with the principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence. However, in practice 102 Court remains an agent of 
discipline (as traditional courts are) and becomes an agent of regulation that employs 
neuro-biological authority, pharmaceutical technologies, and rationalizing medical 
discourses to silence, isolate, and otherwise render the accused invisible to the general 
public. Foucault tells us that disciplinary mechanisms produce docile bodies and 
regulatory mechanisms insulate society from risky internal abnormalities. The bio-power 
of 102 Court insulates the public by rendering the accused docile. It is a suturing of 
anatomo-political and bio-political powers.  
 The truth discourses articulated by forensic psychiatrists parrot the Canadian 
Criminal Code but their authority as therapeutic professionals rationalizes and de-
politicizes even the most draconian treatment orders before the court. Rabinow and 
Rose (2006) discuss the possibility that these truth discourses may not be purely 
biological. This is seen in the hybridization of forensic psychiatric discourses that 
present psychotic symptoms as manageable, physiological, while framing the accused 
as de-contextualized, under-medicated symptom clusters and pharmaceutical 
interventions as “magic bullet60” solutions. The authority of the forensic psychiatrists is 
shocking. Recall the interpretation by one psychiatrist of isolating behavior by an 
accused who was wearing a hoodie. Discourses and practices revolve around the 
merged concerns of risk management (risk of harm to self and society) and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The “Magic bullet” model of medicine is basically to discover the cause of a disorder 
and develop a treatment to counteract it (Whitaker, 2010).   




moderation through pharmaceutical technologies of self. Diversion through 102 Court, 
is, after all, a “voluntary” endeavor, where accused are threatened or punished through 
criminal sanctions for withdrawing their cooperation if that takes the form of missing 
court or non-compliance to a medication regimen. This reflects Rabinow and Rose’s 
(2006) modes of subjectification (Foucault, 1994; Rabinow & Rose, 2006) through which 
individuals are brought to work on themselves. Accused are encouraged (some might 
say coerced with promises of stayed or withdrawn charges) to embrace their sick selves 
and take the medicine that will make them better (citizens). In the next chapter 
dedicated to the perspective of the accused, Big Al’s experience of 102 Court is 




























Chapter Three: Exploring the Experiences of Accused 
“the unwanted and scared, the outcast” (Rudy, father of an accused, describing his adult 
son) 
“we’re people too” (Big Al, former accused with schizophrenia) 
 
 A critical analysis of 102 Court demands attention to its impact on the lives of 
accused from their own perspectives. There are several approaches that might 
accomplish this goal, but I have chosen a phenomenological approach. This chapter is 
focused on the theoretical background of the method used, an exploration of the 
experiences of nine accused who have successfully completed diversion in 102 Court, 
and the meaning of those experiences for them.  I followed an established 
methodological framework (Smith et al., 2009), so the discussion focuses on the 
philosophical ideas that most informed the method of Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA). As introduced in the first chapter, IPA has three theoretical axes: 
phenomenological, hermeneutical, and idiographic and I will focus this discussion more 
on the phenomenological and hermeneutical axes and less on the idiographic. This 
approach is theoretically rooted in aspects of phenomenological philosophy first 
elaborated in the nineteenth century by Husserl and his one-time assistant Heidegger61 
and their intellectual legacies.  
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phenomenological work, Heidegger’s conceptions are central to my approach.  





Phenomenology in Social Science and Social Work 
 While most phenomenology can trace its intellectual roots to Husserl and 
Heidegger, phenomenology has influence beyond the purview of philosophy and is 
recognized as a major qualitative approach in social science research (see Creswell, 
1994). As Zahavi (2008) succinctly puts it, “by presenting a detailed account of human 
existence, where the subject is understood as an embodied and socially and culturally 
embedded being-in-the world, phenomenology has provided crucial inputs to a whole 
range of empirical disciplines including psychiatry, sociology, literary studies, 
architecture, ethnology, and developmental psychology” (Zahavi, 2008, p. 662).  
 Both social workers and anthropologists have leveraged this body of work for 
their own purposes. However, the IPA method of Smith et al. (2009) was first 
established in the area of health psychology (for a review see Brocki & Wearden, 2006). 
It is suitable for a range of research approaches and topics including health and illness, 
psychological distress, and life transitions and identity (Smith et al., 2009). For example, 
IPA’s idiographic commitment makes it a good choice for in-depth case studies (of one 
person or a small number of people) common in psychology and health studies. IPA 
was used in studies that explored the personal experience of various health conditions 
including chronic fatigue syndrome (Arroll & Senior, 2008), chronic back pain (Smith & 
Osborn, 2007), and multiple sclerosis (Borkoles, Nicholls, Bell, Butterly, & Polman, 
2008). IPA has been used in studies of psychological distress from the perspective of 
sufferers such as Howes, Benton, and Edwards (2005) study of six women with 




traumatic brain injury.  Kam and Midgeley (2006) explored the perspectives of five 
mental health professionals who make decisions about referring children for 
psychotherapy. IPA has also been adopted for user-led62 investigations such as the 
work by Pitt, Kilbride, Nothard, Welford, and Morrison (2007) who explored the 
experience of recovery from psychosis. Four in-depth interviews with young people who 
had experienced homelessness formed the basis for an analysis of identity in a study 
conducted by Riggs and Coyle (2002).  
 Phenomenology and subjectivity have long been of interest to anthropologists 
and can be traced back to the work of Boas and the Boasians in the American tradition. 
Hallowell (1955) explicitly theorized cultural phenomenology and many followed in this 
intellectual trajectory. Geertz, for instance, used phenomenology to explore subjectivity 
in various parts of the world and was dedicated to using phenomenology is his work 
(see Good 2012). Phenomenological anthropology continues to enjoy favor with some 
anthropologists. Csordas (1994) has written about experience and embodiment. Corin 
and Jenkins are anthropologists who work is in this tradition and whose research 
interest is in mental illness. Both have done work on the experience of schizophrenia 
(see for instance Corin, 1998, Jenkins & Carpenter-Song, 2008). Jenkins’ interest in the 
lived experience of voice-hearing remains strong (Jenkins, 2012).  
 Medical anthropologist and former Geertz student Byron Good has recently 
written of his frustration with phenomenology as a theory of subjectivity, particularly the 
inability to explore what is hidden (Good, 2012). He takes cultural phenomenology to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 User-led research refers to studies where service users control all stages of the 
research process (Rose 2003).   




task for failing to deal effectively with complex psychological experiences and political 
subjectivity, two intellectual threads that recent studies of subjectivity have fostered 
(Good, 2012). A recent edited volume on subjectivity with contributors primarily working 
in anthropology rejects phenomenology (and other singular analytic frameworks) as 
sufficient to account for the inner world and the intersubjective relations that constitute 
subjectivity (Biehl et al., 2007).  There is a tremendous amount of cross-disciplinary 
phenomenological work with psychiatrists relying on cultural phenomenology in their 
work and phenomenological anthropologists drawing from various philosophical sources 
for their theorization.  
 Social workers have employed phenomenological approaches in both research 
and clinical interventions. Black and Enos (1981) argued that phenomenology was 
particularly well suited to operationalize as clinical intervention. They were interested in 
innovating a self-reflective poetic intervention and used the philosophical underpinnings 
of phenomenology as their validation for doing so (Black & Enos, 1981). A recent 
dissertation by Tara Earls Larrison (2009) explored the professional use of self in 
pedagogy and practices of social work education. A person-in-context approach and a 
client-centered perspective both implicitly incorporate phenomenological concepts, but 
are perhaps under theorized in social work. Wherever social work overlaps with thinking 
in sociology and psychology, where experience is theorized and prioritized one can find 
phenomenological approaches.  
 There are only a handful of studies that apply any sort of phenomenological 
approach to studies of legal processes. Notably among these, is a Swedish study that 




employed IPA to explore the experiences of sexually abused children with the legal 
process (Back, Gustafsson, Larsson, & Bertero, 2011). My rationale for choosing 
interpretative phenomenological analysis as a method is, in part to leverage the close 
disciplinary thought between psychology and social work to begin to think about 
connections between the more theoretical aspects of phenomenology and subjectivity 
and the practice and research of social work.  
 
Method: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
 The phenomenological branch of this research was designed to utilize Smith et 
al.’s (2009) interpretative phenomenological method. I selected this method and 
designed this part of the study accordingly not just because it helps me organize and 
analyze data but also because it offers some overlap between phenomenological 
analysis familiar to anthropology and phenomenological methodology increasingly 
recognized and utilized among health professionals (Smith et al., 2009). Also, by using 
an established protocol, I have been able to share preliminary results with researchers 
who share methodological and/or substantive interests and discuss possibilities for 
future collaborations. 
 As a method IPA demands studying a small number of people through prolonged 
engagement to develop patterns and relationships of meaning. Smith et al. (2009) 
acknowledge the difficulty in determining sample size, which may vary, based on the 
level of commitment to individual case analysis, the richness of individual accounts, and 
structural constraints. They recommend a sample size of three for most undergraduate 




and Master’s studies and more complexity (rather than increased sample size) for the 
doctoral level researcher (Smith et al., 2009). Following their recommendations, I will 
present detailed excerpts from four individual interviews, emphasize a comparison 
between two “success stories” of 102 Court, trace the key similarities and differences 
among accused, and augment the discussion with data from the other five interviews 
with accused and courtroom ethnography.  
 Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants and selection was based on 
referral from community contacts, opportunities that arose due to the extended period of 
participant observation in and near 102 Court, and snowballing wherein accused would 
introduce me to another accused they thought might wish to participate in this study. I 
used what I came to think of as “passive recruitment” among potential accused I met 
through opportunity or snowballing. I waited until a person approached me and engaged 
in a reasonable conversation about the court and my role there. I never mentioned 
reimbursement during my initial contact with accused, opting to wait until, as a clinically 
trained social worker, I deemed a person consistent, logical, and appropriate enough to 
discuss research with. For some accused, voices are so prominent it is very difficult to 
converse and focus. I was seeking the most successful and stable 102 Court 
participants, and extreme distraction and an inability to focus were exclusion criteria.  
 IPA demands a homogenous sample, although the precise interpretation and 
operationalization of homogeneity varies from study to study (Smith et al., 2009). In this 
case, all participants were adults who had passed through 102 Court as accused. Nine 




accused consented to participate in this study63. The accused had all been diagnosed 
with a mental health problem that featured psychosis and had been accused of a minor 
crime within Toronto. The accused had all completed diversion through the mental 
health court. Of the participants, eight were male and one was female. Six men were 
white of various ethnic backgrounds, one was of black Caribbean descent, and one was 
a sub-Saharan African immigrant. The one female accused interviewed was white, 
originally from Canada’s East Coast. The two most common diagnoses among this 
group are schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Dinshaw, 2010). This study did not 
enquire directly about diagnoses and there was no triangulation of diagnostic claims 
made by participants. Although not everyone who appears before 102 Court is involved 
in diversion, everyone who participated in the phenomenological arm of the research 
had been in diversion within four years of participating in the study.   
 Diversion may occur at the behest of the arresting officer(s), pre-trial, or post-trial. 
For the purposes of this study, only survivors who have completed the pre-trial and trial 
processes were considered for participation. This means they were no longer in 
custody; they had been released and were living independently in the community, and 
were returning for report (or had completed the reporting process) to 102 Court. Only 
persons formerly processed through the TMHC who had been released to the 
community and not classified as prisoners under Canadian law were considered for 
inclusion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 All formal recruitment occurred in May, June, July, and August 2012 after the 
University of Michigan’s board of review approved this study and sufficient time had 
passed for accused and professionals associated with the court to trust me.  




 Two men were referred to the study by community social workers that considered 
them success stories of the court. Relationships with the remaining seven participants 
developed over the course of my eight-month participant observation of the court. I met 
these seven people during their reporting phase of diversion, either in the courtroom, in 
the hall outside 102 Court, in the area around the courthouse, and in the case of one 
man, along my daily walk from my apartment to the courthouse where I would pass his 
regular panhandling corner.  
 Interviews with three of the nine accused occurred in just one sitting. Two of 
these accused were referrals from community social workers that had long been away 
from the courthouse. They agreed to participate but with the condition that I did not 
know their names. I had no means to conduct follow-up interviews and knew that would 
be the case before the interview began. All interviews were held in public spaces. 
Adjacent to the Toronto courthouse is a large urban mall, numerous cafes and public 
squares. They are busy, heavily trafficked areas that are so public they offer a modicum 
of privacy. Upon consent from participants, one of several locations was selected and 
interviews occurred in public squares, the mall food court and several nearly coffee 
shops depending on the interviewees coffee preference (Tim Horton’s, Timothy’s, or 
Starbucks). One interview lasted so long (more than four hours) that we walked and 
talked. While this made note taking more challenging, it put the interviewee at ease. All 
participants were compensated $20 for their time64 before the interview began. Two of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 All but one participant insisted on buying me coffee with this money despite my 
protests.  




the nine interviews were audiotaped65, but one was cut short after approximately one 
hour when we began walking through a busy, loud mall. I continued to take notes as I 
walked. Notes were taken during all interviews including those that were electronically 
recorded. Interviews with accused spanned one to five meetings per person and were 
roughly 10 minutes to 4+ hours in duration.  
 
Bracketing 
 Following from Husserl’s phenomenological attitude, bracketing, or setting aside 
our taken-for-grantedness is an ongoing process through IPA. Bracketing is a form of 
reflexivity about all aspects of the research process from interview questions through 
interpretation.  Heidegger warns specifically about the constant presence of pre-
conceptions (which he calls fore-concept, fore-having, fore-sight) that are also a 
constant threat to interpretation of the experience being examined (“the things 
themselves”).  He says, “an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of 
something presented to us” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 191-192). For Heidegger, in 
interpretation, “….our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, 
but rather…..by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 195). Due to the iterative quality of the bracketing process, some 
flexibility in interview questions is required and this is easily accommodated by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Method of recording interviews was determined by the interviewee. Many of the 
accused I spoke with had symptoms consistent with schizophrenia, some with paranoid 
tendencies and therefore the use of an electronic recording device made some 
uncomfortable.	  	  




open-ended interviews of this project. Despite the long history of concerns about 
preconceptions and the special phenomenological term (borrowed from mathematics) of 
bracketing, Smith et al. (2009) offer few insights into how to bracket. My response to this 
dilemma is to disclose the most obvious assumptions that arose for me during the 
interviews and subsequent interpretation of data.  
 My second interview was with a young man (Brian) who had graduated that day 
from diversion. So, he was fresh out of an exit interview with a social worker and had 
recently completed a rigorous reporting schedule that would have included regular 
meetings with a social worker every time he reported to court. Further, it was on a 
recommendation from a social worker regarding his high degree of stability, remarkable 
recovery, and strong communication skills that we were put into contact with one 
another. Brian spoke about his lawyer, about the addiction workers he knew, and about 
psychiatrists, but he never used the words “social worker”. It was notable and I became 
very aware that he was using other professional titles, could name those professionals 
by name, understood the system very well, but said nothing about social workers. So I 
asked him directly about his experiences with social workers, to which he smirked and 
said, “I have never met a social worker, just court workers”. This exchange brought into 
relief two assumptions I brought to the project: that social workers were likely to be 
positive influences in the processes of the court and that they played prominent, key 
roles in the process. Their physical proximity to the court and their professional alliances 
with it seemed necessary for efficient and effective practice. However, for Brian (and 
other accused I met) the overt camaraderie between social workers and court workers, 




the easy flow of people between the two privileged spaces of the courtroom and the 
social workers’ offices, even the sharing of file documents between the two groups may 
have blurred the boundary between those who punish and those who help.  
 The reflexive and ongoing process of bracketing impacted how I conducted the 
interviews and the flexibility of open-ended interviews enabled me to slightly alter my 
questions. I quickly learned that beginning with, “Please tell me about 102 Court” raised 
eyebrows. It seemed from my first two interviews that people narrated their experience 
of the court as part of their legal troubles, and these narratives almost always began 
with arrest. Therefore, I learned to bracket my focus on the court processes in my 
interview questions and to take a broader approach. I altered my first to, “Please tell me 
how you got to 102 Court”.  
 
Tracing Themes Among the Accused 
 I transcribed the audio-tapes and written notes, focusing line-by-line on the 
experiential “claims, concerns, and understandings of each participant” to begin to 
organize the data and trace themes among participants (after Smith et al., 2009, p. 79). 
First, I considered each person’s experiences individually. Once each person’s interview 
had been analyzed, I compared the narratives for recurring themes. Here I present six 
themes that peppered the experiences of the accused I interviewed. I go further than 
Smith et al. (2009) suggest by augmenting the phenomenological data of accused with 
the experiences and perspectives of parents of accused, professionals associated with 
the court, and my observations of 102 Court processes and relationships.  Also, the 




narratives of all participants began with their trouble with the police, usually their arrest 
and were presented as part of the experience of 102 Court. The themes are not 
restricted to the courtroom, courthouse or diversion experiences, but include elements 
of their lives that preceded arrest and subsequent 102 Court appearances or elements 
of their lives that have remained constant despite 102 Court and diversion. I have 
arranged the themes in three clusters: experiences before 102 Court, experiences of 
102 Court and diversion, and enduring experiences. While I have attempted to balance 
the voices of the accused that follow, my recording methods made this challenging. The 
audio-taped interviews offer much more complete quotations. My note-taking skills 
improved over time, but some of my early interviews were less than ideal. Therefore 
many of the quotations that follow belong to Big Al, Maria, and Brian (the first two being 
the audio-taped interviews). I am less comfortable quoting other participants from my 
notes, so I have paraphrased their experiences and connected them to those of Big Al, 
Maria, and Brian.  
 
1. Social Isolation 
 Almost everyone I interviewed spoke about the isolation from their family and 
their general loneliness. Some were from distant provinces and therefore physically 
separated; others had extended family in other countries and had not seen them in 
years. It is likely that the symptoms they suffered caused a fair amount of isolation. For 
instance Maria described her poor relationship with her mother who lives in Nova 
Scotia. She had two children aged 10 years and 13 years. She had not spoken with the 




elder child, a son, for six and a half years. She was emaciated, doing street drugs, and 
exchanging sex for money well into her second pregnancy and placed that child, a 
daughter, for adoption. She could recall the first names and occupations of the adoptive 
parents, but actively worried about how “they were touching her” now that she was 
getting older. Maria described her childhood sexual abuse and was very concerned that 
her daughter might also have those experiences. She described herself as “lonely and 
scared” and said there were “a lot of people I can’t trust. And I lost people I can trust… 
but I can’t trust. I want to. I trust people on the surface but I can’t get close enough to 
any body anymore for it to be real and safe”. Brian described his enduring isolation. He 
said, “my last girlfriend was always threatening to kill me, my family has nothing to do 
with me, I’m on my own”. Jack painfully described his estrangement from his father who 
pressed charges against him. He called the police on Christmas Eve that resulted in a 
traumatic arrest. He is now homeless because his father’s home (which he had been 
sharing) is now inaccessible due to his bail conditions.  His sister will not speak with him 
and he cannot stay with her. Perhaps most difficult for him is the death of his mother 
from cancer a year earlier. His estrangement from his father and sister means he is also 
cut off from some of the material items that remind him of his mother.   
 My observation of 102 Court highlighted how difficult it is for local family 
members who work to support their loved ones through the court process. There is a 
tremendous amount of waiting around in 102 Court, with the time of appearances of 
accused largely unpredictable. It is difficult for family to take time away from work, and 
embarrassing to explain it to employers. Unfortunately some family members are victims 




of accused and wish for nothing more from them. Of course, some family members are 
steadfastly devoted, as were the three parents I interviewed. They were all older, only 
one, Rudy, still worked, but he was a street preacher who made his own hours. Rudy 
was a white man of a black son. He had witnessed police discrimination in his 
predominantly Caribbean neighborhood too many times and did not feel any genuine 
duty to “rat out” his son when he violated his bail conditions. But, his son’s behaviors 
and trouble with the law had estranged all other members of the family including his 
daughter-in-law (and with her, Rudy’s grandson), his son’s mother, and all other 
extended members of his family making Rudy his sole ally.  
 Big Al was most eloquent about the bridges he was attempting to rebuild with his 
mother and sister and the support he had always received from his father.  
 
“I’m in touch with my sister again. Because of all the trouble I was in and 
all the trouble I caused she didn’t want to talk to me. But my psychiatrist 
said, do you write her; do you write your mom and your sister or anything? 
I’ve written notes but they’ve never returned any. Just send a card or 
something. So I send a couple of blank cards and I wrote in what was 
going on. Involved in AA no drinking, kinda like going to church you got to 
make amends and stuff like that. I just gave them a little update. My sister 
picked up on them. And at the last family party she said we’d email each 
other. But I have to like you. That’s what she said. You have to like me! 
Now I got to impress my sister? So we’ve been emailing back and forth. 
And that, that was my Christmas present. I got a card from her on 
Christmas. I was sitting at home. I knew I was going to be alone on 
Christmas Eve again. I always leave it open for my mother and sister. I 
don’t do anything. Just getting the card was good enough.”  
 
“At one year you get a medallion in AA and you’re no longer alone. Which 
is awesome. Actually there’s a joke that you’re never alone with a 
schizophrenic. I thought that was funny. But you’re no longer alone in the 
sense that there are real people around too, you know. I have friends, I 
have family, I have people in my life. Dad went through hell and high 




water. He was with me the whole time. I mean he was ready to punch me 
out and send me to jail. He wanted me to punch him out so he’d send me 
to jail, smarten me up and get me some help. He was at wits end and 
didn’t know what to do.  I’m surprised he put up that long. But nowadays 
we meet for coffee and we just talk. Not too many guys just sit down with 
your father and have good conversation, you know? Cause there’s a lot of 
resentments.”  
 
 There are multiple isolations and marginalizations that mark the lives of accused. 
They are disconnected from services before diversion, many are homeless, they are 
usually unemployed and unemployable, they suffer from stigmatized mental health 
issues that cause behaviors that unnerve and sometimes frighten other people. For 
those who hear voices, they are perpetually distracted even overwhelmed by their own 
thoughts. Many are the victims of violence and there are few sources of shelter or 
comfort. Many accused are turned away at hospitals, deemed problematic at shelters, 
and are known to police as trouble-makers. Some, due to the protracted experience of 
marginalization and rejection, hold no hope for a different life.	  
 
2. 102 Court as a Threshold 
 Seven of the nine people I interviewed spoke of the court as a significant 
threshold in their lives demarcated by a distinct before 102 and after 102 narrative 
divide. Even informants who relayed a negative experience in the court and/or diversion 
recognized the potential threshold of the court if only to have charges dropped. One 
court worker told me there are only three possible outcomes for the accused of 102 
Court: “death, jail, and hanging on with some help”. But from the perspective of the 
accused, 102 Court was a defining experience in their lives, a process that allowed 




them to move into a different life, transform themselves, find new ways of coping, even 
repair damaged relationships. 102 Court had a tremendous impact on Big Al’s life. He 
said: 
 
“OK so going through the diversion which I never heard of before in my 
life. They’re just going to let me off [if] I just go to, if I keep going to, keep 
showing up at court appearances. And stay outa trouble. That, that, I took 
that. I said for sure. Because I…for years I’ve been in trouble with the 
court system because of alcohol and drugs, and schizophrenia and 
everything. Just acting psychotic and ….and it was like a chance to start 
over. And……I think…..first thing I had to get over was being scared of the 
court system”  
 
 “It helped me so much. It helped.”  
“The court helped me. AA helped me. Yeah the diversion worked. The 
diversion was the best thing because I felt like I could trust them. It wasn’t 
the idea of being let off. There was work involved. I had to stick to what 
they said, but I learned, I learned to trust them a bit. I learned to trust.”  
 
“I think the courts gave me my life back. I think they did. They helped. 
Because for years I didn’t understand what was going on. I just thought I 
was hated and was going through a living hell for the rest of my life.” 
 
“After what I’ve been through, or put myself through, got involved in, just to 
be here on the other side, to be able to relate, to talk about, to be able to 
talk about some of it is like, it’s a blessing you know. I survived it all. I saw 
the dark side. I wasn’t really aiming for it but I managed to get in there. It 
found me”.  
 
Brian said, “[102 Court was] kind of a godsend”.  He did not understand why he was 
sent to rehab to get clean and had many issues with court processes. But he leapt at 
the chance to have his charges stayed or withdrawn and so 102 Court provided an 
opportunity to do that.  
 




3. Disrupted Therapeutic Relationships 
 Arranging appointments and fostering therapeutic relationships is a ubiquitous 
and key process of 102 Court. There are many such relationships that are fostered 
between accused and psychiatrists, social workers, and other psychiatric practitioners in 
the community. Inclusion in diversion is premised on a psychiatric diagnosis and the 
associated therapeutic relationships very often include pharmaceutical interventions and 
monitoring.  The accused have little say in their pharmaceuticalization, although 
agreement to proceed through diversion is taken as tacit agreement to all forms of 
interventions directed by the court. Complaints of intolerable side effects may be 
disregarded, and admissions by the accused that they have changed the dose or 
discontinued the medication must be reported to the Crown attorney and is grounds for 
a new criminal offence. Accused are well aware of the reporting responsibilities of their 
therapeutic practitioners. Often their introductions to practitioners are through the court 
workers or actually in the court offices or holding cells. Certainly meeting the court social 
workers at every court appearance and the physical proximity of the CRTC offices with 
the courtroom links these social workers and court workers like attorneys and judges in 
the minds of many accused. Relationships can become skewed under these 
circumstances and seven of the nine accused interviewed expressed these disruptions 
in various ways. For instance, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health is the flagship 
mental health institute in the city, perhaps the country. Many families of mentally ill 
people wait months for appointments with specialists in the multi-sited institute. They 
have spent billions on renovating their spaces and updating their public face, with ad 




campaigns that attempt to de-stigmatize mental illness. CAMH is a teaching and 
research facility, linked with the University of Toronto and generally attracts the “best of 
the best” employees. People suffering with mental illnesses in Toronto face a paucity of 
resources, so to gain access to the people and services of CAMH would seem an 
enormous advantage for accused. And yet, there was a great amount of hostility 
towards the institution generally and psychiatrists more specifically from many accused. 
Some community social workers were also, surprisingly, skeptical about CAMH’s impact 
in the lives of the mentally ill. Both accused and community workers called it the 
“factory”. I asked several accused and a social worker why they called it the “factory” 
and was told it was because they treated everyone the same way. They felt their care 
was not individualized, that they were considered symptom clusters not people with their 
own stories, personalities, and particular problems. My observation of 102 Court 
revealed many in-custody accused begging for jail rather than treatment at CAMH, 
which seriously calls into question the stated goal of 102 Court to provide a more 
therapeutic experience compared with jail. It is possible that the negative attitudes of 
some social service workers influenced the opinion of the accused, but it is just as likely 
that the experiences of their clients at CAMH as well as their own professional 
involvements contributed to the characterization of the hospital as impersonal. As Big Al 
recalled: 
 
 “It was difficult, we talked about things. There wasn’t anything concrete 
that we could do there. There was a lot of talk. And the psychiatrist he 
wasn’t too interested – not like the psychiatrist I have now, we talk, he 








 Maria had recently been admitted to CAMH because she was deemed a threat to 
herself or others. She had been protesting a well-publicized downtown promotion that 
involved nearly nude models. She knocked a media light over and was arrested and 
taken to CAMH. This media campaign was one she found “gross” and “disgusting”. She 
began our interview wanting to discuss it and returned to the topic many times 
throughout our interview. This struck a chord in her due to her own sexual “violations” 
on the street and in her childhood. She laughed off her experience in CAMH. It was 
inconsequential to her because she was neither suicidal nor homicidal and they could 
not “treat” what was wrong with her in this case.   
 Of course psychiatrists have a particular role to play in the care of mentally ill 
accused and that is not necessarily to spend as much time as they would prefer getting 
to know a patient. That task often falls to social service workers who are in much more 
frequent contact with accused. The social workers of the CRTC certainly meet with their 
clients every time they come to court which usually begins very frequently (possibly 
daily), then tapers as the accused demonstrates his or her compliance with the 
scheduled court reporting. Also, CRTC social workers set up and monitor community-
based social services for clients. However, more than half the accused interviewed 
described disrupted relationships with social workers. As Brian told me smirking, “I 
never met with a social worker, just court workers”. Also, the CRTC social workers are 
involved in the surveillance of medication compliance. They regularly ask clients if they 




are taking their medications. It was clear that some accused lie about compliance, well 
aware that deception threatens their diversion, may precipitate further charges, and may 
delay their legal troubles.  But when side effects are intolerable and those in charge of 
prescribing medicine override your desire to stop taking it, it forces many to hide the 
truth from their care providers. As Brian admitted to me, “I don’t take the meds….please 
don’t tell them”. It might be the case that intolerance to medication leads to trouble with 
the law as a contributing factor along with deinstitutionalization and inadequate mental 
health care services. If accurate, 102 Court seems an institutionalized mechanism for 
forcing pharmaceuticals on people who cannot tolerate it; an escalation of deception, 
isolation, and disconnection from services rather than a solution. While non-
pharmaceutical intervention may be proposed and arranged by social workers, they are 
not alternatives to psychiatric pharmaceutical treatment, and some social workers admit 
that exposure to 102 Court’s population of accused has convinced them of the central 
role of pharmaceuticals for people’s stability. While a positive aspect of care for some, 
who, if not the social workers, would advocate on behalf of accused that cannot tolerate 
side effects? Many accused said they had always hated the medications prescribed to 
them. Hiding their non-compliance from their care teams adds to their social isolation. At 
best, pharmaceutical interventions were accepted as inadequate but necessary for a 
better life.  
 Social workers occupy an ambivalent positionality in this system: they cannot 
fully build trust with their clients because there is limited confidentiality. They work 
closely with Crown attorneys, are materially and socially connected to the court workers 




(which is clear to anyone attending court, even a casual observer), and they have 
access to restricted areas of the courthouse like the holding cells. This can be construed 
as convenient for clients or efficient systemically, but it links care workers and 
disciplinarians closely. It is not only accused who struggle with these material and 
symbolic associations, one social worker, in frustration admitted how difficult she found 
how she was professionally positioned, lamenting that, “I’m not a social worker; I’m a 
paralegal”. She struggled with the ethics of her professional identity and professional 
management that did not understand the tension that needed to be navigated regularly 
due to this ambivalence.  
 Brian had the most trouble with his prescribed medications, although most people 
I met objected to them or felt they were of little help. Brian said: 
 
“I’m afraid to tell the doctor what I am really going through. My mind is so 
clouded. When I take it [medication] at night, it knocks me out, makes me 
feel stoned. I’m not taking it. Makes me feel uncomfortable in my own skin. 
I’m on the edge all the time.  When I take my meds I feel like shit. Skin 
crawling, wake up at seven, puke….” 
 
4. Key Supports 
 All participants listed particular people associated with 102 Court and diversion 
who were one of the keys to their success. One interviewee was adamant that he was 
tempted to relapse but did not do so when he thought of the promise he had made to 
the judge in 102 Court. He simply did not want to disappoint the person who had given 
him another chance, who believed in him. This was echoed by many accused in the 
courtroom. Court employees were well aware of the power of their positions. One Crown 




attorney said she leveraged this power by looking directly and intently at accused and 
engaging them to keep their word to her, to see them and treat them as people. She 
said this tactic worked one day, by chance, and she employed it now and then. She 
mused that people expect little of accused so it can be powerful to tell them you expect 
them to follow through. This research indicates that it was not a particular person or 
professional position that helped accused, but that the presence of someone or a 
handful of people who were trusted or dedicated or honest was a key factor for the 
completion of diversion.  Big Al credits a rather large support network: 
 
“I’ve had help. I had Bob’s help, I had Susan from Straight Talk.  I’m in AA, 
my family, they don’t judge me. My father was there through the whole 
thing. I pushed him to the limit because of the illness. It was really bad.“ 
 
Big Al saved the highest praise for a lay person, a cellmate who helped him realize his 
problem with alcohol. He recalled:  
 
“I was at the Don jail, waiting for a bail hearing or something and I was 
telling this cellmate oh yeah I got drunk last night and I did all this crap. 
And he handed me the big book which is like the bible of AA. Started 
reading it. All these people have the same problem as me. I read like a 
hundred or two hundred pages and then I told my lawyer I was an 
alcoholic. He told the judge. I can’t remember which one, which time it was 
that that happened. But then they got the message that it wasn’t just 
schizophrenia but there are drug and alcohol issues too. I remember his 
name. His name was James. He was in big trouble. Whenever I’m in a 
meeting I mention that book. And even though I was behind bars away 
from society someone had reached out with some help.  And it was there. 
And I got the message”  
 




 Social workers, both community-based and those working with the CRTC were 
sometimes cited as particularly helpful to the diversion process. One man said,  “the 
men in prison are just praying for someone to bail them out and for many people the 
CRCT folks are their only hope. The stress of the psychiatric hospital is all many can 
bear; getting better or getting housing is way too much to hope for”. However, Brian was 
very disillusioned with the social workers he met. I asked him about his experiences with 
them and he snorted, “what social workers? I never met a social worker. Just court 
workers”. Maria’s life was not significantly impacted by her experience in 102 Court but 
she encountered professionals who made a difference to her. She had a legal matter 
pending that was not eligible for diversion66 but one of the duty counselors of 102 Court 
promised her assistance in transitioning to the regular stream. Despite her struggle to 
trust people, she was optimistic about the counselor’s involvement with her case. She 
said, “the guy that’s there is going to advocate for me to get legal aid faster and get the 
trial over with faster. And be a good girl and not have to be a piece of ass on the street, 
which is what I’m doing because I am using”.   
 
5. Continuum of Violence 
 Narratives of all participants included stories of violence, perpetrated both against 
and by accused. Violence clearly marks the lives of participants and many of the 
accused I observed in court. The strongest theme and the one most echoed in the 
courtroom was violence against accused by the police and court officers. There is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Possibly due to her refusal/inability to stop taking street drugs which interfere with her 
ability to obtain prescription medications that would be part of any further diversion.  




doubt that court officers are the sharp end of the disciplinary stick in the courthouse. 
The court officers I interviewed described the challenges of their job and the fine line of 
empathy and control they walked which seemed especially challenging among an in-
custody population that might smeared feces or menstrual blood on themselves, or even 
physically attack them. When a judge orders an accused taken back to the cells and 
they refuse to move, it is the court officers who must wrangle the person to the cells. 
Many court workers and accused recognized the difficult role of court officers.  
 Sid had a particularly difficult time with the court officers. Every time I spoke with 
him he told me the same story of being beaten badly by court officers67. He felt targeted 
and regularly faced ridicule and physical violence. He explained many of the ways that 
court officers could “screw with” him and other accused. For instance, in-custody 
accused will be dressed in street clothes if there is a slight chance of release; otherwise 
they remain in jail garb, bright orange jumpsuits. If an accused who is disliked by the 
court officers is at the end of the docket they may legitimately leave the person in the 
jumpsuit. But if the docket is short and the accused is released, they must make their 
own way back to the jail to collect their clothes and other belongings wearing only the 
jumpsuit. This marks them as a prisoner and if they cannot find additional clothing, is 
inadequate in cold weather.  
 Certainly the brutality of some court officers was legendary among accused and 
court workers. Big Al said, “some of them have short fuses so they popped off on some 
people, some inmates” Sid claimed court cells were more brutal than jail cells. He said, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 In fact, every interview with Sid was about violence perpetrated against him. In some 
sense his was a trauma narrative.  




“Anyone would prefer jail to court cells”. As I described in Chapter Two, I was shown the 
cells adjacent to 102 Court by a court clerk. Recall that the walls, benches, and floors 
are made covered in metal. Many in-custody accused complained in court about how 
cold the cells were.  
 Police interactions with mentally ill people are cause for some public debate in 
Toronto, with the police shooting of a runaway psychiatric ward patient making 
headlines during the course of this research. There is an effort to train police officers to 
deal with mentally ill people they encounter, but stories about the excessive use of force 
are ubiquitous. One community social worker recalled how a young mentally ill woman 
had her leg broken by arresting officers. Many in-custody accused cry out about misuse 
and targeting by police. Certainly many of the interviewees I spoke with described the 
violence of their arrests, albeit some thought it was deserved. For instance, Big Al 
recalls his last arrest: 
 
“…I was out of control. I uh, I heaved a refrigerator off a balcony. I was 
very psychotic. They sent the ETF68. Well they sent, they sent the uh, the 
building security, then the police then the ETF. When they finally got in the 
door. And…well… it wasn’t pretty. They…they were trying to subdue me 
but I was already subdued. Well that’s alright I deserved it anyways…they 
brought me out into the hallway. And then the ambulance [guy] said are 
you alright. I said I’m fine“. 
 
Recalling his last arrest on Christmas Eve at his father’s home, Jack says:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ETF is the Emergency Task Force, the tactical unit of Toronto Police Services. It is 
mandated to deal with high risk situations like kidnapping or emotionally disturbed 
people.  




“I don’t remember threatening bodily harm. It’s my word versus the cops. I 
was the one who got the knee to the back, thrown on the ground” 
 
 One law clerk passionately explained his view of the Toronto courthouse. Waving 
his arm over his head to indicate the whole building (or perhaps the criminal justice 
system) he said, “this whole thing is structural violence”. There are many examples of 
how this structural violence plays out in the lives of accused. For instance, women have 
fewer available community resources like shelter beds and women-specific 
programming, which sometimes causes delays in release planning. There are concerns 
about the violence of racism and xenophobia among accused, as explored in Chapter 
Two of this work.  Some of the discourse heard in the courthouse reveals how some 
regard accused as less than people. I heard a lawyer on his phone looking for an in-
custody client who had not yet arrived to the courthouse from jail. He said, “I’m trying to 
locate a body. Where is it? Is it on its way? Is it in transit?” When court is in session it is 
important to have a “brief and a body” for a case to proceed. This dehumanizing 
characterization is a glimpse into some forms of structural violence faced by accused.  
 The gendered axis of violence (both physical and structural) was most prevalent 
in Maria’s account69. Her life is marked by violence. She experienced childhood sexual 
abuse and she fled her life and family in Nova Scotia to live on the streets of Ontario’s 
cities. Of her childhood trauma she says, “When I had my first sex ed[ucation] class I 
found out about molestation and that it was wrong and I said to somebody and my mom 
kicked the shit out of me cause I told the guidance counselor. I’m still dealing with it”. 
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She has sex in exchange for money when she cannot make ends meet. Describing her 
life she said:  
“I’m homeless. I’m living outside. I still have to live. I have to 
walk everywhere. I’ve got guys hitting on me, trying to pick 
me up cause I’ve been on my own forever. And when you’re 
hungry and you need money or you need companionship, 
you’re lonely and then you feel guilty and then you run to 
drugs, right? To cover up the guilt that you feel for having to 
do that. In this kind of society, in this day and age, why am I 
going through that?”  
 
She described the challenges of living on the monthly support given her by the Ontario 
Disability Support Program [ODSP]70. But the shortage of money was only part of the 
problem for Maria. In order to cash the check, she ran a gauntlet of predators waiting for 
ODSP recipients at downtown check cashing businesses every month. She said,  
 
“I stand there for hours to get in there and get my check and 
it covers nothing. I go to money mart and I have to worry 
about the dogs reaching into my pocket and taking it from 
me. I got to worry about being grabbed and groped. I got to 
worry about being raped.”  
 
Being a woman addict is very dangerous for Maria. She explained, “When I sleep it’s 
just like being in a coma (because of drugs) and I get violated.” But there are more 
subtle ways that Maria’s life is marked by violence. For instance, there are long waits for 
female-specific programming and many services are clustered in neighborhoods with 
drug dealers. Maria said,  
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“And if you’re hungry, especially in the morning if your 
hungry, you know and shelters aren’t open in the daytime. 
Most of the shelters are around drug related [people or 
places]. Cause it’s the slums. And to get into a program, the 
wait, the wait is phenomenal.”  
 
The structural and physical violence that marked Maria’s life was overwhelming and 
beyond the scope of 102 Court to address. Whatever the diagnosis that brought her into 
the court, there is no provision for accused who may (arguably) be dealing with the 
sequelae of childhood sexual abuse71. The scarcity of female-specific resources in 
Toronto and the vulnerability of street life due to her gender amplify her needs and 
confounds routinized solutions.  
 
5. Coping Techniques 
 Many of the participants described their own coping techniques. For some, 
coping with addiction was the key focus, while for others it was coping with voices or 
paranoia. Several people believed spirituality was the key to their stability. Big Al 
believed there was a spiritual aspect to illness:  
 
“I mean who’s to say, I mean maybe they’re sick but maybe they’re 
spiritually sick too. There’s a spiritual world too. There is”.  
 
Jack was “trying really hard to be healthy”. He rejected the dominance of the 
pharmaceutical industry in his wellness and was dedicated to healthful eating, doing 
research about food as medicine, and spreading the word to other similarly diagnosed 
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people about herbal combinations and medicinal food alternatives. Rudy, father of an 
accused and originally from Guyana, believed that his son would be better “in the 
islands, where there aren’t so many rules, not so much stress. That’s why there’s less 
mental illness”. Big Al recounted how he used AA meetings to cope with voices: 
 
“I’ve told people If I’m feeling stressed out, anxious, hearing some of the 
voices, whatever’s happening…if I can get myself to a meeting - within ten 
minutes of being in the meeting, it [the voices] goes away. I mean I don’t 
know how to describe it, but it just, it just starts going away. By the end of 
the meeting, I’ve heard the speaker, I’ve talked to a few people, you know, 
um, I’m OK, I’m good to go”.   
 
 These coping techniques overlap with explanatory models of illness for many 
people. Sickness of spirit, the ingestion of toxic food combinations, and the social 
context of fast-paced, stressful, highly medicalized Canadian culture are part of the 
reason accused do not fit well into society, why doctors and police officers are trying to 
change and control them, and why they feel so alone.   
 These explanatory models and the many years of labeling (medically and 
forensically) coincide with an ambivalent relationship to their diagnoses. For Brian, as 
with many people I observed in court, the diagnosis has changed over the years. Brian, 
even after rehab, diversion, and numerous frequent psychiatric appointments, asked me 
what bipolar meant. He said he understood what schizophrenia was, but this new 
diagnosis was not something he understood.  Big Al was the most biomedically literate 
participant. He understood his schizophrenia as chronic. He accepted antipsychotic 
medication and its side-effects and found it helpful: 





“And if I feel the voices taking over kinda, I will take one in the day if I need 
to. So, yeah, I mean I still have the illness. It’s not going away. With the 
medication, you don’t lose so much, you know, I don’t know how to 
describe it. I just have to white-knuckle it through sometimes. You know 
just wait for it to stop. You know my worst bad days nowadays aren’t even 
close to what it was like before. I just have to hold on”.  
 
 
He also considered his misuse of alcohol a form of “self-medication” to deal with his 
voices that stopped working after a while. Then alcohol became an obstacle to coping 
with the voices: 
 
“Even though I have schizophrenia I can work on the illness now instead 
of not knowing what’s going on. To abstain from alcohol, like I said, since 
that last day I drank I’ve had no doings with the police at all…But I still 
have the illness. I still have it. It won’t go away. It’s manageable. I’m happy 
with it”.  
 
 Sometimes the harsh life of the streets makes other demands on people. To 
cope with the sexual vulnerability of living on the streets, Maria did drugs to numb the 
pain and fear of this experience and to qualify for a bed in rehab, a safe, if temporary, 
residence. Once clean, she was ejected back onto the streets and the cycle continues.  
 It became clear during our many hours together that she was very near-sighted 
and she often borrowed my glasses to see something. I always carry extra glasses with 
me on the advice of my specialist, because to lose or damage them, would render me 
functionally disabled, so I have some appreciation for the limited view Maria had on the 
world. I was alarmed at her lack of glasses and set about finding the means to get her a 




pair. She laughed at my concern and these attempts, reminding me of how little she had 
to truly see and how being visually impaired was a sort of coping mechanism to soften 
the edges (literally) of the harshness that defined her life.  
 
The Ambiguity of “Success” 
 Here I contrast two cases of diversion (Big Al and Brian) through 102 Court in 
order to stress how very similar accused, professionals, and processes may produce 
very different outcomes that might both be labeled “successful”. I selected these two 
cases because there is a high degree of overlap in their experiences, the people they 
were in contact with throughout their 102 Court experience (lawyers, social workers, 
etc.), and in numerous other ways. They are both white men, born and raised in the 
Toronto area, who had graduated from diversion within three years of the interview. 
They both had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, although Brian had also been 
diagnosed at various times with bipolar disorder. They both had substance abuse 
issues and named alcohol as their substance of greatest issue while dappling in street 
drugs. Some of the same professionals helped them through 102 Court. They were 
referred to me by the same social worker who highlighted their stability, improved 
mental health, and what complete “success stories” of diversion they both represented. I 
believe she was very proud to have been part of their journey through the system.  
 Big Al used the language of biomedicine in his recollection of his 102 Court 
experience, having integrated the truth discourses of sickness that characterize the bio-
power at play in 102 Court and discussed the Chapters One and Two (Rabinow & Rose, 




2006). Big Al distanced his behaviors and actions from who he was as a person, 
emphasizing that the illness made him behave in particular ways. This echoes 
psychiatric discourses about mental illness that dissociates behaviors caused by illness 
and identity. He accepted antipsychotic medications as necessary, a mode of 
subjectification, and had a good working relationship with his current psychiatrist. He 
was well connected with a network of support. Previously, he had been isolated socially, 
having no friends, estranged from most of his family, and no work colleagues, but was 
now repairing ties with his family, making new friends, even beginning a new job. Big Al 
was a model of self-governance. He mimicked the truth discourses of authorities, he 
had internalized the language and accepted the sickness that lived within him. He could 
articulate his own irrationality and the consequent behaviors that had brought him into 
contact with the law. His relative success was in part due to his greater immersion as a 
anatomo-political subject. Brian, in contrast, was no longer on his medication and had 
not been compliant for some time. He admitted purposely deceiving the court and social 
workers regarding his compliance. He did not understand why he had been sent to 
rehab, felt no one had ever asked for his story, and still felt completely isolated. He was 
planning to move to a different city, breaking any support ties he had gained through the 
diversion process.  
 I wish to stress the huge difference between these two “successes”. What a client 
reports and what actually occurred can be vastly different and lead to biases about 
practice impact in people’s lives. The comparison of Big Al and Brian is a cautionary tale 
for practitioners whose clients are savvy enough to survive the streets, addiction, 




isolation, and jail terms and may view 102 Court and diversion as another site where 
survival on their own terms is necessary, even if that means lying to social workers and 
psychiatrists about compliance, as Brian did. The comparison also offers insight into 
why exit interviews, particularly performed by agency employees, may not capture an 
accurate picture of impact among clients.  
 
Summary 
 Studies of mental health courts like 102 Court in Toronto from the perspective of 
accused are rare. The accused in this study experienced 102 Court as a threshold 
imbued with potential. Not everyone agreed that there was anything necessarily 
therapeutic or healing about the processes of the court, but it was possible, given the 
right charges, diagnosis, and availability of resources that 102 Court might improve 
quality of life for those who pass through it as accused. Of particular importance was 
support from key people. They might be lay people who offered the right advice at the 
right time, or a particularly helpful attorney or a social worker who saw them through the 
processes of the court and the local social service system. Also, non-pharmaceutical 
coping techniques augmented (sometimes dominated) participants’ the court-ordered 
pharmaceutical interventions.  Isolation from family, either enduring or before 102 Court, 
was a strong theme among participants. Many participants also described disrupted 
therapeutic relationships after years of contact with community and forensic mental 
health care providers. Violence marked the lives of all accused and ranged from the 
structural violence of dehumanization and discrimination, the scarcity of resources 




available for women, to the sexual vulnerability of living on the streets and the police 
and court officer inflicted violence that occurs as routine in many arrests and prisoner 
transfers.  
 Despite concern from professionals associated with 102 Court that accused 
could not offer interview answers, asking people to tell their stories had a positive 
impact on participants. Accused referred to the study were told of the afore-mentioned 
professional concerns regarding their narrative and cognitive abilities and expressed 
gratitude for interest in hearing their stories. As one participant said, “we’re people too”.  
 This research casts light on the difficulty in defining “success” in such a court. 
Legal scholars and professionals discuss recidivism rates as one of the critical outcome 
measures for mental health courts. 102 Court relied on exit surveys administered by 
social workers who worked closely with the accused during the diversion process. Both 
indicate some degree of success. However, Brian’s narrative, with his admission of non-
compliance during diversion and his deception of social workers, psychiatrists, judges, 
and Crown attorneys throughout the process forces us to reconsider how to define 
“success”.  
 There are several limitations that are evident in this work. Only two of the nine 
interviews presented above were audio-taped. While this was appropriate from an 
ethical perspective, it limited the consistent in-depth analysis called for in IPA. 
Transcribing notes, and my note-taking skills were less than ideal. I would prefer any 
follow-up investigations with this population to require audio-taping even if that meant 
losing participants.  




 Big Al was a very articulate interviewee whose narrative style including looping 
back in his story, reconsidering his words, then rewording his recollections. He was 
biomedically literate, had an easy-to-follow narrative style, and was one of the 
participants who agreed to be audio-taped. Therefore, his voice slightly dominates the 
six themes above.  It is possible that the stability enjoyed by some participants may be a 
function of having completed diversion several years before the interview occurred 
compared with more recent graduates of diversion. This suggests the need to further 
compare immediate and longitudinal impact in the lives of diversion graduates. Because 
of the nature of my chosen population, follow-up interviews were difficult in some cases 
and it was impossible for me to contact interviewees to go over transcripts to ensure I 
captured their opinions and stories appropriately. Finally I believe it would be more 
useful to cluster participants by diagnosis and alleged crime. Most participants revealed 
their diagnoses voluntarily, but I did not specifically ask them to produce this 
information. Clustering people by diagnosis and by criminal allegation might further 

















Chapter Four: Discussion 
 The aim of this research was to critique the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in 102 Court through the theoretical lens of subjectivity. I have explored 
the subjectivity of the accused through a phenomenological analysis and assessed the 
processes of subjectivation that also shape their experiences. In this final chapter I will 
synthesize evidence presented in the previous chapters and weave the findings though 
a critical discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence and the bio-power evident in the 
processes of the court. Four critical issues emerged from this work and will form the 
basis for the discussion that follows. I will argue that a particular sort of bio-power that 
produces a pharmaceutical subject is at play in this system. While 102 Court produces 
openings for some people who pass through it as accused, it foreclosures possibilities 
for others.  
 
Critique of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 Recall that Winick and Wexler describe law as a social force that may produce 
“therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences” (Winick & Wexler, 2003, p. 7). Also, 
rather vaguely, they suggest court structure may maximize the therapeutic potential 
(Winick & Wexler, 2003). In a comparison of traditional72 and transformed court 
processes that result when the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence produces a 
specialized court, legal outcomes are replaced by therapeutic outcomes, rights-based 
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approaches are replaced with interest- or needs-based approaches, and the adversarial 
process is replaced with a collaborative process (Winick & Wexler, 2003).  Of seriously 
mentally ill accused, Marini says, “Many of these…..have become homeless. Many 
refuse to take needed medication in the community, and suffer a reemergence of their 
symptoms, often requiring re-hospitalization” (Marini, 2003, p. 59). This statement 
qualifies the medication as “needed”, places the responsibility firmly on the mentally ill 
person who has refused to take it, and places the responsibility for addressing this 
problem on health care institutions. “Jail and the criminal court process is inappropriate 
for most of these individuals, whose problems are due more to their mental illness than 
to their criminality. As a result, mental health court has been developed to attempt to 
divert them from the criminal process to the treatment in the community that they need” 
(Marini, 2003, p. 59).  
 Recall from Chapter One that there are five core concepts that define therapeutic 
jurisprudence and are operationalized in 102 Court and other mental health courts 
(Marini, 2003; Schneider et al., 2007; Winick & Wexler, 2003). Below I discuss each of 
core concepts in relation to 102 Court.  
 
1. Medication, framed as “needed”, is the cornerstone of release plans and, for most 
accused becomes a key component of diversion where compliance is necessary for 
graduation from diversion. The processes of 102 Court rely heavily on psychiatric 
treatment and psychiatrist-patient relationships, medicating accused, and surveilling 
compliance. The population eligible for diversion through 102 Court, those considered 




“properly” before the court, overwhelmingly present with psychotic features, making 
pharmaceutical treatment possible and preferable in the Canadian evidence-based 
medical model. Some antipsychotic medications are also conveniently available in 
injectable formats, making unconsented treatment that may occur during treatment 
orders much easier to administer. The term “treatment order” belies the coercive and 
involuntary nature of this legal order. The language of medicine and benevolence 
saturate court language, where forensic psychiatrists assure the court of the benefits of 
antipsychotic medicine, where accused are sent to hospital, not jail, but where non-
compliance may become a criminal offense.   
 
2. The medical system has failed to adequately care for seriously mentally ill people, 
forcing the legal system, unprepared for an influx of seriously mentally ill people, to 
action. This is how most analysts frame the historical circumstances that have resulted 
in so many mentally ill people in contact with the law. The framing is factual and 
historical but is not neutral. There is tension between the systems of medicine and law 
that undergirds the activities of 102 Court, occasionally becoming more visible. 
Schneider et al. (2007, p. 2) is fairly direct about the purposes of mental health courts 
are to shunt people away from the criminal justice system and back to the mental health 
care system where they belong.  There is occasional frustration in the court with wait 
times for hospital beds, which are under the control of the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health [CAMH]. When lower courts like 102 Court attempt to force the medical 
system to respond more quickly or otherwise disrupts the balance between the two 




systems, lawyers from CAMH appear in 102 Court, sometimes leading the legal parties 
to superior court to have the issue heard before another judge.  
 
3. The negative psychological outcomes of jail compared with hospitalization are 
emphasized, where imprisonment is believed to cause or exacerbate decompensation. 
For example, Marini says, “Subjected to the extreme stress of jail detention, they suffer 
further decompensation” (Marini, 2003, p. 59). Here he argues that jail itself causes their 
mental health to suffer, without citing a source. Surely, his statement may be accurate 
some of the time but evidence gathered in this study has demonstrated that for some, 
like Big Al, jail and the people he encountered there, were key to his transformation. 
Confinement in jail can itself be a stressful and violent experience. Certainly the Don 
Jail, where most male accused of 102 Court would be held until their matter was 
resolved, is a particularly appalling example of jail in Canada. The Don Jail (a.k.a. “the 
Don”) has been condemned by many critics as dangerously overcrowded and an 
embarrassment to the justice system.  Justice Schneider, 102 Court’s administrative 
judge at the time of this research, set Canadian legal precedent when he ruled in R. v. 
Smith [2003] O.J. 1782 that an accused being held at the Don Jail was to be credited 
three days of “time served” for every day spent in the Don due to the deplorable 
conditions73. Despite these widely recognized problems with the Don, evidence from 
both branches of this study challenge the assumption that for all people hospital is less 
stressful than jail. When an accused is ordered to hospital in lieu of jail, they are 
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imprisoned in the building or ward. If they are sent on a treatment order this has a 
maximum length of stay of 60 days, but if accused are remanded to the Ontario Review 
Board, their confinement is subject to annual review and may last years, even 
indefinitely. Observation of 102 Court revealed that some accused prefer jail to hospital; 
some accused beg to be sent to jail rather than return to the hospital. It is important to 
note that everyone I observed in 102 Court who preferred jail had likely had previous 
negative experiences in hospital74. For some accused, jail time is not a negative 
experience. In the case of Big Al it was his cellmate, who was “in big trouble” who set 
him on the path to recovery and played a pivotal role in Big Al’s transformation. It 
seemed to hold more meaning for Big Al that this help came while he was “away from 
society”. Finally, one out-of-custody accused of 102 Court purposively broke the law in 
minor ways when he needed the respite he could find in jail from the hardships of life on 
the streets. This accused, a well-educated and articulate older man, had been 
imprisoned in his home country in Africa for many years due to his political beliefs and 
found Toronto’s Don Jail quite restful by comparison.  
 
4. The adversarial process in court is suspended in favor of a collaborative approach to 
put mentally ill accused at greater ease. There is evidence that the collaboration of the 
Crown attorney may have been a dramatically different experience for accused who had 
been before Crown attorneys in regular courts. Families of accused sometimes 
commented that it was a relief that the Crown did not “throw the book” at their loved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This was evident from their pleas where they explicitly referenced “the last time” or 
“not again” or referred to hospital procedures like being held down and injected with 
drugs.  




ones accused in 102 Court. But there were also accused who openly demanded new 
counsel because their lawyer was not fighting for them. Many accused expect defense 
attorneys to defend their clients by arguing against the prosecutor. It illustrates a 
potential problem with the suspension of the adversarial process in 102 Court: it blurs 
the boundaries between defense and prosecutor. Some defense attorneys silently 
assented to orders requested by the prosecution like the draconian treatment order 
without cross-examining the forensic psychiatrist regarding the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medications. By comparison, other defense attorneys 
resisted treatment orders on every occasion out of principle and to register their 
objections on the record. For a system that is premised on transparency, the off-the-
record negotiations between defense and prosecution75 that I could only partially 
witness and learn about through conversations with attorneys does not reflect the 
transparency ideals of the criminal justice system especially when the adversarial 
process is suspended. This lack of transparency about defense-prosecutorial 
consensus is particularly problematic when the accused is marginalized, without many 
personal advocates, and less likely to be heard if he alleges misrepresentation.  
 
5. There is an attempt to look upstream, where the criminal behaviors of the accused 
are envisioned as caused by mental illness making treatment of the illness the most 
appropriate deterrent to future criminal behavior. The cause of criminal behavior is well 
outside the scope of this research, but there are two problems of logic associated with 
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this conceptualization. Marini’s introduction to mental health courts paints a picture of 
the release of mentally ill people from institutions into ill-prepared communities. He 
writes, “The tightening of civil commitment standards and the policy of 
deinstitutionalization has led to thousands of people with mental illness living in the 
community” (Marini, 2003, p. 59). This is a rather de-historicized, anachronistic account. 
Deinstitutionalization occurred primarily in the 1950s and 1960s, when adults were 
released to the community. Assuming people were released at 18 years of age in 1965, 
they would be 48 years old in 2013 or older if they were part of the earlier phases of 
deinstitutionalization. Of course, many people who suffer serious mental illness and live 
in our communities are significantly younger. His narrative condenses time and links 
historical policy and events to contemporary social concerns. In his second statement 
he says that both jail and court processes are inappropriate for these accused because 
the underlying problem is not criminality but mental illness. Merriam-Webster defines 
criminality as “the quality or state of being criminal and criminal activity” (Merriam-
Webster, 2013).  This quality of being criminal cannot be solely defined by criminal 
behavior or both mentally ill and mentally well accused would possess it. This argument 
assumes that a mentally ill person could not also possess this quality of criminality. If 
they did possess both, somehow the mental illness underlies or is more fundamental or 
more directly responsible for criminal behavior than the quality of criminality. Apparently 
appropriate responses to crime based on criminality are punitive but responses to crime 
based on mental illness ought to be therapeutic. Marini’s final statement concerns 
diverting people away from detainment and back to community services. However, in 




his narrative community mental health services are where the problems began. I believe 
as 102 Court has demonstrated that what he really meant to write was that they are 
diverted away from jail and mandated to adhere to community mental health treatment. 
If criminality is met by the criminal courts with surveillance and detention, mental illness 
is met with surveillance and conditional release for some and surveillance and detention 
for others. It is evident from interviews with accused that many of them had been in 
community mental health care before entering 102 Court as accused. For instance, Big 
Al had attended group therapy programs at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
for concurrent disorders. Sid described himself as a shelter pro saying he had lived in 
the shelter system for years and felt it part of his responsibility to teach newcomers 
about the shelter system. Therefore, people passing through 102 Court do not 
necessarily lack community services. By focusing on illness, the legal system rationally 
defers the responsibility for mentally disordered accused to the medical system. This 
produces new forms of subjectivity at the medico-legal nexus that will be expanded later 
in this chapter.  
 Despite my attempt to unpack the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence, it 
remains difficult to assess its impact on people who pass through 102 Court as 
accused. Let us distill the amalgam of characteristics discussed above to an attempt to 
produce more positive mental health effects than negative effects through the 
processes of the court. These processes are altered by authorities of the court 
interested in both efficient and ethical deployment of the law in the best interests of 
accused. While there is widespread agreement (implicit at least) about the theoretical 




possibility of court processes being therapeutic or anti-therapeutic, there is no 
suggestion that a court designed to deliver therapeutic jurisprudence like 102 Court 
might, through the very mechanisms intended as therapeutic, inadvertently be anti-
therapeutic as the findings of earlier chapters indicate.  
 As I discussed in Chapter One, the courtroom itself is intended as a therapeutic 
agent. It becomes the physical center of wide web of connections and relations that are 
intended to support accused, managed by social service workers and supervised by the 
Crown attorney and the judge. However, it is also the center of power relations and 
surveillance. This recalls Foucault’s panopticism, which describes the development and 
deployment of observational technologies to produce disciplined and productive bodies 
(Foucault, 1977). Foucault draws on an architectural analogy, Bentham’s Panopticon, a 
prison system that employs new techniques of surveillance to control prisoners 
(Foucault, 1977). Prisoners are made highly visible, always scrutinized, or always 
potentially scrutinized by authorities (Foucault, 1977). Foucault emphasizes the “the 
capillary functioning of power” that characterizes panopticism, an apt analogy to the 
disciplinary foci that 102 Court becomes in the lives of accused (Foucault, 1977, p. 198). 
Recall from Chapter One that Winick and Wexler (2003) described the specialty 
courtroom as a “laboratory” to uncover the elements of court processes that contribute 
to therapeutic goals (Winick and Wexler, 2003). Foucault tells us that the Panopticon 
can also be a laboratory, to “alter behavior, to train or correct individuals….to 
experiment with medicines and monitor their effects” (Foucault, 1977, p. 203).  




 The contradiction of the simultaneous invisibility of the accused to the general 
public and the strict surveillance of the court is consistent with Foucault’s (1977) 
arguments about punishment in a modern setting. He claims that punishment tends to 
become the most hidden part of the penal system. In 102 Court the punishment, at first 
glance, seems absent. But the analyses presented in Chapters Two and Three highlight 
the structural violence that accompanies participation in the court and the coercive 
threat of further sanctions that qualify the administration of pharmaceuticals. The 
question of whether treatment is therapeutic is not asked nor does it matter. Disordered 
bodies are re-ordered by discursive practices and under threat of legal sanction. The 
rationality of neuropsychiatry and the technologies of pharmaceuticals replace 
technologies of imprisonment.  
 Beyond the authority of forensic psychiatrists to establish the norm and the 
routes along which the pathological may be made to be consistent with the norm, 
Foucault argues that the law itself operates increasingly “as a norm” (Foucault, 1976, p. 
144). He claims that in the modern era, judicial institutions are “increasingly 
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, etc.) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory” (Foucault, 1976, p. 144).  
 
102 Court as a Space of Liminality  
 The first critical issue that emerged form this research is the potential for 102 
Court to transform people’s lives. The court held tremendous meaning for some of the 
accused who completed diversion. Put simply, it was a second chance; an opportunity 




to change their lives. For some, like Big Al, 102 Court was essentially a threshold that 
he struggled through and which transformed his life from a pre- to a post-mental health 
court reality. For Brian, the transformative possibilities of 102 Court were more limited. 
He clearly recognized the legal advantages of having charges stayed or dropped as a 
result of participation in diversion, but he did not embrace a broader opportunity to 
transform his life as Big Al did. This seems to be the therapeutic potential of 102 Court. 
It is not in the collaborative legal process, or assuring access to community-based 
services, or even necessarily pharmaceutical treatment. Because for some accused 
who pass through 102 Court, those three mechanisms of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
may be anti-therapeutic. This apparent ambivalence may be explained by considering 
102 Court as a threshold. Some accused (like Big Al) are transformed through the 
experience; other accused (like Brian) may cycle in and out of contact with the law and 
102 Court, caught in an ambiguous space of precarious (in)stability.  
 The anthropological literature about thresholds and liminality began with the 
publication of Rites of Passage (1960[1909]) by Arnold van Gennep. Liminality derives 
from the Latin limen, meaning threshold. Generally, it refers to in-between situations 
characterized by the dislocation of established structures, a reversal of hierarchies, and 
uncertainty about the future (Horvath, Thomassen, & Wydra, 2009). Liminality was used 
by van Gennep to define the middle of three stages of rituals in small-scale societies. 
He recognized a pattern among rites of passage in many different societies. During the 
separation phase, likened to a metaphorical death, the initiand must leave something 
behind by altering routines and practices (van Gennep, 1960 [1909]). In the middle 




phase, the transition phase, marked by liminality, a strict sequence of activities is 
followed under the guidance of a leader or master of ceremony. In the final stage, the 
incorporation phase, the initiand is re-introduced into society with a new identity (Van 
Gennep, 1960 [1909]). Thus the transformation is complete. These stages may be 
applied broadly to rites of passage such as Bat Mitzvahs or graduation ceremonies, but 
may also be productively applied to natural disasters such as transformations in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, for instance (Thomassen, 2009).  
 Van Gennep’s work was taken up by Victor Turner who began writing on the 
topic in the mid twentieth century. Turner developed the concept of liminality, some of 
which (particularly his discussion of liminoid experiences (see Turner, 1974)) do not 
apply well to 102 Court. However, Turner suggested that a liminal state may become 
stuck or “fixed”; a dangerous situation in which the suspension of normal life 
characteristic of liminal stages becomes permanent (Turner & Turner, 1978). More 
recently, authors interested in liminality suggest it can be a tool to bridge inter-
disciplinary boundaries, specifically experience-based and culture-based approaches 
(Horvath et al., 2009). In other words, the model may be applied to voluntary and 
involuntary situations (Thomassen, 2009) working in various disciplines, but most 
generally liminality refers to an in-between period (Horvath et al., 2009).  
 For anthropologists interested in liminality, there have been, since van Gennep’s 
work, many transformations of how liminality may be productively utilized (see 
Thomassen, 2009). Van Gennep’s work on rites of passage and liminality remained 
marginal in the European academy for political reasons (see Thomassen, 2009 for a 




discussion of van Gennep’s relationship with Durkheim and his subsequent 
marginalization in anthropology).  Thomassen says, “liminality is a world of contingency 
where events and ideas, and “reality” itself, can be carried in different directions” 
(Thomassen, 2009, p. 5). Van Gennep was interested in studying phenomena as they 
occur, and because of this perspective, “liminality makes sense only within social 
dramas” (Thomassen, 2009, p. 13). Using this model, I contend that 102 Court is 
fundamentally liminal.  That is, the underlying characteristic that ties the themes 
discussed in Chapter Three together (including the variations) is liminality.  
 Liminality has both spatial and temporal dimensions and may be applied to many 
different subjects: individuals, groups, or entire civilizations. Van Gennep stressed that 
liminality may operate at the individual and collective levels simultaneously. Below 
(Table 2.) I adapt Thomassen’s model for consideration of 102 Court accused 
















Table 2. Types of Liminality Experienced by Accused 
Time   Individual Group Society 
Moment Sudden event 
affecting one’s life – 
traumatic arrest or 
crisis that led to 102 
Court 
n/a (there are no 
cohorts in 102 
Court, but there 
may be cohorts 
associated with 
court-appointed 
services such as 
rehab) 
n/a 
Period 102 Court reporting 102 Court reporting 






Epoch Individuals standing 











for the duration of 
their lives and not 
by choice. 
Social minorities - 
permanently 
marked status of 
mentally ill people. 
Increasing 
pharmaceuticalization 
of medicine, stigma 





    
 By presenting Table 1. adapted specifically to the accused of 102 Court, it 
becomes obvious that there are accretions of liminality experienced by accused. 
Certainly, liminality operates simultaneously at the individual, group, and society-wide 
levels with various temporal dimensions as well. For the accused of 102 Court, it may 




be argued that they are individuals who have been marginalized and stand outside 
society due to the symptoms they suffer with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. But, 
perhaps it is more accurate to call them a particular social minority group; people who 
hear voices and suffer other psychotic symptoms that will chronically marginalize them 
from the mainstream. There are enduring experiences related to the stigma of serious 
mental health problems, the historic deinstitutionalization that occurred in Canada in the 
1950s and 1960s, the implementation of universal healthcare and the subsequent 
pharmaceuticalization of medicine. There are degrees of liminality (Thomassen, 2009) 
and liminality among the accused is perhaps most acute at the individual level. Despite 
being part of a stigmatized social minority due to both mental health problems and legal 
problems, and the routinized solutions of 102 Court, accused are overwhelmingly 
framed as individuals. There are no formal cohorts of accused in 102 Court but informal 
cohorts may develop when reporting schedules overlap for periods of time. For 
instance, a group of accused may all be asked as individuals and by different social 
workers to report to court every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday for weeks. They all 
come just before 10:00 am, wait in the hall outside the courtroom, and eventually may 
take on the characteristics of a cohort.   
 Using the phenomenological data presented in Chapter Three, the accused 
experienced 102 Court as a threshold and in this regard it related well to van Gennep’s 
middle stage of rites of passage, the transition or liminal stage.  Basic rules of behavior 
are questioned and hierarchies are suspended in the liminal phase (Thomassen, 2009). 
In 102 Court, the adversarial process that defines the criminal justice system is 




suspended, the regular rules of etiquette for courtrooms are relaxed, and one of the 
main goals of the court is to release people from jail as quickly as possible unlike 
regular courts. Liminal periods are characterized by a collapse of order and a loss of 
background structure (Thomassen, 2009). Arrest and imprisonment, uncertainty about 
future outcomes, loss of housing, disruption of personal relationships, and the 
confluence of panoptical medical and legal processes combine to exacerbate disorder 
and undermine the structures of regular life for accused. The leader or master of 
ceremony role might be considered the judge although typically a master is someone 
who has himself been through the liminal phase and therefore guides from experience. 
The reporting rituals are the formal, public, well known procedures that if completed 
properly will lead to a new status. If diversion is successfully completed by accused they 
are said to graduate from the program. This graduation parallels the graduation that 
occurs to mark passage out of liminality into a new status of reintegration. 
 But there is a danger, as Turner recognized, in being caught in permanent 
liminality (Thomassen, 2009), when a person gets stuck in one the three stages of 
rituals (Turner & Turner, 1978). Many accused of 102 Court cycle in and out of trouble 
with the law. They are cyclically on and off medication, adequately and inadequately 
housed, and are often committing the same crimes over and over again. Recall James 
who chronically dined and dashed pub lunches in Toronto. He became stuck in the 
liminal stage of 102 Court and his case illustrates the dangerousness of permanent 
liminality. When it became clear to the authorities of 102 Court, that diversion had not 
changed James’ behavior and that it was very likely he would continue to cycle in and 




out of trouble and the court, James was found not criminally responsible for his actions 
and remanded indefinitely to a psychiatric facility under the auspices of the Ontario 
Review Board. Turner called the permanency of transitional states “the 
institutionalization of liminality” (Turner, 1969, p. 107). Permanent liminality is indeed a 
dangerous state, one that may lead to indefinite detainment in a psychiatric facility in 
response to nuisance crimes. This institutionalized liminality becomes a zone of 
exception (Agamben, 1995) in which an accused becomes invisible to the world.   
 Turner understood that liminality went beyond recognizing the importance of in-
between states and could also help understand psychological sequelae related to those 
experiences (Thomassen, 2009). Thomassen (2009) asserts that in modern societies 
rites are increasingly individual oriented; part of processes of individualization. The 
experiences of the accused of 102 Court offer a counter example where the ubiquitous 
pharmaceuticalization of accused and the routinized processes and language of the 
court homogenize accused as a group. This facilitates the management and specifically 
the surveillance of the accused by the court. The antipsychotic medications 
administered to so many accused have Parkinsonian side effects, replacing the public 
unmedicated symptoms like voice-hearing and associated distractions and talking (often 
visible and disconcerting for observers) with the flattened affect and masked emotions 
associated with Parkinsonism.  
     
 
 




Racial Axis of Structural Violence 
 Comack and Balfour (2004) say that law is more than a set of rules; it is a 
“process that entails gendering, racializing, and classing practices” (Comack & Balfour, 
2004, p. 10). Law is a normative system set up to control events, and I would add 
behaviors, that challenge those norms (Gigeroff, 1969). Farmer and Gastineau (2009) 
argue (as does much of Farmer’s work) for the symbolic centrality of health and listening 
to the sick and abused to uncover the violence at work in people’s lives. However, 
Farmer (1997) warns of the complexities of explaining or even describing extreme 
suffering. Glimpses into the structural and corporeal violence that marks of the lives of 
the accused of 102 Court permeated this study. In this section I will discuss the 
egregious racial disparity observed in 102 Court.  
 Chapter Two offered evidence that there is an over-representation of black men 
in 102 Court. Also, evidence indicated that there are critical outcomes of 102 Court 
processes that differ by race including remand to the Ontario Review Board for indefinite 
detention. Racial disparity in psychiatric diagnosis and disproportionate detention seems 
to indicate a degree of structural racism. However, it is difficult to contextualize these 
findings due to the lack of racial disparity data in Canada related to both the criminal 
justice system and the prevalence of serious mental health problems like schizophrenia. 
The scarcity of evidence (and formal and informal disinterest) pertaining to race 
contributes to the structural violence experienced by 102 Court accused.  
 Conversations with the national black advocacy group, the African Canadian 
Legal Clinic assure me that there is anecdotal information that are regularly presented 




to them, but no dataset exists to their knowledge that documents the rates of black 
people who pass through the criminal justice system. That people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia are regularly found in the courts is common knowledge among 
community social service workers and advocacy groups, evidenced by the regular visits 
of representatives from the Schizophrenia Society of Canada to the Old City Hall 
courthouse. However, every conversation with professionals who deal directly with 
clients with schizophrenia yielded no information about rates of schizophrenia among 
racialized Canadians. A recent paper published in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 
reviewed 229 papers regarding the rates of mental illness among immigrants, refugees, 
ethnocultural, and racialized groups in Canada (Hansson, Tuck, Lurie, & McKenzie, 
2012). They found “very little research on non-immigrant, culturally diverse populations 
in Canada” (Hansson et al., 2012, p. 111).  None of the authors’ review articles focused 
on people suffering with psychosis (Hansson et al., 2012). Only aboriginal peoples 
regularly appear in the literature documenting over-diagnosis of mental illness among 
Canadians. Some research focuses on psychosis among immigrant and refugee 
populations (see for example Seeman, 2010) but this framing of people as immigrants 
focuses the critical lens on the process of movement and relocation and ignores 
questions about racism or othering. It also does not create the space to consider the 
effect of racism on mental health outcomes among racialized Canadians as has been 
recorded elsewhere (Noh, Kaspar, & Wickrama, 2007). Research from the United 
States records an over diagnosis of schizophrenia among African-Americans, 
particularly African-American men (Barnes, 2008; Metzl, 2009). As Hansson et al. 




(2012) concluded, the lack of information about race and mental illness may result in 
less than equitable mental health services for Canadians.  
 A literature review was conducted for race and ethnicity in the Canadian judicial 
system.  Evidence is plentiful from the United States that there are a disproportionate 
number of black men arrested and incarcerated (Alexander, 2010). There is a far 
murkier picture that emerges about Canadian people and the relevant social systems. 
There is an almost complete absence of racial disparity data that relates to black people 
in Canada.  
 There is more research regarding race and the judicial process compared with 
rates of schizophrenia but the picture is far from complete. The Toronto police services 
website acknowledges that they deliberately do not collect or publish racial data except 
for police stop data (Toronto Police Service, 2003). This policy and practice was 
intended as a means to reduce stigma and racism but it confounds attempts to 
contextualize these study results and may actually mask disparities. Some information 
about Toronto police profiling (police stop statistics) is available due the work of 
investigative journalists employed by the Toronto Star newspaper (Rankin & Winsa, 
2012). The profiling is more egregious in some zones than others. For instance, in the 
downtown’s Entertainment District, the ratio of young black men stopped to the resident 
population is 252:1, for young brown males it is 65:1, and for young white males it is 
23:1 (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). Their analysis of police stop data in Toronto between 
2008 and mid-2011 indicated that the number of black and brown males stopped by 
police in each of the city’s patrol zones exceeded the number of young black and brown 




men living in those zones (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). Arrest statistics do not exist for 
Toronto and Canadian incarceration rates are national in scope. Aggregate statistics 
often mask regional differences and I would expect incarceration rates of black men to 
be more concentrated in the large cities in which the majority of black Canadians reside: 
Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa account for 70% of the black Canadian population 
(Mensah, 2010). National statistics reveal there is an overrepresentation of black men in 
the prisons which is not as egregious as the situation faced by aboriginal men, but still 
of concern.    
 Certainly a limitation of the observational data collected in this study is that racial 
identity is not self-reported. Access to people being held in prison was outside the scope 
of this research and ethics approval because incarcerated people are considered 
vulnerable populations. Practically, there was no way to speak to accused held in 
custody to ask them how they would consider their racial identity. For that matter, given 
the numbers of people who report to the court out-of-custody, it was also impractical to 
interview them all as they report in rapid-fire sequence at 10:00 am. The point of entry 
into the criminal justice system is police arrest, which is often based on racial profiling. 
Therefore, observational data may more accurately simulate systemic prejudice than 
self-report. Recall that my investigation into race and gender began with the observation 
that there seemed to be a disproportionately high number of older white women and 
young black men in 102 Court as accused.  
 Due to the observational methodology, it was impossible to distinguish aboriginal 
accused from either white or other visible minority accused. Toronto’s mental health 




court may or may not have had aboriginal accused passing through it. The presence of 
an aboriginal specialty court in the same building may have reduced the numbers of 
aboriginal accused observed in 102 Court. But working aboriginal peoples into future 
research designs would be an important clarification.  
 
Bio-power and pharmaceutical subjectivity 
 The final two critical issues that emerged from this research are the possibilities 
of involuntary pharmaceuticalization and indefinite psychiatric detention and the 
authoritative and de-politicized discourses that mask coercion. MacDonald, Hucker, and 
Hebert (2010) argue that the court system does what it can, but that it cannot determine 
best placement for the mentally ill nor can it address clinical needs.  And yet 102 Court 
attempts to do just that. Justice Richard Schneider, writing about the establishment of 
102 Court, specifies the deliberate attempt to direct disordered accused away from the 
legal system and back to the medical system where they properly belong (Schneider et 
al., 2007). The law medicalizes legal practices and transforms subjects from legal 
subjects to medico-legal subjects. The therapeutic jurisprudence that underlies 102 
Court is premised, in part, on the notion that seriously mentally ill accused are before 
the courts due to illness. This approach, looking upstream for non-criminological causes 
is laudable. However, the cornerstone solution is pharmaceuticalization that helps 
some, is neutral or tolerable to some, and forecloses possibilities for others. The 
phenomenological data presented in Chapter Three gathered from Big Al and Brian are 
two examples of success stories that had different relationships with pharmaceutical 




interventions. For Big Al, antipsychotic medications helped him through the worst times 
with his symptoms. It did not eliminate his voices, but helped him to tolerate them. But 
for Brian, the side effects were intolerable so he discontinued his medications, thereby 
threatening his successful diversion and forcing him to hide his non-compliance from 
physicians and social workers.  
 This reliance on pharmaceutical solutions mediated by the legal system is a 
perfect suturing of the once de-coupled anatomo-politics and bio-politics that 
accompanied deinstitutionalization. There are both disciplinary and regulatory 
techniques that overlap in 102 Court processes. Psychiatric treatment becomes 
involuntary, and the consequences of non-compliance legal. Psychiatrists and other 
health care workers become part of the mechanism of surveillance, mandated to report 
non-compliance. Accused are forced to present health care workers with synopses of 
criminal allegations. This disrupts the patient-provider relationship, when accused are 
fully aware that practitioners are part of the legal system as much as a psychiatric 
system. As arbiters of the norm, forensic psychiatric assessments and the mandatory 
compliance to their prescriptions authorized by the judge makes pharmaceuticalization a 
technique for ordering disordered individual bodies and the processes through which a 
problematic population of mentally ill accused may be managed.  
 Pharmaceutical compliance becomes a mechanism for incorporation (or re-
incorporation) of marginalized seriously mentally ill accused into society in multiple 
ways. The symptoms of psychosis that render sufferers as “other”, outside the perimeter 
of social normalcy may, for some, be lessened, bringing the accused closer to “passing” 




for normal despite lingering sentiments of isolation and persistent (if tamed) symptoms. 
Foucault calls this otherness “dividing practices” and offers three examples: the mad 
and the sane, the sick and the healthy, and the criminals and the good boys (Foucault, 
1982, p. 777). The accused of 102 Court are divided from others in all three of these 
ways. It is the accumulation of dividing practices in this population that really poses a 
problem for governance. Their compliance with pharmaceutical treatment while in 
diversion helps accused avoid the legal slippery slope that may result in long-term 
detainment in a psychiatric facility. It may help break a cycle of recidivism and mounting 
criminal charges that threatens the freedom of accused despite the relatively minor 
nature of their legal transgressions. Foucault contends that the goal of discipline and 
punishment in the modern era is the production and management of useful, efficient 
bodies (Foucault, 1977). But there is no expectation that 102 Court accused will ever be 
useful and efficient. I argue that the therapeutic jurisprudence (as it is operationalized in 
102 Court) is more of a regulatory technique, where inefficient bodies are rendered 
“normal”, and thus easily manageable. Compliance with pharmaceuticals becomes both 
the disciplinary technology and the regulatory technology.         
 One of the effects of 102 Court is the production of pharmaceutical subjects. 
Jenkins (2010) argued that the pharmaceutical self is amplified in the case of 
schizophrenia. Here, I argue that the pharmaceutical self is amplified even further when 
a person suffering psychosis becomes a medico-legal subject. Discourse about illness 
and medication contributes to the creation of pharmaceutical subjectivities for Jenkins 
(2010). But in criminal justice systems including 102 Court, the ubiquity and power of 




routinized and legalistic discourse amplifies this effect. The accused of 102 Court 
engage the pharmaceutical self through the experience of taking antipsychotic 
medications, they engage the pharmaceutical imaginary when they interact with the 
institutional dimension of treatment (Jenkins, 2010). However, 102 Court adds additional 
layers of surveillance, a wider array of authorities, and additional institutional arenas of 
contact. Jenkins (2010) after Foucault (1976) asserted that, “the increasing 
medicalization of mental illness is the spread of a form of diffused governance that 
produces rational and technical categories and practices that vitiate the moral and 
political meaning of subjective complaints and protests” (Jenkins, 2010, p. 3), a state 
response to a perceived crisis (namely the deinstitutionalization and criminalization of 
the seriously mentally ill). Certainly this is consistent with work by Metzl (2009) about 
the political and historical deployment of the psychiatric category of schizophrenia in 
response to race protests in the United States (Metzl, 2009). The findings presented in 
Chapters Two and Three have little to do with subjective complaints or protests, but they 
do serve a purpose. Seriously mentally ill people are often unseen by the world. They 
live precarious lives on the edge of society, many are homeless, they are frequently 
marginalized economically, socially, psychically, and politically. Whether engaged with 
medical care or legal issues, seriously mentally ill people challenge efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, which have become the hallmarks of modern, capitalist systems of 
governance. They are, as one accused father called them, the “unwanted”. So the 
processes of 102 Court may be considered a diffuse form of governance that produces 
rational and technical categories that make seriously mentally ill people invisible again. 




The ideal resolution includes securing their freedom (at the cost of pharmaceutical 
compliance) to maintain invisibility and fits well within a decades long Canadian vision of 
a “just society”76 but is perhaps more appropriately consistent with Foucault’s 
“normalizing society”, the historical outcome of technologies of power centered on life, 
such as bio-power (Foucault, 1976). But if the conditions of diversion are unable to be 
satisfied and cycling through the mental health court occurs, accused may either be 
shunted back to the regular system or detained in psychiatric facilities indefinitely.  But 
by either route, they become invisible to society again. Biehl has claimed that psycho-
pharmaceuticals “mediate abandonment” through the scientific truth value” and the 
physiological effects of drugs (Biehl, 2010, p. 95). In 102 Court, psycho-pharmaceuticals 
mediate invisibility and conformity.  
 The truth discourses deployed by authorities associated with 102 Court also 
mediate rationality. One of the contradictions that pervade the subjectivation processes 
of the court is the inconsistency of accused’s rationality as they proceed through the 
system. The irrationality and rationality of people who pass through 102 Court as 
disordered accused are strategically ascribed by authority figures such as lawyers, 
judges, forensic psychiatrists, and the social workers who work as part of the court 
team. I was cautioned by a judge and a forensic psychiatrist that it would be useless to 
interview or speak with accused because they are “completely irrational”. When 
accused appeared in 102 Court in custody and scream out allegations of abuse suffered 
at the hands of court officers, police officers, or corrections officers, their cries are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The idea of a “Just Society” as a vision for Canada was used repeatedly by former 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and has since become part of a national imaginary.  




largely ignored due to ascribed irrationality. Yet there are several aspects of their 
participation in diversion that hinge on the rationality of accused. For instance, the 
voluntary decision to participate in diversion of 102 Court is framed as a rational choice 
informed by their counsel’s explanation of responsibilities and outcomes associated with 
that choice. This expectation of rationality continues through the processes of diversion 
such as scheduling appointments for reporting to court and with community-based 
service providers. The penalties for breaching conditions of bail (i.e. further criminal 
charges) imply that breach of bail occurred with complete rationality. Ironically, many 
alleged crimes are presented as rational within a delusional framework. For instance, a 
man appeared in-custody in 102 Court accused of assaulting a woman and her young 
son on a city street. The mother and child were walking on a sidewalk, behind the 
accused and in the same direction. With a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, defense 
argued that his client believed the pair were stalking him, he became increasingly 
fearful, and finally turned around, confronted them, and defended himself from this 
imaginary aggression by hitting them. The judge who heard this argument agreed that 
this was a rational response given the delusional and paranoid nature of his diagnosis. 
This strategic ascribed rationality is one aspect of the structural violence faced by 
accused. Their (ir)rationality becomes a strategy of silencing them and of holding them 
accountable for their own legal issues while creating a space where professionals do 
not need to address accountability regarding their clients77.  
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counselors who enjoy working with mentally ill clients due to lack of accountability that is 
possible with uncritical clients or clients that are in effect, voiceless.  





Future Directions for Research 
Social workers and social justice advocates are implicated in many of the 
processes and outcomes of 102 Court and all mental health courts regardless of 
structural organization. This dissertation research opens several avenues for future 
research, both qualitative and mixed methods and in both Canada and the United 
States.  
The experiences of successful graduates of mental health courts beg the 
question of what happens to these successful graduates over a longer period of time. It 
also raises the question of how the experiences of successful graduates compare over 
an extended period of time with accused who fail to graduate or who opt to have their 
cases heard in the regular stream of justice. Also, some mental health courts have 
cohorts or peer mentors, two internal support mechanisms that may altar both outcomes 
and experiences among accused. These are some of the comparative and long-term 
research questions that emerge from this work. 
 Research regarding racial and gender disparities within the Canadian criminal 
justice system and the mental health care system is urgently needed. Large criminal 
justice and healthcare databases exist in Ontario, and Canada more generally, but 
access is restricted. It is possible to request the information although the process is 
often prolonged. However, quantitative analysis of population wide data about the 
demographic characteristics of who is prescribed antipsychotic medication is, at least 




theoretically, possible78. Given the specificity of certain medications, such as lithium, to 
treat diagnosed bipolar disorder, this approach may prove valuable. Similarly, data from 
the criminal justice system is also available upon request.  Recently a report emerged in 
Canada regarding the soaring number of aboriginals in Canada’s prisons (Sapers, 
2012). The research, however, was conducted by the Office of the National Investigator, 
a federal government agency that had access to records that may not have been 
available to an outside researcher. Their research was reported widely in the Canadian 
media in the spring of 2013 with little discussion about disparities among other 
racialized groups in prison. There is little foundational work about prevalence rates of 
serious mental health problems and arrest and incarceration rates by race that could 
serve as the basis for asking more subtle questions about specialized courts in 
Canada79. For instance, how do specialty courts work together? By this I mean there 
are locations, including the courthouse in Toronto in which I conducted this research 
where Gladue (a.k.a. aboriginal) court, drug court, and mental health court all operate 
with overlapping populations of accused. How are decisions taken by Crown attorneys 
and defense lawyers to determine who appeals to which court? It is entirely possible to 
have an aboriginal person suffering from a psychotic disorder and addicted to drugs. 
Are graduation rates from diversion programs variable by race and gender? Certainly 
the administrative judge of 102 Court would welcome an evaluation of the court.  
 I heard numerous expressions of concern about the Ontario Review Board [ORB] 
processes and as a site of discrimination. Review board hearings are, like 102 Court, 
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open to the public although rarely attended. A brief ethnography of the ORB might 
reveal disparity and provide the evidence on which to base a broader study of the 
system of indefinite detention.  Again, there may be a way to leverage the large 
provincial health datasets to explore who is detained in psychiatric facilities, with which 
diagnoses and for what length of time.  
 Much of my future research will be conducted in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex 
of the United States, an excellent location to conduct research given the extensive 
network of specialty courts and associated judicial and medical facilities. There are 13 
specialty courts that operate in the metroplex. I plan to replicate the phenomenological 
part of this dissertation among accused who have passed through those courts and to 
establish a long-term protocol for tracking graduates. The Dallas-Fort Worth courts work 
with social services practitioners who serve these populations. Some research has been 
(and is being conducted) with these courts, so more is known of the demographics of 
accused and racial disparity in graduation rates and the courts are in contact with social 
work researchers. For instance, John Gallagher explored racial disparities in a Dallas 
area drug court for his dissertation and found that African American accused had lower 
rates of graduation than Caucasian and Hispanic counterparts (John Gallagher, 
personal communication, October 2012).  Ethnography of the courtrooms would 
augment work done by Dr. Gallagher whose insights included that courtroom practices 
negatively impacted African Americans proceeding through the drug court, but he did 
not include actual research in the courtroom (John Gallagher, personal communication, 
October 2012). Also, I hope to establish a long-term qualitative study that explores 




experience of the justice system, mental health care services, and recidivism among 
mental health court graduates compared with accused who were eligible for mental 
health court but chose the regular stream. The coordinated assessment units that serve 
the Dallas specialty courts would be an excellent location to explore decision-making 
processes that impact court demographics, processes, and outcomes.  
There are several implications for social work practice that emerge from this 
work. First, understanding the experiences of the accused within mental health courts is 
an important component of practice, but practitioners in these settings are, as this 
research indicated, part of the system and may not be able to accurately collect 
feedback from their own clients, creating an opportunity for an independent researcher 
to mediate. Social work that utilizes a Foucauldian lens to reflect on practice is not 
unknown (see Chambon, Irving, & Epstein, 1999) but to my knowledge has never been 
applied to social workers associated with specialty courts.  Finally, most of the social 
workers associated with 102 Court indicated how under-prepared they were for their 
positions. Forensic social work practice and pedagogical assessments are indicated 
and I have begun to speak with other qualitative and mixed methods researchers who 
work in mental health courts to pool data and draw comparisons crucial to practice in a 
comparative manner. Specific to the Toronto setting is a concern regarding the lack of 
attention to racial disparities and to matters of cultural influence and variation that might 
impact outcomes. While practitioners are directly implicated with these concerns, the 
target for future research would be provincial government policy makers who decide 




which data variables to include and which to omit and who make the data they do 
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